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INTRODUCTION
A case study on the formation of the Republic of 
Cyprus must necessarily be an investigation of precedent and 
contemporary forces which have interacted to produce this 
one solution to a modern colonial problem. The Cyprus con­
flict was initiated primarily in Great Britain's need for 
strategic bases in the Eastern Mediterranean as it was coun­
tered by an aggrieved need of the Cypriots for self-determina­
tion. The struggle appears to have its origin both in the 
eighty-two years of British occupation, as well as in the 
composition of the Cypriot mentality, which is an ancient 
legacy. The inter-relation of these two forces is most 
profitably evaluated by examining formative eras, since 
events such as independence or self-determination do not 
occur in isolation. Hence, a single-case study must be 
placed in its historical perspective before one can unlock 
its real meaning and impact for the world generally.
Since the story of Cyprus is one that has its 
birth far back in the past, the intricacies of its develop­
ment are often unknown to students of international affairs. 
The purpose of this work will be an attempt to establish 
the proper place of the Cyprus issue in the course of world
1
2politics, as well as to try and show its importance in the 
continuum of related social processes. The struggle for 
enosis (union with Greece), and the reactions to this move­
ment by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey are also essential 
facets of the study. The creation of the Republic of Cyprus 
resolved all the major issues and marked the disposition of 
the last vestige of colonialism in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Of equal importance is the possibility that the Cypr*us set­
tlement might have created a prototype applicable in solving 
similar territorial disputes. The Cyprus prototype, viz., 
securing minimum size sovereign base areas, while simultane­
ously granting independence to the remainder of the territory, 
was found to be a unique but workable alternative to the 
tensions that characterized the island in the three years 
before the 1959 London Agreements were signed by Great 
Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Republic was to be created 
by the target date one year later, but it actually never 
was granted formal independence until August l6 , I960.
It was significant that the London Agreements not only 
ostensibly ended colonialism in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
but also repaired the threatened harmony in the eastern 
flank of NATO, the western world's security system.
The key to the Cyprus settlement was the meet­
ing in January, 1959. between the Greek Prime Minister, 
Karamanlis, and the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, in 
the peaceful country of Switzerland. These two leaders.
3great rivals under the most favorable circumstances, resolved 
finally their differences and thus ended the bloody guerilla 
action for control of the island of Cyprus. This bi-lateral 
accord known as the Zurich Agreement, was the first time the 
Greeks and the Turks were ever en rapport concerning Cyprus. 
The Agreement was immediately presented in London, where . 
®reat Britain's Cabinet concurred eight days later. The 
leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus could 
do little but go along with the "powers" as a formality, 
and the London Agreements were then consummated. The Bri­
tish, Greek, and Turkish parliaments added their respective 
endorsements before any of the signatories could express 
any reluctance. As a last step, the Tripartite declarations 
and documents of February 19, 1959, were published in an 
official British White Paper, and thereupon became "the 
agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem 
of Cyprus."
The Cyprus prototype was devised because the pro­
cedures involved in administering in the island permitted 
an effective separation of British military considerations 
from domestic Cypriot affairs. Consequently, Great Britain 
was able to delineate two coastal enclaves as "Sovereign 
Base Areas" in perpetuity and have the agreement formalized 
in the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic 
of Cyprus. Application of the prototype was found to be of 
limited use in other areas appearing to have similar colonial
4syndromes. Caution should first be adhered to in attempts 
to superimpose the Cyprus framework over other situations.
It would indeed be rare to find completely analogous condi­
tions elsewhere as existed in Cyprus, Cyprus was at a 
sufficient level of socio-cultural development to allow a 
system of self-government in a political setting virtually 
uninhibited by the functioning of the two British bases.
The prototype could not be utilized, for example, to end 
the American occupation of the Ryukyu Islands and the reasons 
are analyzed in the final chapter. Still, the settlement of 
certain other colonial conflict areas, especially in the 
Mediterranean, might lend themselves in part to the Cyprus 
prototype.
As an admonition, it should be remembered that 
emerging nations jealously guard every bit of newly won 
sovereignty and the existence of foreign bases in any form 
often may not be tolerated. The crucial lesson in the 
entire study of the fledgling Republic of Cyprus is that 
few strategic territorial problems are so complex that they 
defy resolution, provided that goodwill, empathy, and diplo­
macy are employed in the combined light of past history and 
current social forces.
The detailed study of the Cyprus problem is one 
that is filled with valid as well as specious legal argu­
ments, logical as well as baseless deductions, and rational
5as well as emotional pleas. When one is working with such 
a variety of sources and materials, it is difficult to avoid 
bias to some extent. Nebulous aspects of nationalism must 
be pitted against the sounder realities of colonialism in 
the treatment of the Cyprus question. The resulting anta­
gonism was treated as objectively as possible, but here 
again the latent value judgments of the author might inad­
vertently slip into the final analysis. Nonetheless, the 
author practiced conscientious restraint throughout in an 
effort to avoid making conclusions before sufficient evi­
dence had been presented.
CYPRUS s A POSSIBLE PROTOTYPE FOR TERMINATING THE COLONIAL 
STATUS OF A STRATEGICALLY LOCATED TERRITORY
CHAPTER I
CYPRUS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1878-1951
The name of Cyprus, along with scores of other vir­
tually unknown or hitherto forgotten geographical areas, has 
helped to make headline news in the post-war wave of nation­
alism and the emergence of former colonies as nation-states. 
The already dynamic arena of foreign affairs is enhanced in 
the public eye by typical journalistic penchants for empha­
sis on the fanfare, chaos, or misgivings which often accom­
pany the entry of a newly sovereign nation into the world 
community. While this embellished treatment of an event 
long in gestation may certainly fire the imagination of the 
casual observer of international relations, it contributes 
little to the critical mind of a serious student. In fact, 
throughout the fanciful musing, which usually results from 
a distant country's splash of notoriety, there can often be 
detected a pathetic bewilderment on the part of the naive— - 
as well as many of the alert--students of global problems. 
The explanation is the same in both cases, namely, a lack
6
7of awareness as to the specific historic development which 
had led up to a particular culmination--this last phase being 
only what the news media havechosen to report. The result 
of this absence of sophistication and lack of depth prevents 
insight necessary for a scholarly evaluation. Therefore, 
contemporary problems must be placed in their historic set­
ting in order to discover the meaning and message these pro­
blems have for the world in general.
Indeed with the independence struggle of Cyprus, 
as with most current events, it can be shown that the roots 
of the crisis are traceable far back into history. This 
is especially true of studies in nationalism, which should 
be considered in the light of their long, colorful, and 
occasionally shameful pasts. With such a background, on© 
can begin to understand why conflict is generally inherent 
in nationalistic movements and why the attempted resolutions 
of these conflicts are fraught with disappointments. More­
over, history helps one to begin to understand such impor­
tant contemporary concepts as social structure, factionalism, 
national myths, loyalties, attitudes, and resulting behav­
ioral patterns, which heretofore were simply described but 
never explained. This broad and deep analysis is parti­
cularly crucial with nations that have never known any sort 
of autonomy in their recent histories, yet have still been 
forced to embark on the hazardous transition from traditional
1
society to twentieth-century nationhood. Here the story 
of classical imperialism can help make vivid the Indelible 
heritage which has shaped the destinies of nations that did 
not exist before World War II.
Therefore the importance of a thorough and sysxs- 
matic treatment of the political developments of an emer­
gent nation cannot be minimized. Of the many fledgling 
states in the present world community which should first be 
studied by the historical method, as a preface to more pene­
trating analyses, the case of the Republic of Cyprus is for 
numerous reasons an excellent example.
Ancient Cyprus
Archaeologists have determined that the island of 
Cyprus was occupied in the Neolithic Period by human in­
habitants who were skilled in the use of the characteristic 
flint, bone, and stone implements of that age. The knowledge 
of life during that period was a comparatively recent dis­
covery of a Swedish expedition in the 1930’s and consequently
caused a regeneration of interest in Cyprus as a key to life
2as it existed in the fourth millennium B.C. Therefore,chro-
^It is purely a relative matter as to what "recent" 
history must constitute. For the purposes at hand, the ad­
jective refers only to the last sixty years which would rule 
out the nearly three hundred years of independence which 
Cyprus knew under the Lusignans, 1192-1489, A.D., or at other 
brief periods in its early history.
2
Major Gordon Home, Cyprus Then and Now, London:
J. M. Dent, i960, pp. 13-16. This is the most current ac­
count of the history of Cyprus, but mention should also be
9nologies of Cyprus written in the 19th. Century generally 
date life back only to the Bronze Age and agree that recor­
ded history began with the Mycenean culture (15OO-12OO B.C.) 
Those ancient records mad© it apparent that Cyprus had con­
tinually been sought as a prize by imperialists of the day 
and the first conquest cam© after an invasion by Egyptian 
seafarers under the leadership of Thutmoss The pat­
tern of future events for Cyprus was thus established over 
three thousand years ago, and since that time Cyprus has ' v. 
ruled, inter alia, by Phoenicians, Persians, Macedonians, 
Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Crusader Kings, Venetians, 
Ottoman Turks, and finally the British.^
The remnants of each successive invader can be 
seen tangibly in the ruins on the island, but more Impor­
tant are the intangible qualities which have contributed to 
the complex mosaic that characterizes ths temperament of the 
modern Cypriot. The resulting congeries t«nds to make the 
native-born Cypriot a rara avis, and hence seems to belie 
the claims that Cyprus should belong to any one country or
made of the monumental four volume work of Sir George Hill, 
The History of Cyprus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1952), as well as Stanley Casson, Ancient Cyprus,
Its Art and Archaeology, (London; Methuen & Co., 1937).
^This was the fifth king of the XVIII dynasty of 
ancient Egypt and the date is given as circa l4?9 B.C., which 
was the zenith of the New Empire of Egypt over the entire 
Eastern Mediterranean. Casson, Ibid.
k ,
The Middle East, 1959, ?th Ed., (London: Europa
Publications Ltd., I960), p. o3■
10
another. The present state of independence may have more 
lasting importance in allowing the unique Cypriot identity 
the chance to emerge, but this is a subject to be treated 
by the historians of the futur®. It is of more relevance 
to this study to look at the various eras of importance 
which Cyprus has held in the history of the Eastern Medi­
terranean, and thus determine why the island has always 
found itself in the strategic and vital place which it still 
maintains today.
A British writer in the latter part of the 19th
Century made this concise summary of the place of Cyprus
in history; ^
A race advancing on the East must start with Cyprus. 
Alexander, Augustus, Richard, and Saint Louis took 
that line. A race advancing on the West must start 
with Cyprus. Sargon, Ptolemy, Cyrus, and Haroun- 
al-Rashid took this line. When Egypt and Syria were 
of first-rats value to the West, Cyprus was of first- 
rate valus to the West. Genoa a?fid Venice, struggling 
for the trade of India, fought for Cyprus and enjoyed, 
supremacy in that land by turns. A'ter a new route 
by sea was found to India,- Egypt and Syria declined 
in value to the Western Nations. Cyprus was then _ 
forgotten; but the opening of the Suez Canal /l869/ 
has suddenly restored her to her ancient place of 
pride.5
Surprisingly enough, the seventy years which have lapsed 
between the writing of that account and the present day ha/ve 
done little to alter its veracity as to the role of Cyprus 
in Mediterranean politics..
^W. Hepworth Dixon, British Cyprus, (London; 1887), 
quoted In Lawrence Burrell, Bitter Lemons, (New York: Dut­
ton, 1957), p. 11.
11
Various epochs of history in the island of Cyprus 
are fascinating studies in themselves. The Ptolemaic Per­
iod lasted approximately two hundred, and fifty years, during 
which time the self-styled "Kings of Egypt and Cyprus" grew 
even more opulent from the wanton exploitation of the raw 
materials in the island.^ This phase of Cypriot history 
ended when the island was incorporated into the Roman Empire 
circa 58 B.C. The story of the Roman Period corresponds to
7
chapters out of the Bible. The proselyt.ism of Paul and.
the martyrdom of Barnabas are to the Christian synonymous
with the name of Cyprus. The Byzantine Period, dating from
the 5th Century A.D., marks the beginning of the Christian
era in the island and the establishment of the Orthodox
Christian Church in Cyp;rus--a branch completely independent
of the Orthodox Eastern (Greek) Patriarch, as well as the
8Roman Catholic Pope. The eight cenîur.lss wh.i.:h are encom­
passed in the Byzantine Period were higi.vlightsd. by back and 
forth struggles between the Cypriot Christians and the Moslem
*^ Hom®, op. cit., pp. 26-31-
7
See in particular Acts of the Apostles and Romans,
passim.
g
The Church, of Cyprus became autonomous at the Coun­
cil of Ephesus in À31 A.D. and was justified on the grounds 
that the original text of Matthew was discovered in the is­
land. It should be noted that the Orthodox Church comprises 
seven autocephalous branches, which correspond to the tradi­
tional patriotic church of the particular nation, and are 
held together in a vague sort of confederation today. See 
Donald Attwater, The Christian Churches of the East, (Oxford: 
Blackfriars Pubs., 19^7)■ Also note; Franz Von Loher, Cy­
prus : Historical and Descriptive, New York: Worthington
1878, pp. 235-243.
12
"infidels" who invaded periodically from the Syrian coast 
fifty miles to the east-— these events presaged the series 
of Crusades which were to follow between the 11th and l4th 
centuries, when the European Christians originally attempted 
to wrest the Holy Land from Islam, but ultimately succeeded 
in the greater purpose of familiarizing the Occident with 
the culture of the then more advanced Ori @nt.
Cyprus During the Crusades 
It was the third of the great Crusades that was 
to leave a telling effect on the future of Cyprus. Richard 
I of England made history with his shrewd maneuvering against 
the Moslem chief, Saladin, and the island of Cyprus played 
a crucial role in his overall strategy. Gordon Home des­
cribes the fortuitous circumstances around Richard and 
Cyprus in this way:;
It was by accident of a storm in the year 1191 that 
finally terminated the Byzantine control of Cyprus and 
gave birth to the line of Lusignan kings who ruled 
in the island for close on three centuries. The tem­
pest also brought about the first contact of England 
with Cyprus when Richard Coeur-de-Lion took posses­
sion of the island by force of arms -and held it 
tentatively for a y e a r .9
Richard had no intention of seizing the island as a part of
his religious mission and proved it by selling his newly
acquired territorial booty to the Knights Templars as soon
as was feasible. When an indigenous uprising threatened the
^Home, op. cit., p. 43,
^  13
Templars' control of the island, Richard took back Cyprus, 
upon the invitation of the Templars, in a proposed exchange 
for the original sum paid. Possibly this was to set a pre­
cedent for the English attitude regarding fiscal matters 
and Cyprus, for Richard unscrupulously resold the island to 
a consortium headed by Guy de Lusign.an, a former king of 
Jerusalem. As for the Templars, "one can almost hear his 
laughter when the question of his returning the cash was 
r a i s e d T h i s  act may have resulted in ostensibly nothing 
more than establishing the Lusignan dynasty. Still it was 
curiosly similar to the policy of the English rulers who 
were to reacquire Cyprus seven hundred years later by an 
equally devious means and then were to administer the pro­
fits from the island in ein equally unprincipled method, 
viz.,the Cyprus Tribute, infra.
The Lusignan Period lasted almost three hundred 
years and is noteworthy as the longest luabroken span that; 
Cyprus had been an. Independent entity. Cyprus flourished 
commercially under the rule of this European dynasty, des­
pite the fact that the autonomous Orthodox bishops were for-
11ced to swear fealty to the Latin Hirearchy. The Lusignans 
withstood nearly two hundred years of continual seige by 
Mameluke sultans, Ottoman janissaries, Genoese marauders,
^^Ibid., p. $4.
^^Hill, op. cit.. Vol. II.
l4
amd Venetian infiltrators; however, the latter part of the 
l4th Century heralded the decline of the proud little prin­
cipality. At the height of the House of Lusignan's power, 
the kingdom, in association with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, 
established and maintained the most effective containment 
policy against the swelling tide of s 1 am in the post- 
Crusade era. Cyprus even joined the Venetians at one in­
stance in a naval campaign against th* Asia Minor coast and
12succeeded in capturing Smyrna from the Ottoman Turks. Yet 
the strategic value of the island could not be overlooked, 
even by the Christian nations which had designs on the 
Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus one© again could not escape 
attack, this time by the Genoese.
Kidnap and ransom seemed to be one of the most 
efficacious weapons short of war in this medieval period, 
and Cyprus, as a direct result, found itself in the embar­
rassing position of paying tribute to both Genoa and the 
Mamelukes in Egypt. In fact, the entire city of Famagusta 
was ceded to Genoa in 137^ as security for an indemnity to 
be paid in return for the release of King Peter IX, whom the 
Genoese had captured earlier. The situation so degenerated 
after years of successive forays by the grasping nations on 
its periphery, that the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus was for­
ced to turn to Venice to save itself from being divided and
12
Alastos, Doros, Cyprus in History, (London: Zeno 
Publishers, 1955). P- 152.
15
conquered. By virtue of a convenient marriage, the royal
13families of Cyprus and Venice were joined. While this 
tactic served to preserve the territorial integrity of the 
island against the Turks, it concomitantly brought about the 
end of the Lusignan dynasty when Cyprus was finally annexed 
by Venice in l489-
The status of a sovereign Cyprus was thus to be 
interred for a period of nearly five hundred years, and the 
heritage of independence was all but unknown to the condi­
tioned Cypriot mind when the decision was made in 1959 that 
Cyprus should once again be free. Whether a strong tradi­
tion of sovereignty is a prime requisite to the successful 
self-governance of a modern nation will be decided as the 
futures of the emergent former colonies are recorded. In 
this respect, Cyprus can claim little more than some of the 
most primitive Afro-Asian countries which have also been 
recently placed on the precarious pathway of freedom.
The Pre-British Period 
The final three hundred years before the British 
occupation of Cyprus is separated into two distinct eras-- 
the Venetian and the Ottoman. The Venetian rule survived
13Alastos, op. cit., p. 170.
14Cyprus does not fit into the composite picture of 
the typical emergent nation, e.g. Vera Micheles Dean's peri­
patetic "Bandungia." The institutions of 20th Century Cyprus 
are decidedly "different from those it had four or five cen­
turies before." V. M. Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western 
World (New York: Mentor Booksl 195?)> PP• l4-l6.
lé
almost a century of Turkish assaults before it yielded to 
the powerful Ottoman Imperial armies. The Venetian rule 
was most oppressive and marked the beginning of a decadence, 
that was magnified under the Turks, and not arrested until 
the British assumed the administration of Cyprus. While 
the historians of Cyprus will remember the Venetians for 
their virtual enslavement of the Cypriots,the more liter- 
ary types will recall that the plot of Shakespere's Othello 
centered around Cyprus during the Venetian period. Whether 
the dark-skinned protagonist in the great drama was actually 
one of the Venetian governors of the island is a matter 
still disputed among experts. Nevertheless, the port city 
of Famagusta today is extremely proud of a citadel in its 
harbor named "Othello's Tower" and the matter of historic 
authenticity is a closed matter there.
15Alastos, op. cit., p. 206.
^^Home, op■ cit., pp. 70, 130. Literature has fur­
nished many insights to life in certain eras which the his­
torians tend to overlook. For that reason, a reading of the 
Shakesperean classic will provide an emotional picture of 
Cyprus under the Venetians' rule. It should also be noted, 
that the Bard of Avon was not the only author to immortalize 
Cyprus. Besides the mentions in the Bible, the legends of 
Homer attribute Cyprus as the birthplace of Aphrodite, as 
well as the site of the mythical king Pygmalion's making the 
statute, Galetea, come to life. These romantic traditions 
are reflected in the current fiction, about Cyprus, as well 
as in the indigenous writings. The idyllic, pastoral out­
looks of the past have permeated the attitudes of the pre­
sent-day Cypriot, and these illusions persist despite the 
fact that the independent Republic of Cyprus has been immer­
sed into the modern world of Realpolitik. (See, for example 
Sir Harry Luke, Cyprus; A Portrait and An Appreciation,
(New York; Roy Publishers, 1957)•
17
The defeat of the Venetians by the Ottoman Turks 
in 1571 was looked upon by the native populacej paradoxically, 
as an emancipation of sorts. The Turkish victory in Cyprus 
directly ensued from the decision of the rulers in Venice 
to concentrate their forces with the navy of the Holy 
League (composed mainly of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian ships) 
in the epochal battle of Lepanto, which culminated in the 
defeat of the Ottoman navy and averted for all time the 
threat of Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean. Venice, 
however, had sustained such severe losses in the campaign
that it never tried by force to recapture Cyprus. In many
respects, however, the Christian inhabitants were to fare 
much better in the next two hundred years under the Moslem 
rulers of Cyprus, than they had under their Roman Catholic 
captors. The Battle of Lepanto, therefore, was just as cru­
cial to the future of Cyprus as it was to the future of the
Western Mediterranean, and that of Europe as well.
It was in the period of Moslem domination that 
the Cypriots had the opportunity to develop their intense 
-ethnocentricism and identification with the Greek mainland. 
This budding nationalism was caused in part by the Greek 
independence struggle, during the 1820's, but more by the 
brutal reprisals the Turks inflicted on the Greeks in 
Cyprus. The waning years of Turkish rule in Cyprus were 
bleamished by a wanton slaughter of Greek Christians, in an
18
effort to discourage Cypriot participation in the Greek
revolt. An sincient Cypriot historian summed up the order
of the Sultan, sent to his pasha in Cyprus at that time,
as simply "to kill as many of the Christians as he thought 
17worth killing." The public execution of high Cypriot
Greeks, along with many of the peasant class, caused so
much disgust that legations from Western European nations
freely opened consulate doors to fugitives, but these
18humanitarian acts saved relatively few.
Possibly^ the most significemt development in 
Cyprus under the three centuries of Ottoman suzerainty 
was the liquidation of the Latin Church and the restoration 
of the independent Orthodox Archbishopric. This event occur­
red in 1575 and marked the end of almost four hundred years 
under the Roman See. This major concession of the Turks 
was matched only by the subsequent abolition of serfdom in 
Cyprus, and both of these can be looked upon as rewards to 
the peasants for the help they gave the Turks during the
17Spyridon Triooupi, History of the Greek Revolu­
tion, translated from the Greek by Gotham in Excerpta Cypria, 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1902), pp. 465-66, quoted in Home, 
op. cit., p. 96.
18It may be noted that the British based later 
demands for Ottoman reforms of administration in predomin­
ately Christian territories on the inhuman treatment meted 
out in Cyprus, especially during the Greek revolution. In 
the Cyprus Convention, such negotiations were an integral 
part of the British position.
19
invasion. The landless class had been deprived and discon­
tented under the two prior regimes (the Lusignans and the 
Venetians), and had the Cypriot peasants not supported the 
Turks when they did, the course of. history could well have 
been altered. Successive years of steady degeneration in 
the Ottoman administration of the island may have made the 
Cypriots regret their fateful decision to help the Turks.
Yet the fact still remains today that the Church commands 
such an important position in Cypriot life and politics 
because of the many years it has enjoyed a free hand in 
domestic religious matters. While Cyprus has ostensibly 
been under alien domination for centuries, it has always
been "in fact governed by the Greek Archibishop and his
19subordinate clergy." Such was the case up till indepen­
dence in i960 and many feel it still sums up the political 
scene today.
Turkish rule of Cyprus was, at best, indifferent 
and, at worst, oppressive, depending upon the temperaments 
of the Sultans and governors who emerged on the scene dur­
ing the "three dreary centuries" that followed the expulsion 
of the Venetians. At one point in the 18th Century Cyprus 
was considered hardly more than a piece of property apropos 
for including in the dowry of the Sultan's daughter. As a 
consequence, Cyprus was independent of the Ottoman Empire
19 /Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios. (London;
Putnam, 1960), p. 7.
20
between 1720 and 17^5* before finally being reunited.
Still Cyprus prospered no better under a spend-thrift pup­
pet king than it did under direct control from Constantinople. 
By the time the British were to demand the transfer of Cyprus 
to fulfill the terms of the Cyprus Convention, the Turks 
were quite surfeited with the bothersome affairs in Cyprus. 
Besides the continual state of alert the island was under,due 
to the petty forays of former rulers of Cyprus, there were 
numerous insurrections among the indigenous population. In 
essence, the Turks were most disenchanted with Cyprus by 
1878 and the relinquishment of the island, in exchange for 
insurance against possible Russian aggression^ was regarded 
as quite a good bargain.
The Turks, while they ruled, assumed the role of 
the common enemy in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots. This 
negative attitude served as a focal point for solidifying 
the tribal penchants of the island population— at least in
those matters which loomed as a threat to the Greek-Cypriot 
21identity. Unwittingly the Turks created conditions that 
forced the Greek population of Cyprus to relate with
20
Home, op. cit.. p. 91.
21Muzafer Sherif euid Carolyn W. Sherif, Outline 
of Social Psychology, (New York; Harpers, 1956), Chapter 
21, "Men in Critical Situations," pp. 715-743.
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everything anti-Turkish. Therefore, the Orthodox Church—
the most antithetical institution to Islam--was the symbol
of the frustrated Greek nationalism that became increas-
22ingly more manifest in Cyprus. The Turkish policy of 
alternating oppression and indifference created a sore spot 
in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean that was to 
fester and plague the status quo for centuries. But the 
Ottoman Turks were never to be remembered for their percep­
tive nature or the ability to interpret the rumblings of 
their subjects. As long as the Turks held a power position 
by means of intimidation and violence, they felt no need 
to consult barometers of public opinion. Nevertheless, 
by the middle of the 19th Century the Ottomans were show­
ing signs of becoming the "sick man of Europe," and they 
could not have chsinged much of their colonial policy even 
if they had seen fit to do so. When the British took over 
the forces of Greek-Cypriot nationalism had already crystal­
lized. The policies of the British were not too unlike that
22The Islamic Empire of the Ottoman Turks saw 
little difference between Church and State, e.g. the Sul­
tanate and the Caliphate were the same in their governmental 
system. Similarly, the Sultan declared religious authori­
ties to have jurisdictional rights over his other subjects, 
Christian or Jew, as the case might have been. Different 
professions of faith were organized into separate subordin­
ate groups known as millets (nations). The Churches 
consequently became identified with the national purposes 
of their peoples, as well as those of a religious nature. 
"The Church of Cyprus, because of the pecularitios of the 
island's history, had always been political..." Doros 
Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heinemann, 1 9 6 o ), p. 3 6 .
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of the Turks and could only result in aggravating the 
existing discontent.
The Beginning of the British Occupation
There is no debating the fact that the epoch 
which made the deepest impression in the island's politi­
cal future opened in 1878, when the British leased the 
island from the Ottoman Turks. One must begin tracing the 
development of this historic event in the year 1875» when 
the one-year old government of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) was called upon to deal with
the "ever-recurrent problem of what to do with the Ottoman
I t 2 3Empire--the so-called Eastern Question. "
Ottoman power was at a low ebb at this juncture 
and the Russians were attempting to fill the power vacuum 
by expanding their Empire west and southward toward the 
warm-water port of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. 
England and the other European powers did not try to hide 
their alarm and fear of Russian designs. Protests were 
regularly sent to the Czar, but he disregarded them with 
equal regularity and proceeded with his aggressive policies. 
The specific incident which reopened the "Eastern Question"
was the insurrection of Bosnia and Herzegovnia in the
Ottoman-held Balkan region. The demand of the Christians
23
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus 
Convention Policy of 1878. (Cambridge: Harvard U., 1934),
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there for reform in the territorial government were met 
concomitantly by the altruistic sympathies of the European 
nations and the avaricious interests of Russia. The only 
concern the British had in the Near East at this time was 
the protection of her imperial interests in India, and 
this could be done only by preventing Russian advances in 
Ottoman Asia. The British wished to achieve a peaceful 
settlement of the Bosnian uprisings with no repetition of the 
Crimean War of twenty years earlier. To this end, the Con­
cert of Europe, under the inspirational leadership of 
Disraeli, had outlined certain reforms for the Turks to 
put into effect in her European possessions. When these 
reforms were refused by the Sultan, Russia declared a long
2kthreatened war on Turkey in April, 1877.
The war lasted less than a year, and the Turks
were forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in March, I878. 
The powers in Europe, however, refused to accept this arbi­
trary arrangement, since the provisions in the treaty had 
virtually given Russia control of the Dardanelles. The 
other European nations insisted that the same matters be
discussed at a six-power conference at Berlin in June of
2 51878. In the meantime, in a period that was characterized
0/1
Ibid., p. 43.
25Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, 
Vol. IV (London; H. M. S. 0., 1891), p. viii.
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by diplomatic deceit and subtle subterfuge, the Disraeli 
government— a masterful practitioner of the art— went ahead 
with some undercover negotiations. While the Congress of 
Berlin was parceling out bits of the Ottoman Empire, the 
British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Austen Layard, 
had privately concluded a pact with the Ottoman Sublime 
Porte on June k, I878. This pact, or the Cyprus Convention 
as it was commonly called, was the joint design of Disraeli 
and his Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury. It may be looked 
upon as a prime example of the way Great Britain played the 
role of the "balancer of world power," in order to perpetu­
ate the "Pax Britannica" of the 19th Century.
The British idea behind the Convention was to
dôter the psychological advantage the Russian would gain
over the entire Ottoman Empire, if Russia were to occupy
Ottoman Asia. In a letter from Salisbury to Layard on May
30, 1878, the situation was stated in this way:
Even if it were certain that Batoum, Ardahan, and 
Kars will not become the base from which the emis­
saries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due 
time followed by invading armies, the retention of 
them by Russia will exercise a powerful force in 
disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte.
As a monument of feeble defense on the one side and 
unsuccessful aggression on the other, they will be 
regarded by the Asiatic population as foreboding 
the course of political history in the immediate 
future and will stimulate by combined action of hope 
and fear, devotion to the Power which is in the 
ascendent, and desertion gf the Power which is thought 
to be falling into decay. ;
26Correspondence Respecting the Convention Between 
Great Britain and Turkey of June k, 1878. No. 1. The Marquis
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Considering the potential threat, the resulting British 
policy was the only logical pathway open to avert the poli­
tical conditions which had been created:
/H. M. Governmenjt7 does not propose to attempt the 
accomplishment of the object by taking military 
measures for the purpose of replacing the conquered 
districts in the possession of the Porte. Such an 
undertaking would be arduous and costly, and would 
involve great calamities and it would not be effec­
tive for the object which Her Majesty's Government 
have in view, unless subsequently strengthened by 
precautions which can be taken almost as effectively 
without incurring the miseries of a preliminary war. 
The only provision which can furnish a substantial 
security for the stability of Ottoman rule in Asia­
tic Turkey, eind which would be essential after the 
re-conquest of the Russian annexations as it is now, 
is an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough 
to fulfill it, that any further encroachment by Russia 
upon Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by 
force of arms.
After the plan was presented, the British imposed two con­
ditions before the pact was consummated and the Porte had 
no alternative, but accept. The first dealt with reforms 
in the government of Ottoman territories that were inhabi­
ted predominately by Christians. The second condition, 
however, was vastly more important as it mentioned the 
desire of the British "to occupy a position near the coast 
of Asia Minor and Syria." It was finally agreed that 
"the island of Cyprus appears in all respect the most
of Salisbury to Lavard (Foreign Office), /C-205217» 18?8, 
LXXXII, 1 p . Ï1 (Note : British Sessional Papers will be
cited by title, command number, year, volume, volume page, 
and original page).
2^ ?Ibid.
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28available for the object."
These preliminary points were included almost 
verbatim in the final form of the Cyprus Convention. The 
essential sections of the Convention stipulated that 
"England engages to join HIM the Sultan in defending them 
/ottoman territories/ by force of arms..." In order to 
execute the agreement, "HIM the Sultan...consents to assign
the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by
29England." A further provision was the guarantee of the
Porte to "safeguard the British overland route through: the
30Ottoman territory to India," which was an important con­
cession at that time.
The occupation of Cyprus by Great Britain on 
July 12, 1878 and the signing of the Treaty of Berlin the 
very next day had "meant not the end, but the beginning of 
increased anxiety and responsibility for Lord Beaconsfield 
(Disraeli) and Lord Salisbury. The disclosure of the 
secret treaty with the Porte had caused heated cries of 
treason on the homefront from Gladstone's Liberal "loyal 
opposition"; while on the international level, England had
^®Ibid.
29Convention of Defense Alliance between Great 
Britain and Turkey To Protect Against Russian Intervention, 
June 4, 1878, Article IV, Hertslet, op. cit., p. 2722
30
Lee, op. cit., p. IO5 .
31Ibid., It could have been at this time that 
Disraeli made his famous quote: "What we anticipate seldom
occurs; ' what we least expect generally happens."
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to face up to the flabbergasted and vindictive powers that 
lodged protests on her claim to Cyprus. France, in parti­
cular, felt the occupation of Cyprus would not only command 
the coasts of Syria and Egypt, but also, by the terms of the 
Convention allow Britain the right to intervene in the admin­
istration of all Asiatic territory subject to Ottoman juris­
diction. Prance felt the Mediterranean had surely become 
"an English pond" and the messages between the Quay d ' Orsay 
and Whitehall stated this apprehension in no uncertain terms. 
One said in part:
Franc® respects England as a great Asiatic power, 
but looks upon herself as a great Mediterranean 
power.. . The two nations must stress the need for 
action in concert of a friendly policy founded on 
a just and.geciprocal consideration for one another's 
interests.^
In a most solicitous way, Salisbury answered:
/Great Britain's/ policy had been inspired by no 
projects of aggrandizement upon the shores of the 
Mediterranean, but purely by a solicitude for vast 
interests which we (UK) possess in Asia and which 
is our duty to defend. The interests of Franco as 
a great Catholic power in the Lebanon and in the 
Holy Places of Palestine have always been scrupu­
lously respected by this country.
Such was the diplomatic manner of Great Britain in the 19th
Century, but it can hardly be said that Prance received any
satisfaction from those amenities.
Salisbury's rationale for the acquisition of the
32
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island of Cyprus as a base was quite logically presented.
He had reasoned that the "onerous obligation" to contain 
Russia, should it attempt to extend its frontiers, could 
not be fulfilled from a distance as far as Malta. The 
other two alternatives were even worse; the occupation 
of Suez would probably be resisted by France, and a base 
at Alexandretta "might be construed as indicating an inten­
tion to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia." 
Since Great Britain did not want "to be suspected of designs," 
which were wholly absent from their thoughts, Cyprus, through 
a process of elimination, became the only place which could 
satisfy all the considerations at hand.
Great Britain, in the usual custom of the age, had 
to do something to palliate her decision to occupy Cyprus, 
and this could best be done by agreeing to territorial 
concessions to the dissident members of the Congress of 
Berlin, as well as some others. The final compromises, or 
territorial adjustments, were made along this order: Russia
was permitted to keep Kars and Batum; Austria was allowed 
to occupy the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovnia; 
France was invited to administer Tunisia; Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Greece were given considerable areas of Turkish terri­
tories; Italy, in her turn, had to be contented with the 
recognition of her ascendancy to the status of a Great Power;
1878), p. 8.
^^Ibid., (Salisbury to Lord Lyon, No. 3, August 7»
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and finally Germany had acquired the prestige that Berlin 
had formally replaced Paris as the focal point of European 
diplomacy. This arbitrary disposal of territories with­
out the least regard for the sentiments of the native 
inhabitants, was a conmion practice on the diplomatic tables 
of that day.
Great Britain indeed found herself in possession 
of Cyprus in I878, but also it was soon apparent that she 
had taken upon herself an almost staggering commitment to 
protect the vast Ottoman Asian possessions against the 
Russian menace. Party loyalty even broke down on this 
issue and the arrangement made by the Tory statesmen,
Disraeli and Salisbury, "was looked upon with the same 
suspicion, distrust, and apprehension in the Conservative 
as well as the Liberal rahks."^^ Perhaps this dissension 
did not reach its zenith until the change of government in
1880, when Gladstone became the Liberal Prime Minister. 
Gladstone personally referred to the Cyprus Convention as 
"shabby," and stated that he "regrets the secret agreement... 
by which the annexation of territory has impaired the repu­
tation of England as one of the most clean-handed members
35Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great 
Powers in World Politics, New Ed., (New York: American
Book Co., 1939), pp. 174-75.
Lee, op. cit.. p. 112.
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37of the European family." The Liberal Government even
considered the "retrocession" of Cyprus, because "the
act would give England the splendid opportunity of disin-
38terested renunciation."
This moralistic declaration on the part of the
Gladstone government were triggered less from contrition
aind more from the belief that the acquisition of Cyprus
could never bring any military or political advantage to
the Crown. When a memorandum, expressing this same thought,
was sent to Queen Victoria, the great monarch simply wrote
39in the margin; "I do not agree in the least with this."
With such formidable opposition, coupled with the legalists
in Parliament who felt that England had entered a contract
40and it was "only common morality to accept the position," 
Gladstone could do nothing other than retreat from his 
original stand. His attention, however, was soon trans­
ferred to another Middle Eastern territory that was ulti­
mately to diminish the value of Cyprus as a strategic base. 
For it was Gladstone who was responsible for the British
37W. N. Medlicott, "The Gladstone Government and 
the Cyprus Convention, 1880-85," Journal of Modern History. 
XII, March-December, 1940, pp. 186 ff.
^®Ibid.
39
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40Medlicott, loc. cit.
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occupation of Egypt in 1882. The four year period that
Cyprus was in the limelight of Eastern Mediterranean poli-
4ltics hardly benofitted the island in any material way.
At first Cyprus was thought to have all the com­
bined requisites of location, size, population, and defen- 
sibility to carry out England's commitments in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Then, many began to realize the deficiencies 
of the island. Strategically, its use in defense of Ottoman
Asia was doubtful, for "what was to prevent an attack upon
2j.o
the Persian Gulf from the highlands of Armenia” " Also
there was no suitable harbor, and the cost of constructing
one was prohibitive. As early as 1881, the plans for
improving the piers in Lamacà and Limassol were "postponed
43for engineering reasons." A year later the High Commis­
sioner, Sir Robert Biddulph, made this eloquent plea for 
the construction of a harbor in Cyprus, but it was met with 
little sympathy in Britain. In Biddulph's words:
the want of harbours in Cyprus so totally prevents 
the formation of any commercial entrepot that I 
believe the expenditure of the money^^n question 
cannot fail to be most advantageous.
Still conceding these drawbacks, most British and foreign
41Bullard, op. cit., p. $1.
42Lee, op. cit.. p. 79.
43_ Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, 
/C-2930/, 1881, LXV, 67, p. 11.
44Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of 
Cyprus. /C-3384/. 1882. XLV. 15. p. 39.
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observers agreed that Cypmis was, nonetheless, an essential 
bulwark in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, 
to the majority of the English populace, the "acquisition 
of Cyprus was completely justified in spite of the failure 
/of the British/ to make the best use of it.
In a comprehensive historical study of Cyprus,
Sir George Hill lists three causes for the unfortunate fail-
46ure of the British in the affairs of the island. First, 
the primary blame can be attributed to Prime Minister 
Gladstone. Though the Liberal leader could not dispute the 
possibilities of the island as a means of protecting the 
route to India (one of the chief goals of British foreign 
policy at that time)^ he nevertheless let his personal 
vendetta against his political rival cloud his thinking and, 
thus, prevented his government from developing the island, 
which could possibly have put the Tories in a better light 
in history. Second, France stepped out of joint control 
of Egypt shortly after Britain's leasing of Cyprus, and 
consequently, gave Great Britain the undisputed right to 
develop Alexandria and Port Said as Mediterranean bases.
The last of Hill's reasons was the rather tenuous conditions 
on which the island had been held, i.e., England would 
evacuate Cyprus if Russia restored to Turkey the Ottoman
^^Hill, op. cit.. Vol. IV, p. 274.
^^ Ibid.
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kllands seized in Armenia. This tended to discourage 
private English capital from being poured into the island’s 
economy, as there was no guarantee of indemnity for improve­
ments in event the British would actually evacuate Cyprus.
In the last year the Conservatives were in power, 1879, 
Salisbury wrote to Layard concerning investments in Cyprus;
I am informed by the First Lord of the Admiralty 
and Secretary of State for War, who have recently 
returned from the island, that the application 
of capiÿgl is arrested by the uncertainty of 
tenure.
When the Liberals came to power the following year, they 
attempted nothing which would alleviate the fears of poten­
tial English entrepreneurs in Cyprus, thus foreign private
49investment in Cyprus has almost been nonexistent.
To the convincing list posited by Hill, a fourth
point may be added to help in the explanation of British
indifference concerning Cyprus. This was the immediate
cognizance by the British that imperial loyalty would be
most difficult to capture among the Cypriots, if and when
50the island would become a colony. The drive towards
^’^/C-20517, 1878, LXXXII, 9, op. cit.. Annexe, p. 5
48
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49The largest private enterprise in Cyprus is the 
Cyprus Mines Corporation, which is an American firm that 
has been exploiting quite profitably the copper mines on the 
island for over fifty years.
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enosis (union with Greece) was not kept secret by the 
Cypriots, and many Englishmen were most sympathetic with 
the Greek-Cypriots. In fact some philhellenists in England 
criticized their government for the embarrassment the inhabi­
tants of Cyprus were forced to suffer after they had wit­
nessed "their island handed over like a chattel as part of 
a bargain;" but these idealists did not realize, evidently,
"that /the acjt/ was merely in accordance with the rules of
51the diplomatic game as played in those days."
Actually England had acquired Cyprus for pur­
poses it could never fulfill with complete satisfaction, 
and this fact was seemingly proven beyond doubt to the 
Liberal government of Gladstone within the first four years 
of British occupancy of the island. The fundamental moral 
or defense problems that Disraeli admirably wanted to solve 
with his Cyprus policy either were handled in due course 
by the occupation of Egypt, or the subsequent Entente with 
Russia in 1904, or were set aside e n t i r e l y . M u c h  was
51
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promised for the island and the native inhabitants, but
little was actually accomplished. England, by the 1930's,
had become disenchanted with Cyprus and the modicum of
interest shown previously in the island had just about
dwindled entirely. In the words of Miss Monroe: "/England/
allowed it /Cypru^/ to degenerate into a Cinderella, and
the Fairy Godmother, though announced two or three times,
53has not yet put in an appearance."
British Administration of Finances and the Cyprus Tribute 
Prior to the signing of the Cyprus Convention, 
Salisbury wrote Layard about the matter of payment to the 
Porte, since the island was still to be an Ottoman posses­
sion. The important part of the correspondence stated:
Her Majesty's government do not wish to ask the Sultan 
to alienate territory from his sovereignty, or to 
diminish the receipts which now pass into his Treasury. 
While administration and occupation be assigned to Her 
Majesty, the territory shall still continue to be part 
of the Ottoman Empire and the excess of revenue shall 
be paid over annually by the^British government to 
the Treasury of the Sultan.
In the Annexe to the Cyprus Convention, which was signed
about six weeks after negotiations on finance had begun.
Article III originally stated: "England will pay to the
Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expen-
5 9diture in the island..." This provision did set the stage
e o
Monroe, op. cit., p. 49.
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op. cit.. p. 2724.
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for the one positive measure Britain managed to introduce 
in Cyprus during the period immediately following her leas­
ing. That was the infamous "Tribute," which was so hated 
by the Cypriots and was to be remembered as a scourge 
always to be held against the British. In a most apolo­
getic tone— obviously directed at her readers who feel 
historical backgrounds should be slighted— Miss Monroe 
states: "The story of the Cyprus Tribute is long, and
shows the British Government in the unbecoming role of
Shylock, but, long though it is, it affects Cypriot opinion,
56and therefore must be told."
British-Cypriot relations commenced in a most 
friendly manner, but the pleasant relationship was short­
lived. The Cypriots warmly greeted the arrival of the 
British not only because the Cypriots "had throughout their 
history welcomed any change of this kind," but also because
"they generally seemed to entertain the expectation that
57all taxes would be abolished." A more fallacious prognos­
tication could never have been conjured up, and the rude 
awakening came in 1882, when it was finally decided with 
the Ottoman government what the "annual fixed payment" 
should be. As determined by Article III of the Annexe to 
the Cyprus Convention, supra, the annual Tribute to the
^^Monroe, op. cit., p. 50.
5?Hill, op. cit.. p. 293.
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Porte was to be "22,936 purses, (ll,468,000 piastres, or
at 120 piastres per pound sterling, it would amount to
\ 58103,212 pounds sterling.) Negotiations brought this 
figure down to 85,000 pounds sterling, and with the addi­
tional 5,000 pounds awarded as a rental by an agreement 
signed February 3, 1879,^^ the figure was left at 90,000?^^ 
Further negotiation in 1889, subsequently fixed the Tribute 
at approximately 92,800 pounds sterling, or the equivalent 
of ten shillings ($2.50 then) per every man, woman, and 
child in Cyprus.
The imposition of the Tribute has been aptly 
described as one which "failed to allow for Turkish methods." 
The Turks traditionally spent the barest minimum on the gov­
erning of their outlying possessions, while the British 
administration at its worst was lavish in comparison. Thus, 
the Cypriots found themselves paying not only for the oner­
ous Tribute, but also they were supposed to cover the expen­
ses incurred by the British rule of the island. This steady
^^Ibid., p. 463 and Hertslet, loc. cit.
59— Correspondence Respecting the Island of Cyprus,
/C-23297, 1878-79, LIV, 453, p.
^^Agreement for a Fixed Annual Payment. Hertslet, 
op. cit., p . 2844.
Hill, op. cit., p. 464. (it might be noted here 
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op. cit,. . p. 50, where the final sum of the Tribute is 
listed as "99,000 pounds sterling.")
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drain of an already poor economy in Cyprus left nothing 
for internal improvements. In fact, Cyprus was neither 
"able to repay amply the charge of its own establishment 
as was initially thought," nor was the island even able 
to make its domestic ends meet. Therefore, many a sizable 
deficit had to be made up by the British citizenry each 
year, which was hardly a popular expenditure. A contem­
porary editorial, April 1, 1879, in the London Examiner 
and Times stated the dilemma in this way:
The English troops had hardly landed when every 
inhabitant considered that he would henceforward be 
free from any tax payments... On the contrary, the 
Government had been very considerate and has accep­
ted all arrears due to the Turkish government in 
caime currency, which is worth less than 25% of 
Turkish real money, viz. gold and silver_^ Generally 
the Cyprigÿs were not unjustly treated /in financial 
matter^/.
The chief rub in the whole affair of the Cyprus 
Tribute was the fact that the money was never actually paid 
to Turkey, and this disturbed both the Cypriots and the 
Turks. Actually the money was deposited in the Bank of 
England to pay off an old Ottomem Loan of 1855» guaranteed
by both England and France, on which Turkey had defaulted
65from 1877 onward. The small sum that was left over went
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into a Consols Fund to pay for such contingencies as ran­
soms of Englishmen captured by Turkish brigands, and this 
too irritated the Porte."" Cyprus, on the other hand, felt 
she was paying for a debt with which she was not in the 
remotest way connected. Agitation against the Tribute 
never did stop and it was continually used as a symbol of 
British oppression.
Attacks on the Tribute came not only from the 
Greek-Cypriots in the island's Legislative Council, but a 
special deputation visited England in 1889 to implore Queen 
Victoria's "high succor" and plead for remission of fiscal 
burdens, which were disproportionate to the island's resour­
ces and means. The group, headed by Archbishop Sophronios, 
stressed the fact that after ten years, Cyprus "whose fate 
was entrusted to the most well-governed and civilized 
nation," had witnessed the instituting of many reforms, 
but the "reforms which had been given could not meet the 
desires of Her Majesty, which dictated them."^^ The Queen 
was gracious enough to receive the deputation, but it was 
obvious she planned to do nothing about alleviating the 
fiscal burdens in Cyprus. Instead the Archbishop had his
^^Ibid., p. 468.
^^Purther Correspondence Relating to Affairs and 
Finances of Cvprus. /C-5812/. 1889. LVI. 99. p. 70. Each 
individual paid an annual tax equal to about 1/5 of his 
yearly income, by way of production.
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ego salved by being creatôd a Doctor of Divinity in the
68University of Oxford.
The Turks too levelled criticism at Great Britain 
for the handling of the Cyprus Tribute. The Turkish semi­
official press, Tarik, ht Constantinople, charged that 
Britain had not carried out the reforms which were con­
templated at the time they took over the island. It went 
on:
It is well-known that although the speedy prosperity 
of the island of Cyprus (whose administration was by 
a special treaty temporarily entrusted to England) 
was announced, nothing has been effected except the 
imposition of additional taxes, a general depression 
of local trade, and similar results...Certain offi­
cials have evolved nothing but a number of strange 
schemes for wasting the revenue of the country, by 
transferring the capital to the hills for benefit of 
change of air. Even the existing schools are shut 
and the population, both Mussulman and Christian have 
commenced to emigrate, and those who remain have has­
tened to implore the.assistance and compassion of 
the civilized world.
The attacks in the Greek newspapers in Athens were even
more sarcastic, as can be seen in this excerpt from the
Messager d'Athens entitled, "Chypre Sans Los Anglais:"
En effet, Chypre est devenue un bon placement pour 
des cadets de l'aristocratie britannique. En fait 
d'administration, c'est le cas de dire que les 
Chypriotes n'en ont jamais en pour leur argent.
gg ' — -
Home, op. cit., p. 218.
69Correspondence Relating to the Affairs and Fin­
ances of Cyprus. /C-9923/. 1888. LDOCIII. 2S3. n. 103.
7°Ibid.. p. 91.
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There is little doubt that these criticisms carried far less 
weight with Queen Victoria than the report of the Under­
secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Winston Churchill, 
who visited Cyprus in 190?. In the report Churchill (now 
Sir Winston), declared: "We have no right, except by
force majeur, to take a penny of the Cyprus Tribute to
relieve us from our own obligations, however, unfortunately 
71contracted." It was largely through the efforts of 
Churchill, and others, that the Imperial Parliament voted 
a permanent annual grant-in-aid of 50,000 pounds sterling 
to Cyprus in 1907, which reduced the Tribute accordingly.
Administration Between the War and 1931
At the onset of the war in 1914, Turkey joined 
forces with the enemy Central Powers, hence Great Britain 
immediately annexed Cyprus. One might have thought that 
the Tribute to the Ottoman Porte would have been abrogated 
by the annexation, but it merely changed names and was 
thereafter known as the "Share of the Turkish Debt Charge," 
which did not serve in any way to mollify the Cypriots.
The war years made the internal problems of Cyprus seem 
insignificant. Yet, it was in 1915, that the island was 
offered to Greece for an obvious threefold purpose. First, 
it was offered as a bribe to induce Greece to enter the war 
on the side of the Allies, in order to save Serbia. Second,
^^Hill, op. cit.. p. 468.
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it was doubtless a concession to the fanatic Greek Cypriots
who had cried enosis ever since 1878, and third, giving the
island to Greece would have relieved Great Britain of con-
72tinuing with the bothersome Tribute. Surprisingly, King
Constantine's government at Athens refused the offer. While
this produced no discernable psychological effect, it did
somewhat curtail the growing sentiment of those Cypriots
who had favored union with Greece. However, ten years
later, when the Colony was established, the British Empire
was placed in the same light as had been the Ottoman Empire
— neunely, "the obstacle to the union of Cyprus with the
73Greek national state" — emd the ardent enosis feelings 
were consequently regenerated.
With Cyprus legally under the sovereignty of an 
enemy state, England found itself in a peculiar position 
at the beginning of the war. There was little else for her
to do, but annex Cyprus and, by so doing, eliminated a
position which was continually used in specious answers 
to Cypriot pleas, i.e. that Britain was merely a "tenant"
on Cyprus. Cyprus' part in the war was small; it was used
primarily as a naval base and supply station, yet it did
72
It was definitely known that the Tribute "was
a millstone around the neck of the early administrators,"
and would become nothing other in the future than a "sorry 
tale of obtruseness and obstinacy." Mayes, op. cit., p. l6l.
73Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International
Affairs. 1931, (London: Oxford U. Press, 1932), p. 36I.
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withstand a series of enemy air attacks. The island was, 
however, more important as the subject once again of secret 
diplomacy, this time with France. Along with the plan to 
partition the Near East into respective spheres of influ­
ence, the furtive Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 promised 
that Britain would not negotiate about Cyprus without the 
consent of Frajice. This pact was not made public until four
years later, when the France-British Convention was signed
74on December 23, 1920. The British annexation of Cyprus
was never actually recognized by the Ottoman Porte (since
the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 was never ratified); thus,
formal recognition was not made until the Treaty of Lausanne,
when Turkey was under its benevolent despot, Mustafa Kemal
7*5Ataturk Gahzi Pasha.
The signing of the Armistice ending the First 
World War heraled a period of thirteen years of relative 
calm on the island of Cyprus. Still there was an openly 
organized movement among the Cypriot Greek intellectuals
74For the full text of these two documents, see 
J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East,
Vol. II, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1956).
75"The Lausanne Conference," Round Table, XIII,
No. 50, 1923, p. 342. For the text of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, see The Treaties of Peace. 1919-23), Vol. II,
(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1924). The signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 
1923, were: the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Greece,
Italy, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Japan.
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in favor of secession from the British Empire and union 
with Greece, though this view was hardly the view of the 
Greek majority nor Turkish minority on the i s l a n d . A l s o  
there were cries for complete independence from some extre­
mists who had possibly taken Wilson's "Fourteen Points" too 
seriously, and this forced Britain to face a dilemma not 
too unlike the one presented in 1959, but the earlier solu­
tion was decidedly more arbitrary. As Arnold Toynbee des­
cribed it:
The British Government at Westminster, on the other 
hand, took the view that the people of Cyprus--Greeks 
and Turks alike--were unripe for self-government; and 
the British authorities in Cyprus held that the Cypriot 
Greek national movement, while general and genuine 
among the urban minority of the Cypriot Greek popula­
tion, was neither spontaneous nor deep-rooted among 
the peasantry.77
Still, it must be said to the credit of the Greek Cypriots 
that their protests against British occupation were, up till 
that time, pacific and presented in accordance with the Con­
stitution of 1882 and its later modifications.
The first Constitution, which was unchanged by 
the annexation in I9l4, provided for a Legislative Council 
consisting of twelve elected and six appointed members. The
^^As early as 1881, there was a rumor circulated 
that Cyprus had been offered to Greece. The Greek natives 
claimed such a thing would "be their ruin," while the Tur­
kish population applied simultaneously to the Sublime Porte 
for "Protection of their honour and lives." There was no 
indication that the situation was any different in_1921._ 
Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, /C-2930/, 
1881, LXV, 67, pp. 105 and 113.
77Toynbee, op. cit., p. 363-
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High Commissioner's Report for 1882 summarized the function­
ing of the Council in this way:
After nearly; five years of existence as a Crown 
Colony /_a±c/, Cyprus has been endowed with represen­
tative institutions. The new Legislative Council 
consists of eighteen members, six of whom are pub­
lic officers appointed by the Crown and twelve are 
elected by the people. Of jthe twelve elected, three 
are elected by Mahometans /si^7 and nine elected by 
non-Mahometan inhabitants, these numbers being based 
on respective numbers of Mahometans and non-Mahome­
tans as revealed by the census taken in 1881.78
The accepted legislative practice was for the three Moslem 
(Mahometan) members to side with the six appointed members 
so as to bring about a nine-to-nine stalemate with the 
Greek members, and this was in turn broken by the vote of 
the High Commissioner. In this manner. Great Britain was 
always able to parry the efforts of the Cypriot Greeks to 
enhance their nationalistic aspirations through legal means 
When Cyprus was made a Crown Colony on March 10, 1925, a 
Royal Governor replaced the High Commissioner. The Legis­
lative Council was subsequently enlarged to 24 members, of 
which twelve were Greek, nine were appointed, and three 
still designated for the Turks. It is curious that the 
Greeks continued to complain that the Turks were over­
represented in the new Council, as the Turks at the time
80supposedly "formed only one-sixth of the population."
78
_ Cyprus, Report by H. M. High Commissioner for 
1882. /C-3772/, 1883, XLVI, 51, p. 9.
^^The Middle East. 1957. op. cit.. p. 64.
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Hill, op. cit., p. 428. The three official 
Turkish members out of 24 figures out to be one-eight of the
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The revised constitution for the colony of Cyprus
did not, as many Cypriots had hoped, change the financial
system. Therefore, the Tribute, which was equally hated
by both the Greeks and Turks in the island, was still being
collected. In 1926, the elected members of the Legislative
Council passed a resolution that "the obligation to pay
8lthe share of the Turkish Debt Charge should cease." This
was followed by the rejection of the budget estimates for
the coming fiscal year by the Greek members, merely because
it contained provisions for the burdensome Tribute. In
retaliation. Great Britain threatened to invoke the"Royal
Prerogatives" and "modify the constitutional arrangements"
82which had made possible the recent unfortunate events.
Such modifications were never instituted, for Britain soon 
relieved the Cypriots of their whole share in the Turkish 
Debt Charge (the Tribute) by substituting a grant-in-aid 
for the remaining amount. The only condition was that 
Cyprus pay to the Crown, as did all other Crown Colonies, 
the annual sum of 10,000 pounds sterling toward "Imperial
body, which is decidedly less than one-sixth. If the Turks 
had a disproportionate number of the nine appointed members, 
it was purely a temporary condition which could be blamed 
on favoritism of the Governor or any number of other fac­
tors. As a result, the Council was derisively termed the 
"toy parliament."
Q 1
Ibid.. p. 476.
®^Ibid.
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Defense," and that was to close the matter once and for all. 
What the Cypriots did not know "was that they were expected 
to waive any claim to the surpluses in London— now amount-
Q o
ing to over 1,000,000 pounds sterling."
The Cypriots unfortunately were not that easily
placated. When they saw that Britain was in a conciliatory
mood, they pressed further. The Cypriots claimed that two
different sums were owed to them: first, was the "ransom
fund," or the unexpended surplus which had been invested
in Consols since I878; and second, the Tribute payments
since 1914, when Cyprus became a "colony" (the term was
incorrectly used by some of the more patriotic Greek Cypriot
. 84
members of the Legislative Council.) The British rejec­
ted outright the pleas made by the Cypriots, and after much 
evasion finally explained their actions "when Philip Snowden, 
Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, told Parliament in July, 
1931 that the money had gone into a sinking fund for the
Q c
Ottoman Loan of 1855•" This announcement was soon fol­
lowed by the Government's proposal to increase Cypriot taxes 
to meet the deficit that was brought on by economic conditions 
in the island and over the world generally in the late
83Mayes, op. cit.. p. I6I.
84
Monroe, op. cit., p. 51-
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Mayes, loc. cit.
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1920's . T h e  seething discontent in the island was soon 
to erupt. In October, 1931» "resentment flared up in
Cyprus, till the flames, blown on by Enosis agitators, burned
87down Government House," in a vivid act of protest.
The mob action was not spontaneous. It was later 
proven that the archbishop of Cyprus and his Prelates (the
Ethnarchy) had a direct hand in inciting the Greek Cypriot
88community. It was all provoked by the resignation of the 
twelve Cypriot Greek members of the Legislative Council, 
and the news of this served as an obvious prearranged sig­
nal. Immediately, demonstrators started shouting for enosis 
and small isolated units formed into the mob which marched 
on Government House in Nicosia singing the Greek national 
anthem. Before the riot was quelled, the House was burned
to the ground, six civilians were killed, scores injured,
89and 400 arrests were made.
Britain reacted after the outbreak with stern
86The depression in the U. S. was felt with even 
greater intensity by nations closely linked to the American 
economy.
87
Mayes, loc. cit.
88British Information Services (b .I.S.), Cyprus,
ID 1340, July i960, p. 3* The ruling authority, or elite, 
of the Greek Orthodox Church is termed the "Ethnarchy," 
which means literally headship of the race or nation, (Cf. 
Patriarchate, literally headship of a family or tribe.)
QO
Royal Institute of International Affairs, (here­
after, R.I.I.S.), Cyprus, (London: Chatham House Memoran­
dum, Oxford U. Press, 1959), p. 4.
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punitive measures. Reinforcements were dispatched to the 
island and the first official act was to abolish the Con­
stitution and all elected bodies, which included the Leg­
islative Council, but not the Executive Council which 
continued in being. The next action was the deportation of
ten Cypriots, including two bishops, who were directly
90implicated in the riots. Civil liberties were severely 
limited and the island was autocratically ruled by the 
Royal Governor, with the assistance of the six-member Exe­
cutive Council, of which only two represented the Greek 
Cypriots. In 1933, the emergency measures were eased 
somewhat and an Advisory Council was established, with 
four ex officio members and ten others appointed by the 
Governor. No legislative powers were granted either 
council, but they both could advise on internal policies.
It was during this time that terrorism was first manifested, 
with the occasional assasination of a member of the Advi­
sory or Executive Council, for no other ostensible reason 
than his willingness to see that his fellow Cypriots wore 
represented, to some extent at least, in the government 
of the island.
The Early Enosis Movement 
Under Ottoman rule, the Ethnarchy had led a
90B.I.S., Cyprus. loc. cit.
^^Hill, op. cit.. p. 432.
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persistent effort to free Cyprus from the Turks. The 
drive as such met with little success, but was soon to be 
modified by certain developments during the Ottoman reign. 
In particular, the Greek revolt and liberation gave the 
nationalists on Cyprus a new focal point, for it was at 
that time that the idea of independence shifted to one cf 
union with Greece (enosis). Despite the inhuman reprisals 
inflicted on the Cypriots during the Greek revolution of 
1825, the idea of enosis continued to gain currency among 
the indigenous Cypriots. It was traditional that the 
Ethnarchy should assume leadership in such matters, and 
therefore it became the center of political activities. 
After the British occupation,, the Ethnarchy increased their 
efforts for enosis and conservative Cypriot-Greek politi­
cal parties were formed with the "union" issue being the 
key plank of their platforms. Dissatisfaction with the 
existing administration was the crucial weapon the enosists 
exploited in the hope of broadening the base of their sup­
port. Less than a year after the British ascension,
Cypriot nationalists charged: "The present regime of Her
Majesty's Government is not new, but just a continuation
92of former Turkish misrule." Also these same forces mar­
shalled rumours, allegations, and isolated incidents into
92Correspondence Respecting Complaints Made Against 
the Government of Cyprus. /C-2324/. 1878-79. LIV. 901. p. 2.
51
a case against the British administration. These accusa­
tions included flogging, forced labor, "manacled priests,"
93and the exclusion of Greek newspapers. The British
Colonial Office naturally investigated and turned up an
interesting revelation. A letter to Salisbury from the
first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, described
the men who were the source of these allegations:
One was a schoolmaster from Greece, who is one of 
a very small and insignificant party here whose 
avowed object is the spread of Hellenic views and 
a nationalistic movement in favor of Greece, their 
native country. Athens is the hotbed of the revolu­
tionary party and they make free reference to "their 
war-like brothers, the Cretans," /in hopes that the 
Cypriots will follow suit/. One is not Cypriot, 
but President of a small Greek society in Alexandria, 
which has for its object the spread of disaffection 
amongst the people of Cyprus and the general propa­
gation of Hellenism through the Levant.
After thoroughly refuting the charges, the High
Commissioner sent this vindication of his administration
of Cyprus.
When writing in defense of carefully-selected English 
officers who have devoted themselves to the task of 
governing a mixed population under no ordinary diffi­
culties, it is not easy to write calmly regarding 
reckless charges, wherein truth has been intentionally 
suppressed, and cruelty and wrongdoing designedly 
imputed to others by those who originated them.95
The Colonial Office in London urged sufficient investigation
^^Ibid., p. 4.
94
Ibid., p. 15.
9^Ibid., p. 19.
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of these irresponsible charges, so that each and every offi­
cial in Cyprus could honestly give "an unequivocal denial
96to every statement." When this had been accomplished, 
it was readily apparent that the enosis movement was not a 
product of the native Cypriots. The few who openly advoca­
ted the principle had been trained either in Athens or one
of the other centers of Greek culture, despite the fact 
that some might have been native-born Cypriots. The drive 
toward enosis was initially an alien idea to Cyprus and 
the predominate peasant class in the island was totally 
unaware of the consequences one way or another. (See foot­
notes, #76 and #77) The matter of British misrule was
temporarily closed when the Archbishop of Cyprus fozsnally
97refuted the charges later in the year 1879.
The First World War, Greece's refusal to annex 
Cyprus, and the subsequent elevation of Cyprus to the status 
of Crown Colony overshadowed the minor activities of the 
enosists for over two decades. After the 1931 enosis riots, 
the British took such stem measures that the movement was 
virtually destroyed. In Parliament, sympathizers with 
Cypriot aspirations continually pressured the Colonial 
Office to promulgate a new constitution, but their efforts 
were frustrated. A proposed Royal Commission of Inquiry
96 ^Ibid.. p. 8.
^^Ibid., p. 19.
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98was asked for and refused even as late as 1939. Under 
the strict island rule, Cypriots were not allowed to form 
nationalistic groups--this activity for enosis was shifted 
en mass® during the late 1930's to London, where civil 
rights were more scrupulously guarded. In 1937, a ''Com­
mittee for Cyprus Autonomy" was formed in London with the
expressed purpose of getting some degree of "home-rule" for 
99Cyprus. In this period, petitions demanding a constitu­
tion were quit© numerous, but by 1939, the Colonial Office 
Secretary had reason to believe "that petitions have been 
placed in front of villagers by persons upon whose favor 
they are dependent." The observer concludes;
I am satisfied that the great majority of people of 
Cyprus are not discontented under the present admin­
istration. The policy of the administration is to 
work in the direction of more representative govern­
ment; but this process cannot be hurried, and in my 
view it must proceed first through a gradual increase 
of responsibility in local government.^®®
Since enosis was not subscribed to by the majority 
of Cypriots, the Colonial Office policy was therefore to 
encourage the people to develop an interest in the adminis­
tration of their municipal affairs. At the time, Britain 
had no intention of writing a new constitution for the 
entire island, thus the matter of enlarging local governing
98Hill, op. cit., p. 433. 
:bid.
lOOHiii, op. cit., p. 434.
^^Ibi
5k
units, with the hope of eventually extending the governing 
powers of these bodies, became a prime concern. A standard 
answer was consequently devised by the Colonial Office when 
anyone would ask about the possibility of a Constitution 
for Cyprus: "The policy of H. M. Government is to develop
representative insitutions locally before extending them 
to the central m a c h i n e r y T h i s  same policy was expres­
sed as late as 19^5 by the Labor Party's Colonial Secretary,
102George Hall, when the problem still was unresolved.
Such a decentralization of government should have 
been nothing new to the Cypriots who claimed a Greek heri­
tage. Since the days of the city-states, the Greeks have 
preferred to govern themselves in small geographic units, 
and the same phenomenon has carried over to modern times.
The formation of the Greek National State in the middle 
19th Century met most of its difficulty because it could 
not break down the community form of government and get 
the populace to pledge loyalty to the central government.
In present-day Greece, the feeling of a citizen is that he 
is not at "home" unless he is back in his village or on his 
natal island. On Cyprus, the present institution of the 
Mukhtar, the village-elected leader and the four elected 
azas (elders) was well established in the Ottoman hierarchy,
^^^R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 6.
^°^Ibid.
lO^Ibid.. p. 8.
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and. the modern concept of this office is in just as res­
pected and powerful a position aa it was two centuries 
io4ago. History, therefore, bore out the British position
that the majority of Cypriots would be content to be auto­
nomous on their local level of government, and allow the 
island to stay under British ownership. In view of this, 
enosis with Greece could not possibly have been advocated 
by more than an influential few, inter alia, the church.
The World War II Era and Later 
Great Britain had not even considered granting 
the Cypriots a voice in their government at the outbreak 
of World War II, Much of the clamoring ("monotonous" was 
the adjective generally used by the British here) of the 
Cypriots waned when Italy annexed Rhodes in the late 1930's. 
The Orthodox Cypriots became apprehensive when they consi­
dered the Mediterranean ambitions of Roman Catholic Italy: 
British rule was considered by Cypriots to be decidedly 
better from the religious aspect than that of Italy, When 
Italy entered the War and invaded Greece in 19^0, Great 
Britain found that she had acquired a firm ally in the 
Cypriot people. This loyalty was proven by the 6,000 Cypri­
ots who fought next to the British in the Greek campaign 
104Durrell, op. cit,, explained through out his 
work how valuable it was for a new resident to gain the con­
fidence of the mukhtar in Cyprus, These were ordinarily 
appointed by the Royal Governor, and were consequently 
thought to be pro-British, especially by EOKA.
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10 4and the 19,000 who were under arms by late 1941.
Despite the brave services the Cypriots performed 
in the early part of the War, Britain had indicated no 
Intention of granting the island a constitution and of guar­
anteeing its civil liberties. A major concession did come 
in 1943 when municipal elections were held for the first 
time since the constitution was revoked. Two years earlier 
a labor group had obtained permission from the British Gov­
ernor to meet and organize the "Progressive Party of the 
Working People" (aKEL).^^^ At the time of the elections 
AKEL had demonstrated that it was fairly well-organized 
party, and thereby won the elections in Famagusta and Limas­
sol.
AKEL gained strength after the election and, 
during the years 1943-44; it supported many strikes and 
generally protested the absence of a popularly-elected leg­
islative body. Moreover, it was quite vociferous about its
platform, which included a listing of all of the grievances
107that the Cypriots had nurtured since 1931, so as to appeal 
to the enosists. While AKEL was hard at work trying to
^^^R.I.I.A., Cyprus. op. cit., The figures cited 
here did not include the famous Cyprus mules, a breed which 
has distinguished itself for warfare ever since the Abys­
sinian Campaign, I867. Hill, op. cit., p. 435.
^^^Hill, op. cit., p. 435.
^^'^Ibid.
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establish itself, another party, catering to the right- 
wing middle class and boasting the endorsement of the 
Church, was garnering support. The backing of the Church 
has been the key to success in Cypriot politics and the 
past pattern had not changed by 1946. This church-backed 
party, the Nationalist, had quite naturally enosis as its 
main platform. Advocating enosis in fact, was the only 
shared value these two parties had, but it still could not 
prevent great conflicts between them. In early 19^5> dur­
ing the celebration of Greek Independence Day, the parties 
clashed and the police, trying to stop the melee, were
forced to fire into the crowds and caused many casualties
X08before order was restored.
A year before the 1946 municipal elections were
held, eighteen persons belonging to the Pancyprian Trade
Union (PEO) were convicted of attempting to violently over-
109throw the Government. Yet this had no effect whatsoever
in the May, 1946, elections. A left-wing coalition of PEO 
and AKEL was victorious in all but two of the principal 
c i t i e s . T h e r e  has been little doubt from the start that 
AKEL was inspired by the Communists. Its actions, though 
once in a while seeming to disprove its orientation, have 
108R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 7*
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never caused anyone to wonder whether or not it was run 
by the C o m m u n i s t s . B y  1958, AKEL's power laid in the 
fact that it controlled 7/8 of all trade unions in Cyprus.
Cyprus escaped serious attack during the Second 
World War, in much the same manner as it had in World War 
I. It was used chiefly as a supply station as it had been 
previously. A unique problem arose during the War concern­
ing the flow of Zionist immigrants into the British man­
date of Palestine. The British restrictions were not being 
obeyed, so Britain was compelled to use force to curtail 
immigration. On Cyprus, Britain placed large detention 
camps to hold the Zionists who were apprehended trying to 
enter Palestine illegally. The formula for many a Jewish 
immigrant was: from a Nazi concentration camp in Poland,
via a Greek or Italian ship, to a British concentration 
camp in Cyprus. Nobody liked the unpleasant task of pro­
longing the hardship of pitiful Jewish refugees, and the 
Cypriots were no exception. The Communists circulated the 
rumor that Britain was intentionally trying to weaken the 
Greek Cypriot population by an influx of foreigners, and
by causing shortages and increased prices due to the excess
112foodstuffs required by the camps. To add confusion to
^^^Cyprus. Colonial Reference Division, No. R 3389, 
Sept., 1956, p. 3- AKEL was later proscribed by the British 
colonial government in Cyprus.
112
R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 7-
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this, another unofficial report was circulated in 1946 to 
the effect that British troops had to evacuate Egypt and 
would have to install a massive military base on Cyprus. 
These rumors and events caused much of the wartime good 
will between the British and Cypriots to vanish rapidly, 
but this good will was tenuous even at its height.
When the Labor Party came to power by the elec­
tions of 1945 in England, the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. 
Creech Jones, expressed the desire to "seek opportunities
to establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the
113internal affairs of the island." The Governor was asked
to call a Consultative Assembly for sometime in 1947, and 
invitations to the Assembly were sent to twenty-eight care­
fully selected Cypriots. Sir George Hill reports that the 
"response was discouraging." The Church had declared a 
boycott and subsequently fourteen Cypriot Greeks refused 
stating that "enosis" was their "sole political aim";^^^ 
nevertheless, the Assembly was held with eighteen in atten­
dance. The first motion presented by the eight left-wing 
Greeks who were present was that self-government be consi­
dered. When this was refused by the presiding governor, 
they joined with the other members of the Assembly in 
demands for a constitution similar to that of Malta and
^^^Hill, OP. cit.. p. 437.
^^^Ibid., p. 438.
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Ceylon featuring an elected legislature, and curtailing
the powers of the Governor to external matters only.
The Assembly ended in a deadlock, but the British
did present their proposals for a new constitution. It was
not formally presented to the people until six months later,
but the Archbishop of Cyprus called for the rejection of
115the plan before he had even seen it. The intransigent
stand of the politically inclined Cypriot Church had not 
changed in over twenty years. Though the Cypriots leaders 
must be lauded for constancy, they were certainly chided 
by many observers, for their poor eyesight, whatever it was, 
myopia or hyperopia. The now proposal would have established 
Ein elected legislature, giving the Greeks an eighteen to four 
majority over the Turks with four seats to be appointed by 
the governor. A stronger Executive Council was proposed 
euid the Governor was supposed to accept their recommenda­
tions or report the reasons for his refusal to the Foreign 
Office. Many points were left open for discussion, but 
enosis and self-government were specifically prohibited. 
Though the proposal would have been gingerly accepted ten 
years earlier, it was still not an ideal arrangement, but 
as a base for further negotiation, it was certainly worth 
more than a flat, blind refusal by the Cypriot Greeks. The
^^^Ibid.
^^^Central Office of Information, Cyprus, (London:
1958), p. 8.
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Offer remained open, but both Left and Right-wing Cypriot 
Greeks felt that any rational acquiescence toward consti­
tutional development would mean an abandonment of enosis. 
Colonial Secretary Creech Jones stated at one point in 
negotiations that people "in the grip of nationalism are
impervious to rational argument," but he hoped the situa-
117tion would change in some way --but that was never to 
com© until over ten years had passed.
The Militant Enosis Movement
The next municipal elections, in May, 1949, saw
AKEL keep their strength in the coastal cities, but it was
a stinging defeat for them otherwise. The Right-wing party
was victorious in Nicosia, the capital, and in ten of the
other fourteen municipalities. In the final tally, the
Rightists polled approximately three-fifths of the votes
cast. More developments that year were, the resignation of
the governor, Lord Winster, and the appointment of the more
moderate Sir Andrew Wright. These happenings, however, did
not overshadow the elevation in 1950 of the Bishop of Kitium
118to the position of Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus.
This occasion laid the foundation for the period of terror­
istic chaos that was to seize Cyprus between 1954 and 1958.
117
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It should be stressed here that in spite of nearly 
100 years of formal Cypriot demands that they be united with 
"mother Greece," Greece had never made a formal diplomatic 
request that enosis be fulfilled. After an alleged peti­
tion was presented to the Greek government, showing that 
95-7% of the Cypriots wanted enosis, Prime Minister 
Venezelos in 1951 urged the Chamber of Deputies to incorpor­
ate the Cypriot plea in the official national policy. Still 
the Greeks hesitated, possibly because of their recent admis­
sion along with Turkey into NATO, or perhaps public opinion 
was not yet roused. Though in 1951, the Greek delegate to 
the United Nations Assembly in Paris did raise the question 
in the Trusteeship Committee, the Greeks were still chary of 
enosis.
It was not until 195^ that enosis finally became 
an official part of Greek foreign policy, and the official 
Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Greece with Cyprus 
was formed. Soon thereafter Greece began her fruitless 
efforts to annex the island of Cyprus.
At the same time Great Britain attempted to reach 
a peaceful settlement. Another constitution was offered 
Cyprus in 195^, but this was met with a violent response, 
due in part to the concurrent smnouncement that the British 
Middle East Land and Air Headquarters would be transferred
119This plebiscite petition is explained in detail 
in Chapter II, under "The Greek Current."
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120to Cyprus from Jordan. Violence again erupted in 1955 
after the UN refused to discuss the Greek petition and 
these were organized activities, spearheaded by the youth­
ful Greek terrorist movement, EOKA (National Organization
2.21of Cyprus Struggle),
When the situation on the island became extremely 
tense, Britain called a Tripartite Conference with Greece 
and Turkey in 1955, but the firm stands on both the British 
and Greek parts soon revealed that the Conference would 
accomplish nothing. Soon after the talks broke down a state 
of emergency was declared in Cyprus, and the anti-EOKA cam­
paign was placed in the firm hands of Sir John Harding, 
the newly appointed Governor. The state of emergency was 
highlighted by the 1956 deportation to the Seychelles 
Islands of Archbishop Makarios and certain other Prelates 
who were accused of encouraging the terrorist activities 
of EOKA. Nothing the British would have done could have 
more exacerbated the situation in Cyprus than deporting the 
Archbishop. This, therefore, paved the way for an all-out 
British onslaught on the terrorists, and vice-versa.
Despite the seemingly hopeless turn of events
120R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 11.
121The story of EOKA is a study in itself. Many 
recent works have analyzed its role in the Cypriot struggle. 
One of the best and least biased is: Dudley Barker, Grivas :
Portrait of a Terrorist, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, I960).
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on Cyprus, Britain still went ahead with plans to give the 
island an acceptable constitution. Lord Radcliffe was com­
missioned with the job and he devised a most liberal consti­
tutional draft in December of 1956. The chief provisions 
of the proposal were not unlike former ones, ©specially 
that one of 1948. Moreover, the proposals recognized the 
future option of self-determination, with appropriate safe­
guards for the Turkish minority. The Turks accepted this 
as a basis for negotiation but the Greeks refused it out­
right. The Cypriot people themselves never had a chance to 
voice what probably would have been a negative response to 
the Radcliffe proposals.
The Cyprus question was discussed in the UN in 
1957, but nothing positive was expressed by the General 
Assembly except "the earnest desire that a... just solution 
will be found." This did little except to insure the Arch­
bishop's release later that year provided he would not 
return to Cyprus. The British gradually released the emer­
gency measures on the island--though violence had not stopped 
— and proposed a plan in early 1958 calling for a seven- 
year "period of partnership" between the three governments. 
This was set aside at the time both because of the concur­
rent Greek demand for enosis and the Turkish demand for 
partition. When deadlock and the shaky status quo looked 
to be the final solution, NATO Secretary-General Spaak 
dramatically stepped into the picture and set up the
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conferences which later led to the Zurich Agreement and 
the final London Agreements. These negotiations should be 
discussed at length, in order to place in perspective the 
complexities of the British, Greek, and Turkish policies 
as they affected the attempts of the parties to resolve 
the "Cyprus Muddle." (infra, Chapters II and III.)
Chapter II
POLITICAL FORCES EMERGING AFTER 1951 AND 
THE RESULTING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
Preface
The Cyprus problem was far more involved than 
that of a "classic" colonial struggle--with the indigenous 
population desiring independence and the mother-country 
denying it. While the rising wave of protest against imper­
ial oppression, exploitation, and deprivation contributed 
to the separatist movement in Cyprus, there were other fac­
tors on the international level which played a significant 
role in making the matter as acute as it ultimately became. 
The pcst-Worlu War II era has been characterized by the 
success of colonies in their drives for freedom from foreign 
domination, and this is vividly demonstrated by the number 
of emergent Afro-Asian nations which did not exist two 
decades ago. The age-old clamoring of the Cypriots found 
an ideal outlet in the wave of nationalism that has pre­
vailed in contemporary world politics, but the promise of 
success in Cyprus was no more assured at that time than it 
was at the beginning of British rule. Indeed, it was not 
until the Cyprus problem had become an "apple of discord" 
between three sovereign nations that Great Britain was
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finally compelled to make a reassessment on her Cyprus 
policy. It therefore should be emphasized that it was not 
primarily the domestic turmoil in Cyprus that caused a 
change of heart in Whitehall, rather it was provoked, 
among other things, by the threat of a grave upheaval 
between allies of the cold war.
Surges toward self-government, or at times merely 
a new government, are explained by Hans Kohn as "due not 
so much to external pressure as to Western ideas themselves."^ 
In other words, it was neither rioting students nor active 
terrorists that brought independence to certain colonies; 
it was more a result of the philosophy inherited from the 
colonizing motherland. It was an attitude which acknowledged 
the natural right of reasonable men to choose their own forms 
of government; or what some like to call self-determination,
2
which is historically an element of American foreign policy.
^Hans Kohn, "Reflections of Colonialism," from 
Strausz-Hupe and Hazard, The Idea of Colonialism, (New York; 
Praeger, 1958), p. 10.
2
Norman D. Palmer and H. C. Perkins, International 
Relations. 2nd Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957)>
p. 697- Many writers feel that self-determination is not 
an absolute right and "President Wilson did mankind not the 
only disservice of his career when he insisted on bestowing 
this concept upon it against the advice of his Secretary of 
State (Robert Lansing), who uttered the warning that it 
would bring 'untold misery' to the world." From Sir Henry 
Luke, Cyprus, New York: Roy Publishers, 1957, P « 183. It
was this point, among others, that caused the break between 
Wilson and Lansing and ended in the letter's being dismissed 
from the cabinet in 1920. See Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplo­
matic History of the American People, 3rd Ed. (Now York:
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This right, however, has been granted by colonial powers only 
on a selective basis, and much discontent has resulted. An 
analogy might be drawn here to what de Toqueville has said 
about a minor concession in voting rights leading ultimately
3
to universal suffrage. For here we see occasional conces­
sions in self-determination ultimately leading to self- 
determination for all, which mesins the eventual demise of 
historic colonialism.
Thus, Professor Kohn is careful to avoid placing 
the blame for the rise of anti-colonialism fully on either
native liberationists or upon the "legalistic, moralistic"
4
nations, as George Konnan has labeled the United States.
Instead he nostaligically observes:
Western imperialism has had only a brief day in 
history. Its sun is now setting, eind though this 
sun has shone over many injustices and cruelties—  
though these were in no way worse than the normal 
cruelties in Asia and Africa— >it has brought last­
ing benefits to both continents..;5
Crofts and Co., 1?46), pp. 65O, 6y4. It might also be noted 
that the principle of self-determination was reconfirmed in 
Point 2, of the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and 
Churchill in 194l. Ibid., p. 783• The United National Char­
ter also declared that the interest of non-self-governing 
territories is "paramount." (Article 73) More to the point 
is Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the UN Charter which refers to 
the development of friendly relations among nations, "based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deter­
mination of peoples."
3Alex de Toqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1959), (The Henry Reeve Text), p. 59.
^George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. (Chicagot 
U. of Chicago Press, 1951)» P • 95^
^Kohn, loc. cit.
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The receding tide of colonialism can be attri­
buted, therefore, to evolution rather than revolution. The 
twentieth century with its changing system of values, and 
its consequential effect on all the nations of the world, 
has brought colonialism into a new and unsympathetic light. 
Whether such a change is justified or abortive is another 
matter, but Professor Kohn indicates by his mention of 
"lasting benefits" that the usefulness of colonialism, i.e., 
to nurture backward areas to political maturity, might not 
be completely passe. The fundamental reason for the pre­
sent moribund state of world-wide colonialism is, with 
little doubt, the altruistic ethical standard which has 
emerged in this new century. Moreover, the Western world 
has been guilty of applying this criterion to what already 
happened in the 19th Century, and the result is that "the 
West suffers from an unnecessarily bad conscience which 
naturally anti-Western propaganda is shamelessly exploit­
ing."^ Cultural disparities forced European countries to 
become colonizers; and the exposure of the colonial powers' 
civilization, in formerly undeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, 
and even America, has indeed reduced the previous cultural 
lag. Still this creates no valid reason that colonialism 
has served its purpose and, therefore now must die. Prof­
essor Kohn feels that the West has a "neurotic urge to make
^Ibid., p. 11.
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7disproportionat® atonement for imaginary wrongs" This 
anxiety and guilt feeling could do the free world infinitely 
more harm than the propaganda engendered by the existence 
of a few remaining primitive territories which necessarily 
must ba ruled by some power.
Cyprus has been occupied by Great Britain for 
almost eighty years; prior to that the island had known 
centuries of varied rulers. Cyprus has been an official 
colony only since 1925, but it has always been— and still
g
is considered by some--an ideal colonial type. In view of 
this, the factors which determine when a colony has become 
"politically mature" can b® a perplexing problem. Some 
observers have suggested scientific guages to facilitate 
the determination of whether a colony should be self-govern­
ing or not, i.e. literary, crime rate, per capita Income,
9
technical progress, success of local government, etc. 
Nevertheless, there is no absolute standard and each case 
must be judged on its individual merits. What individual 
merits Cyprus had for self-government were not quite appar­
ent. It had no recent historical tradition of internal 
autonomy, and since 1931 has been relieved completely of a 
hand in its government, other than on the municipal and
^Ibid.
^Hill, op. cit., p. 191, 613 ff.
9Stefan T. Possosny, "Colonial Problems in Per­
spective," from Strauss-Hupe and Hazard, op. cit■, p. 27-
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village levels.
Various proposals since the abrogation of the 
constitution in 1931 have stressed the necessity for 
improved management of local affairs before a part in the 
government of the island would be granted to the Cypriots,
(see Chapter I, supra). Later proposals pointed toward 
self-government as a distant goal^^ but no one imagined 
it would ever come as soon as it did. The last British 
proposal in July, 1958, the so-called "seven year plan," 
envisioned a seven-year sharing of the sovereignty of the 
island with Greece and Turkey in order to establish self- 
government followed by self-determination.^^ It is evident 
that the alternative of self-government was hastily preci­
pitated in the face of the mounting agitation and terrorism 
from both ethnic elements on the island, neither of which
^^The Labor Government suggested self-government 
for Cyprus at some nebulous future date, but at the time 
(1948) said no change in the sovereignty of the island was 
intended for the present. Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, 
No. 20, 1954. Also the Radcliffe Proposals took bold steps 
toward the establishment of self-government first, and then 
self-determination due at an unspecified future date. Com­
monwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 44, Jan., 1957, PP. 10 ff.
^^Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 61, July, 
1958, pp. 1 ff. It should be made clear here the above 
periodical (correctly called The Survey of . . .) is the 
official publication of the Conservative Party Political 
Centre in London. The views expressed are those of the Con­
servative Party, and are fully endorsed by the Conservative 
British Cabinet. With the Conservative Party in power now-- 
and in fact for as long as the writer has used the periodical 
for this study--The Survey. . . may be considered a semi­
official source.
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could be placated from 195^ onward. The Greeks cried 
enosis, the Turks demanded partition, and British tried to 
compromise with the suggestion of gradual self-government; 
none of the parties was successful in getting exactly what 
it wanted.
The Cyprus question came into prominence for the
British, as well as the rest of the world, in 1954. It
was in that year Greece first openly encouraged the enosis
movement on Cyprus and presented the question to the United
Nations. In that same year the EOKA terrorist activities
were initiated. Also in October, 1954, an agreement was
signed with Egypt for the complete evacuation of British
troops from Suez. Consequently, Cyprus had to become the
center for British power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This
development could do little to appease the dissident Greek
Cypriots, but Britain declared that she had a legal right
to the island and intended to make it her Middle Eastern
base. The Turks were firmly opposed to enosis from the
start, for fear of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and
"partly from misgivings about Greece's ability to defend an
12island so vital to Turkish security." Both of the stands 
were speciously reasonable; but they mattered little to Great 
Britain who, manifesting her own intransigence, proceeded to 
impose martial law on the island and went about building her
1954, p. 11.
12Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 20, Aug.,
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military installations. Thus, began a period of tension 
and bloodshed which was to last almost five years, until 
it was resolved by the unexpected Zurich and London Agree­
ments .
This period enabled each of the participants time 
to devise intricate cases defending their own particular 
views and the political currents in which these developed 
became apparent. These cases, presented primarily to the 
court of world public opinion, were obvious reflections of 
the international milieu and inter-group tensions function­
ing therein. All three currents were eventually to influ­
ence the final outcome of the Cyprus problem.
The Greek Current
The desire of some Greek Cypriots to be united
13with Greece enosis can be traced as far back as I830.
The official endorsement of the Cypriot desire by the Royal 
Greek Government, however, was never announced until 195^- 
The reasons for this puzzling lag are many, but the one 
that the Greek will give is the traditional friendship-- 
sorae view this "friendship" more as dependence— the Greeks
li|.
have always felt for the British. The Greeks had postponed
13
Hill, op. cit., p. 496. Most Cypriot Greek sour­
ces will push this date back to 1821, or the start of the 
Greek fight for independence.
14This had been the case ever since Lord George 
Gordon Byron, the poet, lost his life fighting for Greek 
independence in 1825- However, Greek anglophiles will cite
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an inevitable situation as long as they could; but— parti­
cularly after a personal rebuke of Prime Minister Papagos 
by Prime Minister Eden in 1954— the Greek government felt 
they could no longer stem the tide of world public opinion 
to which the Cypriot Greeks had been appealing so intensely 
through their clergy. The Cypriot Greek case was based 
on the moral issue that a subjugated people under foreign 
colonial-rule had the right to determine how they wanted to 
be governed. The case presents the same principle of self- 
determination which has been embodied into various inter­
national documents since the First World War. (see Foot­
note #2. supra.) .
The acceptance of the Cypriot Greek case by the 
Royal Greek government altered the whole psychological 
picture. To enhance the moral case of the Cypriots, the 
Greeks introduced an emotional aspect, designed to appeal 
to recently freed former colonies. More important than 
that innovation, the Greek case gave the Cypriot Greeks an 
"endorsement for the right of Union /enosis/which never 
existed before, which, if it is not taken seriously /by 
the British/ might land a n y w h e r e . T h e  case did lead to 
an end that few people expected; but not before it had
the Battle of Navarino in 1827 as the beginning of Anglo- 
Greek amity. See Hill, op. cit., p. 150.
15Durrell, op. cit., p. II6 .
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experienced vicissitudes, unwanted supporters, and violence 
to such an extent, that many of the Greek endorsers were 
sorry they had ever expressed their support.
Cyprus has never been a part of Hellenic Greece, 
but the island had known extensive Greek influences ever 
since ancient times. It was part of the Byzantine Empire 
and during that time the Eastern Orthodox Church was intro­
duced and allowed to flourish on the island, "thus religion
combined with language to foster the idea the Cypriots were
17Greek in origin." Language and religion were important 
considerations in the enosis idea, but the undue amount of 
emphasis placed on racial affinity as well by the enosists 
is a curious fact. Race was the weakest link that the 
Cypriots Greek had in their case. Extensive anthropologi­
cal and archaeological evidence has been in existence to 
prove that the primitive population of Cyprus was "an
^^This feeling was evident to any objective viewer 
who would speak with open-minded Greeks in Athens, Istanbul, 
or Nicosia from 1956 onward. This fact is part of the writ­
er's observation while in those cities, since few of these 
opinions were ever published for fear of ridicule, ostra­
cism, or retaliation. One must also bear in mind at this 
point that the so-called "Cypriot case" was one that did 
not have the allegiance of all the Cypriot Greeks. On the 
contrary, it has been sufficiently proven by a number of 
sources that enosis was a doctrine of only a very few on 
the island, but the church helped to make up the membership 
of this "few" and for that reason the movement had powerful 
support.
^'^Hill, op. cit. , p. 488.
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18offshoot from the regions of Asia Minor and North Syria." 
Notwithstanding, racial derivation is certainly not consi­
dered a prerequisite to nationalism. Nationalism can come 
from countless sources and Cyprus was an example of what
is termed "particularistic nationalism," which is based
19upon "secessionist demands of a people." A former gov­
ernor of Cyprus stated a case for enosis before the turn 
of the century:
The Greekness of the Cypriot Greeks, in my opinion 
is indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, 
is greater than pigmentation or cephalic indices.
A man is of the race of which he passionately feels 
himself to be. No sensible person will deny that 
the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, 
Greek-feeling, ...^0
Greek nationalism, slow as it was to seize the
21opportunity the Cypriots made for it, is quite unlike
1 8
Ibid., The Cypriots are Mediterranean dolchoce- 
phals, while the Greeks are Balkan brachycephalic.
19Khosrow, Mostofi, Aspects of Nationalism, (Salt 
Lake City; U. of Utah, 1959)* p. 12. The author notes that 
Cyprus once shared the lead with Northern Ireland as that 
nation which best represented the "frustrated attempts" of 
this type of nationalism.
Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations, (London: 1932),
p. 4yo quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 489.
21
Here again it must be accentuated that the sup­
port for enosis by the Greek Cypriots was not all-inclusive. 
Sir Harry Luke is careful to note this in his work, and the 
following is an accurate summary of the real Cypriot feel­
ing toward enosis; "A Frankenstein monster greater than 
even terrorism is Enosis itself. The villagers have had 
to pay lip-service to it when all that most of them wanted 
was to be left alone. No one dares to say he is against 
it for fear o^ f being branded a traitor, it is the stigma of 
disloyalty /to enosis/ that the strength of the movement 
resides." Luke, op. cit., p. 180.
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that which is understood by other Europeans. The funda­
mental concept is that all countries inhabited by Greeks 
should be united under one central Greek government. Some 
Greeks today still espouse the concept of irredentism, i.e., 
regaining all territories which were once occupied by Greece. 
This belief consequently, makes the contemporary irredent­
ists aspire to regain the entire Byzantine Empire of old.
This irredentist dream, fantastic as it may sound to any­
one who knows modern Greece, has nevertheless been the 
underlying element of Greek foreign policy. Despite the 
traditional internal disintegration or clannishness of the 
Greek nation--which consequently causes the Greek to hold 
his village in higher esteem than the state--Greek national­
ism has still developed because of the Greek people’s com-
22mon concentration on foreign policy. The Greek feels that 
territorial aggrandizement will bring the powerful nation 
status which, due to her pathetic lack of national resources 
and the other qualitative factors which determine national 
power, has thus far been denied Greece. The inordinate
^^Adamantia Pollis (Koslin), "The Megali Idea-- 
A Study of Greek Nationalism." Unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Johns Hopkins University, 1957. PP* 1-43. The 
Megali Idea" or the "The Great Idea" is the dream to bring 
about a greater Greece. The roots of this idea go back to 
the beginning of modern Greece, 1830, and though most writers 
feel the "great idea" is no longer thought of in its broadest 
concept, i.e., to bring about "a resurrected Byzantine Empire," 
(p. 262), Turkey fears it nonetheless. In fact, Turkey char­
ges that this idea has "fired the imagination of many Greeks 
and lent strength to the Greco-Cypriot movement of enosis."
See "The Cyprus Question," Mediterranean Documents, Vol. 1,
No. 3, Nov., 1958, p. 4.
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concern for foreign policy did more than just give the 
Greek extrinsic aspirations. One scholar explains another
results
By concentrating on foreign policy, through the 
structuring of the superordinate goal of irre­
dentism, the internal divisveness of the nation, 
while not eradicated was successfully i g n o r e d . ^3
Following this policy, Greece has entered wars--
especially the First World War--for the sole purpose of
territorial gain. Her statesmen have tried to justify any
territorial acquisition resulting from any war as;
. . .constituting not an extension of the state by 
conquest, but a natural return to the limits within 
which Hellenism has flourished ever since the pre­
historic period. ..
In view of these facts, it is understandable why
"Greek history portrays... the subservience of internal
issues to the exigencies of foreign affairs," which included
"...tangential escapades of territorial aggrandizement..."
25and "...enosis of unredeemed territory..," Thus it is 
not unwarranted to deduce that Greece had designs on Cyprus, 
as was alleged by some scholars since 1830.^^ Why the claim
^^Ibid., p. 207.
2kSpeech delivered in the Greek Parliament by 
Eleutherios Venizelos, October 21, 1915» quoted Ibid., p.
209 n.
2^ Ibid., p. 245.
^^Hill, op. cit., p. 496. See also Luke, op. cit., 
p. 171 and Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, (Washington; 
Royal Greek Information Service, October, 195^)» PP- 5» 24, 
36, and Durrell op. cit. . p. 24.
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was suppressed so long can be explained by pointing out 
that Greece had more exigent territorial objectives closer 
to home. When these objectives were either fulfilled,
(e.g., Thessaly, Thrace, Macedonia, Crete, etc.) or frus­
trated, (e.g., Constantinople and Asia Minor) then Greece 
was afforded the time to meike a claim on Cyprus. This time 
did not come, evidently, until the post War II era.
The success of the early movement of enosis, which 
expressed itself unmistakably within a year after Great 
Britain took over the island in I878, can be ascribed to 
the extreme toleration, almost laxiety, which characterized 
the British Administration at the time. The British took 
no interest initially in trying to dissuade the Cypriot 
Greeks from expressing their Hellenic ties. Possibly the 
British, felt the island was legally part of the Ottoman 
Empire--which it was until I9l4--and therefore, they had no 
right to make the Cypriots loyal subjects of the British 
crown. As a result, schools were allowed to pursue their 
own curriculum from the replica of that in Greece and it
27was taught from the start that Greece was the motherland.
27One of the first reports on education in 1879 
stressed the fact that Cypriot students should be allowed 
"to obtain instructions in English as well as Greek and 
prevent schools from being a focus of Hellenic propagan- 
disra" Correspondence Respecting Complaints Made Against the 
Government of Cyprus, March 5. 1879. /C-2324/, 1878-79,
LIV 501) P . 20. Despite this warning. Colonial Secretary,
Lord Kimberly, stated three years later: "Considering the
rich and varied literature of ancient Greece...Greek is re­
garded for the attainment of a high degree of mental culture."
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That was only part of what was permitted under the early
British rule, Hill also notes:
Their /Greek Cyprio// maps represented Cyprus as 
part of 'unredeemed Greece.' Portraits of King 
Constantine, Queen Sophia, Venezelos and of the 
heroes of the Greek War of Independence decorated 
the walls. And it was the glories of Greek His­
tory, not the achievements of the British nation, 
that were made familiar to the pupils.^
With such a start, it is little wonder why the
British had to contend with the endless cries for enosis 
which gradually increased in intensity every year. More­
over, the desire of the Cypriots became a political issue 
on the homefront. The Greek Club in London, was the 
center of pressures to recognize enosis, which were put 
on the Liberal Government after they came into power in
1880. Prime Minister Gladstone might have privately sided
with the Greek case, but said often in public "that propos­
als involving a violation of the Cyprus Convention could
29not be discussed." This same man, nevertheless, later
acknowledged the Greek case and a famous passage he wrote
in 1897 has been frequently cited in many of the propaganda
publications put out by the Greek Information Office after
the Athens government officially took the case;
I subjoin the satisfaction I should feel were it 
granted me before the close of my long life to 
see the population of that Hellenic island placed
OQ
Hill, op. cit., p. 492.
^^Ibid., p. 498.
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by a friendly arrangement in orgemic union with 
their brethern of the Kingdom of Greece.^®
From the beginning of the occupation in I878 
until the First World War, the British continually invoked 
the obstacle that Cyprus was legally under Ottoman sover­
eignty. With this maneuver, they could successfully frus­
trate the claims of the Cypriot Greeks by pointing out 
that Great Britain was not free to dispose of the island.
The claims made by the Cypriot Greeks during this period
31became more fervent, however, as their population increased. 
When the British formally annexed the island in 19l4, the 
©nosists saw a possibility that their case would be viewed 
in a new light. But, in the same manner that had charac­
terised the British behavior in the years prior, the demands 
for enosis were tepidly received in London. Most Cypriots 
felt after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923» that Britain was 
absolutely free to deal with Cyprus as she planned, i.e., - 
without any reference to the Turks; but these hopes were 
shattered when the island was made a Crown Colony in 1925» 
and Great Britain considered the Cyprus question a closed 
issue. It is interesting to note that even after the dis­
turbances in 1931» the Greek Cypriot case for enosis was
OQ
Cyprus Demands Self-Determination. (Washington; 
Greek Information Office, October, 1954)» p . 18.
O 1
The Greeks increased to 80% of the population 
by 1931- See Cyprus, Touchstone for Democracy. (Athens:
Union of Journalists, November, 1958), Ï1
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not endorsed by Greece. The numerous petitions which 
were signed on the island and the endless Cyprian dele­
gations that invaded London all were ostensibly spontan­
eous and purported that the majority of Cypriots wanted 
union with Greece. Yet not a single instance is recorded 
where the Royal Greek Government spoke up in diplomatic
channels in favor of the enosis movement until after
32World War II. As was indicated before, the reason for
this failure might have been justified; but it has led some
observers to think that Greece actually thought the Cypriot
"moral" case was weak and to side with such a movement
would either make them look foolish in the same arena of
power politics or at least make their efforts appear ill- 
33intended. A British agent on Cyprus at the time made this 
amusing summary of enosis, prior to the Greek acceptance of 
the case: "Well, old man, officially it doesn't exist, but
unofficially it's a bit of headache.
The acceptance of the Cypriot case by the Greeks 
has never been fully explained, but one can easily cit® 
circumstances which may have contributed to the change in 
policy when it finally came about. First, the Truman
32The Greek Parliament approved a demand for eno­
sis in 19^7» however, the Greek government never communica­
ted the resolution to the British. See Hill, op. cit., p.
565.
33See Luke, op. cit., pp. I78 ff. and Hill, op. 
cit.. 565 ff;
34
Durrell, op. cit., p. 119.
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Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey was announced in 19^7» 
and this diminished the importance Greece had placed on aid 
and assistance from Britain. Second, Marshall Plan economic 
aid had been poured into Greece from 1948 to 1951 and the 
economy of Greece was at last approaching viability. And 
lastly, Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO in 1951, 
and thus becoming allies with the West against their mutual 
enemy of Communism. (Regarding the last point, it could be 
noted that this expression of Greco-Turkish accord jolted 
many of the advocates of Greece's claim on Constantinope 
/Istanbul/ and other parts of Asia Minor.)
These conditions allowed Greece time to concen­
trate her foreign policy efforts on other areas which had 
seemed insignificant before, i.e., Cyprus and Greece's 
realization that the Cypriot case of self-determination, 
could bring nothing but eventual union. Greece had inten­
tionally waited for the ideal time to express her steind on 
Cyprus and by the Cypriot plebiscite 1950, it had come.
This policy change by the Greek government made the cen­
tury-old Greek Cypriot plea for enosis take on new dimen­
sions. A Dutch journalist devised an analogy to explain 
the new Cypriot feeling;
Cyprus is like a man who has been told he is impotent 
for generations; suddenly he finds himself in bed with 
a lovely girl and discovers that he isn't--he can 
actually make l o v e  1^5
Quoted, in ibid. , p. 202.
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The Cypriots thought there was no stopping the 
enosis dream, now that Greece had expressed their support; 
but Greece actually disliked being badgered by the Cypri-
O ^
ots. From 1951 on, Greek government officials had tried
to get some kind of concession from the British, so that
they could present a "face-saver which would enable them to
37shut the Cypriots up." Their efforts were to little avail, 
since the Cabinet of Anthony Eden regarded the Cyprus case 
as closed. The Greeks perhaps would have been satisfied if 
they could have got the British to change "closed" to "post-
OQ
poned" but it never happened. A statement made by Henry 
Hopkinson on the floor of Parliament in July, 1954, summar­
ized the "notorious never" position of the British which 
so irritated the Greeks:
36After the Radcliffe proposals were announced 
the official Greek policy became one of moderation. Upon 
hearing this, Col. George Grivas, leader of EOKA, sent a 
demand to the Greek government for more determined action. 
The Foreign Office in Athens replied with forceful rejoin­
ders "The foreign policy of Greece is not determined by 
any area of Greece, nor by any organization of free or 
unredeemed Greeks ; it is determined in the name of the 
Greek people by the Government elected by them which, with­
out ceasing to fight for freedom of the Greeks, must safe­
guard the more general and stable interests of the nation." 
Quoted in Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heine- 
man, I960), p. 182.
37Durrell, op. cit.. p. 11?.
O O
Had the British known the Greek mentality bet­
ter, they could have alienated less of these emotional 
people by answering with an evasive promise, than with an 
honest refusal.
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It has always been understood and agreed that there 
are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, 
owing to their particular circumstances, can never 
expect to be fully independent.3°
It was this complete impasse facing the Greek government 
that forced them to take their struggle for self-determina­
tion in Cyprus to the United Nations.
The Cyprus Issue in the UN
In September of 1950, an unofficial Cypriot 
delegation submitted to the Secretary General the plebis­
cite petition, signed in January, 1950, which indicated 
that 95-7 per cent of the Cypriot population wanted union 
with G r e e c e . T h e  next claim in 1951 was that registered 
by Greece when the Venizelos government demanded the union 
of Cyprus with Greece after the British had declared that 
no formal request for enosis had svar been received. In 
the fall of that same year, Mavros, the Greek delegate to 
the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly in Paris, 
raised the matter in the Trusteeship Committee and claimed 
it was within the scope of the UN Charter, but there was no 
UN action taken on the proposal.
39
Quoted in Cyprus Touchstone for Democracy, 
op. cit., p . 10.
ho Cyprus Demands Self Determination, op. cit., p. 6.
^^The New York Times. Nov. 23, 1951, P . l4. The 
Greeks and their counterparts in Cyprus were especially 
grieved at this time because Libya had. been given its inde­
pendence i while the "descendants of Socrates were still
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During th.® Seventh Session of the Un General 
Assembly in 1952, the Greek delegation once again raised 
the question of self-determination for Cyprus. The Secre­
tary-General did not refer the question to any committee 
and the matter was dropped. During that same year, Arch­
bishop Makarios III of Cyprus visited the General Assembly 
in New York in order to plead the Cypriot case and build 
up support for the Greek case. The next year during the 
Eighth UN General Assembly, the Chairman of the Greek Dele­
gation, Alexis Kyrou, was pressured by Greek public opinion 
to raise the Cyprus question though it was not on the UN 
Agenda. He insisted the Greek government preferred bi­
lateral talks with Great Britain, but Great Britain was 
non-cooperative at this time. So with the help of a group 
of Cypriots, the Greek Delegation petitioned individual 
UN delegates and cultivated a favorable field of opinion
kz
for their big effort which was to come the following year.
By 1954, Field Marshal Alexander L. Papagos was
the new Prime Minister and he along with his cabinet were
rabidly pro-enosis.. The Greek Delegation again raised the
Cyprus question, and this time it was finally placed on the
Agenda of the Ninth General Assembly by the Steering Com- 
43mittee. The Greek case was presented clearly in a letter
slaves." The London Times, May 29, 1952, quoted in Cyprus. 
Background to Enosisl (London; R.I.I.A., Oct., 1955), pT
42
The New York Times, Sept. 22, 1953, P . 5*
^^Ibid., p. 245.
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Archbishop Makarios sent to the Secretary General, in which 
the Archbishop alleged that the British Administration in 
Cyprus contravenes the UN Charter:
It contravenes Article 1 of the Declaration which 
provides that all human beings are b o m  free and equal in 
dignity and rights.
It contravenes Article 19 whereby everyone has 
the right of opinion and expression without interference.
It contravenes Article 20 whereby everyone has 
the right of peaceful Assembly and Association.
It contravenes Article 21 which provides that the 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
Government.
It also contravenes Article 26 (2) which provides 
that education shall be directed to the full development 
of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and Article 26 
(3) which provides that parents have a prior right to choose 
the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
All these violations of fundamental freedoms fol­
low in the furrow of the major violation of Human Rights, 
namely the denial to the people of Cyprus of their right 
to self-determination. They are herein stated only in 
order to show some of the evils that denial of national 
liberty entails; for it should be made clear that our claim 
is that of self-determination and nothing less.^k
In the debate which followed the United Kingdom 
countered Greek claims by stating that the United Nation 
Assembly "lacked competence" to handle this issue, which 
to Great Britain was a domestic one. Also Britain claimed 
that self-determination was merely a legal way by which 
Greece could annex Cyprus and it would not bring about self- 
government. In further debate. New Zealand proposed a draft 
resolution, supported by Turkey, that Article 2, paragraph
p-  ^ ^
Explanatory memorandum in letter from Archbishop 
Makarios III to the Secretary General of the UN, August 22, 
1934. Prom Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, op. cit., p .
35.
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7, of th.© Charter precludes the discussion of Cyprus, 
because there was a domestic issue involved, and UN should 
never take the matter into consideration again. This reso­
lution was amended to read "for the time being" instead of,
"never," and it was adopted by fifty votes to none with
45
eight abstentions.
The argument against the British claim that Cyprus 
was a domestic issue was raised by the Greek delegate, and 
supported by the Russian representative. It was that under 
Article 73 of the Charter, Cyprus was considered a "non­
self-governing territory" and her interests were "para­
mount" ; the United Kingdom had conceded this by submitting 
annual information reports on Cyprus to the Assembly as 
provided for under this Article. Nevertheless, the Bri­
tish influence in the Assembly won out and the matter was
k6dropped until the next year.
The Tenth Session of the UN General Assembly con­
vened soon after the London Tripartite Conference broke 
down in the Fall of 1955• Before the Plenary Session of 
the Assembly, the Greeks again presented a resolution 
requesting that the Cyprus question be placed on the Agenda. 
The Greek Foreign Minister continually had accused the other 
members of the London Conference of its failure. In a speech
^^Yearbook of the UN 1954, op. cit., pp. 94-96. 
^^Ibid.
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before the UN General Assembly he tried to substantiate
the Greek viewpoint and get the Cyprus issue placed on
the Agenda. But it was fruitless effort as the Plenary
Assembly voted not to include the resolution. The Greek
delegation maintained throughout that they were acting for
the Cypriot people only in a defense against British Admin-
istration which was "neither constructive nor democratic."
It was after these frustrated negotiations that widespread
violence broke out in Cyprus, and led to the deportation
of Archbishop Makarios in March of the following year.
The Eleventh Session of the UN General Assembly
convened in 1956 and again the Greek Delegation presented
their request that the Cyprus issue be placed on the Agenda.
The Greek Delegation made application for consideration on
the Agenda under the auspices of the UN principle of "equal
1+9
rights and self-determination of peoples." In general, 
the Greek case for the UN that year was presented exactly 
as it had been the year before. This time during the debate, 
however, the Greek representative stressed the great "mili­
tary machine" which the British were employing to rid the 
1+7
Yearbook of the UN 1955, op. cit., pp. 77-79. 
^^Ibid.
N Q
Yearbook of the UN 1956, op. cit., pp. 94-125.
By this time the case the Greeks were presenting to the 
British was one of demanding the outright annexation of 
Cyprus without even a plebiscite. See Commonwealth and 
Colonial Affairs, op. cit.. No. 37» May, 1956.
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island of terrorism. Also there was an allegation by the 
Greeks that Britain's sole interest in Cyprus was to pro­
tect her oil interests in the Middle East (such an argument 
obviously intended to arouse the newly freed nations, espe­
cially those of the Middle East). Moreover, the Greeks 
maintained that the Lausanne Treaty did not rule out the 
possibility of self-determination by the Cypriots, as Tur­
key and the United Kingdom had held all along. Article l6 
(not Article 20) of the treaty specified that "the disposal 
of these territories and islands is to be settled by the 
parties concerned.
To bolster these logical arguments, Gicece intro­
duced emotional "evidences" of British atrocités committed 
during the emergency period on the island. Numerous signed 
statements of British cruelties and intrigue were presented 
to the delegates to consider along with other information 
presented during the debates. Great Britain did not want 
to be left out of this emotionalism altogether, therefore, 
she introduced the "captured" diary, supposedly written by 
the leader of EOKA, Dighenis (Col. George Grivas). Greece 
thought so little of what she called a "forgery" that she 
included much of the diary in the appendix of the Greek 
publication dealing with the Cyprus question before the
5°The Treaties of Peace (1919-1923). Vol. II,
(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1924), p. 964.
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United Nations.
Four solid days of debate ensued and no less than 
eighty nations took part in the proceedings. Greece had 
two resolutions in front of the Political and Security Com­
mittee: one calling for self-determination for Cyprus, and
the second asking for a fact-finding commission to investi­
gate the charges which the British made to the effect that 
the Greek government was supporting the terrorist EOKA 
movement in the island. Part way through the debate, the 
U. S. delegate to the UN, J. J. Wadsworth, appealed to 
Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to settle the dispute among
themselves and urged that no UN action be taken to aggravate 
'52the situation. Finally, the Political Committee adopted 
a resolution proposed by India, ?6 votes to none with two 
abstentions, and the General Assembly endorsed the decision 
of the First Committee. The resolution stated:
51Cyprus Before the United Nations, 11th Session, 
(Washington: Royal Greek Information Service, 1958), pp.
311-314.
^^The New York Times, February 21, 1957» p . 9.
In the autumn of 1958 at a time when Queen Frederika of 
Greece had been touring the U. S., she was advised by the 
State Department that an end to the Greco-Turkish dispute 
was highly desirable. The Middle East had become an intense 
problem area for the U. S. due to the Arab-Israeli struggle, 
topped by the real or imagined, Soviet penetration in the 
area. As a result the State Department "could no longer 
afford the luxury of a perpetual conflict among her allies." 
Alastos, op. cit., p. 198.
53
Yearbook of the UN, 1956, op. cit., pp. 121-125.
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The General Assembly-
Having considered the question of Cyprus,
Believing that the solution of this problem requires 
an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, 
Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, 
democratic and just solution will be found in accor­
dance with the principles and purposes of the Charter 
of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations 
will be resumed and continued to this end.54
This resolution was greeted with undue enthusiasm 
by members of the UN. There was little that was subsequently 
done in "an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression." 
Archbishop Makarios was freed from the Seychelles where he 
had been deported, but the violence on the island continued. 
The Radcliffe proposals for a new constitution on Cyprus 
was presented after the UN resolution, but the Greeks main­
tained that there was no provision for self-determination,
5 5
and refused to discuss it. Great Britain tried to resume 
Tripartite talks, but these were not warmly received by 
Greece's Foreign Office, which had always resented the 
British invitation to include Turkey. The Greeks insisted 
that the "negotiations" referred to in the UN Resolution 
meant those between Great Britain and a representative of 
the Cypriot people, who in the Greek estimation was Arch­
bishop Makarios. On this point, the British were adamantly
5^Ibid.
55Survey of Colonial Affairs, June, 1957- Tt 
should be noted that Krishna Menon of India then argued 
in a lengthy speech that the obvious "just democratic solu­
tion" was "independence," but the resolution was never 
acted upon. Alastos, op. cit., p. 154.
93
opposed to talks with Makarios, as they felt he was directly
responsible for the rampant terrorism on Cyprus. In view
of the deadlock, NATO offered the us® of "Lord Xsmay's good
57offices" since the parties concerned were all members.
Greece refused this because it would amount to a virtual 
Tripartite Conference and ignore completely the opinion 
of the Cypriot people on this matter.
When the Twelfth General Assembly of the UN con­
vened in September, 1957» there was little evidence that 
the disputants present could show that they subscribed to 
the resolution passed by the previous Assembly. Greece again 
requested inscription of the Cyprus question on the Agenda.
It was once more included on the Agenda under a two-part 
titles first, was the usual contention of self-determina­
tion for the Cypriots, and second, was the claim of "viola­
tions of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial
58Administration against Cyprians." As in the previous 
Assembly, the debate on the question lasted through four 
days, during which time the Greek resolution was amended 
by Canada and others in the Political Committee, and was 
approved as follows:
5 6Survey of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, 
April, 1957, p. 6-8.
5?Ibid., March, 1957, p. 11.
58
Yearbook of the UN, 195/, op> cit., p. 76.
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Considering further that the situation in Cyprus is 
still fraught with danger and that a solution at the 
earliest possible time is required to preserve peace 
and stability in that area, the Political Committee 
expressed its hope that further negotiations and dis­
cussions will be undertaken in a spirit of cooperation 
with a view to having the right of self-determination 
applied in the case of the people of Cyprus.59
When the resolution reached the General Assembly it managed
to get only thirty-one votes in favor and, as this was not
the two-thirds required for General Assembly approval, the
resolution was not adopted.
The Thirteenth General Assembly of the United 
Nations convened in the Fall of 1958. A determined Greek 
Delegation once again introduced the question of Cyprus to 
be placed on the Agenda for the General Assembly's considera­
tion. During the discussion in the Political Committee, 
America, Turkey, and seven other nations also introduced 
resolutions to be considered along with that of Greece.
The final resolution, which was adopted by the Committee, 
was the one submitted by Iran with amendments by Greece and 
Turkey. This draft called for a conference with the inter­
ested parties and a representative of the Cypriot people, 
but it again failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote 
in the General A s s e m b l y . T h e  following day Mexico
59Ibid., also Cyprus Before the United Nations, 
12th Assembly! (Washington: Greek Information Services,
1958), p7 276.
^^Yearbook of the UN, 1957, loo, cit.
^^The New York Times, Dec. 5, 1958.
^^Ibid.. Dec. 6, 1958, p. 1-2.
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introduced a resolution which repeated much of what the 
previous Assembly had suggested for Cyprus, i.e., the 
General Assembly "expresses its confidence that continued 
efforts would be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, 
democratic, and just solution in accordance with the char- 
ter of the United Nations." This resolution was adopted.
To say that the Greek case was successful before 
the UN would not be an accurate statement. However, one 
must not call the results a defeat for Greece either. The 
Greek Delegation made five successive appeals to the Gen­
eral Assembly and, through the debates which were carried 
on, virtually the whole world became aware of the legal 
and moral background of the Cyprus issue. The faith the 
Greek Delegation had in the UN, even after their last 
attempt proved fruitless for their case, must be admired.
If the independent status had not been granted Cyprus,
Greek Foreign Minister Evangelas Averoff would undoubtedly 
have gone to the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly 
in 1959 making a similar statement to the last one he made:
The duty of the UN General Assembly is to arrive at a 
clear and unequivocal decision between— on the one 
hand— the right of the pgople of Cyprus to an inde­
pendent status (as proposed by us)— on the other hand—  
the Turco-British proposals, which under various 
excuses, aim at partition...we appeal to the United 
Nations carrying with us the hopes of a distressed
p e o p l e . 64
^^Ibid.
64Quoted in Cyprus Touchstone for Democracy, op. 
cit., p. 53- Also see: Suryey on Commonwealth and Colonial
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The vast Greek efforts in the UN had, in final analysis, 
little to do with the final settlement of the Cyprus 
problem.
Summary and Analysis of the Greek Involvement
The Cypriot Greek case was on© that took on 
exaggerated proportions after the Greek government offi­
cially cam® to the aid of the Cypriots in 195^* By 1959, 
the Greek case had made a full cycle and then started to 
repeat itself. The first demand for Cyprus by the Greek 
government on the British was enosis, which was tantamount 
to annexation. When this policy appeared slightly aggres­
sive in the eyes of some disinterested nations of the world, 
Greece then demanded self-determination for the Cypriots.
In 1956, the British government had shown to the Greek 
government that self-determination was also unacceptable, 
as a result the Greeks for a time began to demand enosis 
again. In 1957, considering the sympathy the UN had shown 
to their case, the Greeks shifted back to a demand for 
self-determination, but with less aggression. Making no 
headway with this tactic, the Greeks then decided that 
self-government (immediate or eventual) would be the answer
Affairs, No. 46, March, 1957, p . I6. The difference between 
"good offices" and mediation is that in the former the 
third state acts simply as amicable go-between, while in 
the latter a mediator may make suggestions for settlement 
on his own without consulting the disputants. See Palmer 
and Perkins, op. cit., p. 289.
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to the problem, and this was their policy through the 
negotiations in 1958.
It is apparent that, though the tactics changed, 
the Greek strategy of ultimately unifying Cyprus with their 
nation had never altered. Who, therefore, can say the Greeks 
have given up enosis now that Cyprus is independent? EOKA 
leader, George Grivas, was given a hero's welcome when he 
returned to Greece, as well as being promoted to Lieuten- 
ant““General, with full pay for life. Grivas did not wage 
his four-year guerilla struggle for independence in Cyprus, 
but rather for enosis, and publicly, he has expressed dis­
appointment with the Republic of Cyprus. It is doubtful, 
however, that this remarkable military genius will be able 
to do anything to alter the political future of Cyprus' 
fait accompli.
The Greek case was based solely on the fact that
78 per cent of the population of Cyprus allegedly wanted
6 5union with, their motherland, Greece. There was no legal 
justification to it, only the moral case that peoples should 
determine how they are to be governed. The case was
^^The British have always maintained the petition 
signed by practically all the Greek Cypriots in 1950> which 
formed the basis for enosis in Greece's opinion, was a pro­
duct of coercion and threats by the clergy. Cyprus, Back­
ground to Enosis, (London; 1955), P . 11 ; also
Cyprus, the Background. (London; R.I.I.A., 1955) and Luke, 
op. cit., p. 180.
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essentially weak, but the Greeks bolstered it with emotional 
appeals that won over many supporters, including some strong 
advocators in the U. S. Senate.Regardless of how precar­
ious or shallow the Greek case might have been, it did hold 
its own for eight years against a world power such as Great 
Britain, as well as against a lesser, but in no way a less 
formidable power, Turkey. When the Greek felt they were 
losing ground, their policy was flexible enough to change. 
With the help of persistent ''patriots" on the island,
Greece assisted in finally bringing about an honorable 
solution to the Cyprus question. Since Greece lost noth­
ing but her pride, i.e., by giving up her demand for enosis, 
the Cyprus settlement must, in the final analysis, really 
be considered a diplomatic victory for Greece.
The Turkish Current 
Regarding the geographic value of Cyprus any map 
of the eastern Mediterranean will clearly show why the 
aphorism of "a pistol pointing to the heart of Turkey," 
was devised to describe Turkey's security interest in 
Cyprus. Cyprus lies forty miles off the southern coast of
The late Senator William Langer of North Dakota 
took great pride in stating on the Senate Floor on February 
17, 1959 that; "I joined with my collègues in the Senate 
in sponsoring a resolution that had been in front of ^h® 
Foreign Relations Committee /of which he was a i^iember/ for 
several years." U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 
1st Session, 1959, Vol. IO5 .
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Turkey and is visible from the mainland on clear days.
The island faces three of Turkey's growing Mediterranean 
ports: Antalya, Mersin, and Iskenderun. The southern
coast is the only boundary of Turkey which is not virtually 
locked by another country. And the acquisition of Cyprus 
by her historic rival, Greece, would complete a two-sided 
island encirclement of the Turkish peninsula by Greek 
possessions. With these strategic considerations in mind, 
the Turkish government had waged an incessant verbal battle 
to prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece.
Security measures regarding Cyprus, important 
as they are to Turkey, were not her sole interest in the 
island. The island's minority population of approximately 
80,000 Turkish Cypriots would have been enough justifica­
tion for Turkey's concern in the future of Cyprus, even if 
the island had no strategic value to the mainland. Turkey 
knew that her two interests in Cyprus would continue to be 
protected if Great Britain could maintain the status quo.
For this reason, Turkey sided with everything Great Britain 
did from the start, consequently the initial role of Turkey 
was comparatively a minor one. However, when the course of 
events veered in 1955» and presented Greece's moral case 
in a better light, Turkey lost her complacency and actively 
entered the struggle for Cyprus.
Turkey's relatively late entry as an independent 
participant in the Cyprus imbroglio was met with consternation
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by Greece on the one hand, and skepticism by Great Britain, 
on the other. These two nations wondered what Turkey could 
possibly offer as a solution to the confused situation at 
the time; but by the beginning of 1957» they had learned.
It was then that Turkey began to advocate the future parti­
tion of Cyprus, which, to her, was a logical alternative
67to the international problem. At the same time, Turkey 
had sufficiently impressed diplomatic representatives of 
both Greece and Great Britain that if the latter would 
ever concede self-determination to the Cypriots and the 
resulting plebiscite would lead to union of the island 
with Greece, then Turkey would go to war to protect her 
interests. When Turkey had thus expressed her policy, 
the other two disputants realized that no final decision 
could be reached regarding Cyprus without Turkey's appro­
val .
The early enosis movements on Cyprus were never 
of a concern for Turkey. Like Greece, Turkey knew of the 
island's sentiments, but could not forsake more exigent 
matters at home to concern herself about Cyprus. While 
Greece was aspiring to fulfill her "Great Idea" during the 
aftermath of World War 1, Turkey was trying to salvage 
enough remnants of the fallen Ottoman Empire to make a 
new nation. When the opposing Greek and Turkish doctrines
1956, p. 7.
^^Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 30, May,
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again clashed in Asia Minor (1921-23), the Turks led by 
Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) came out victorious and the Greeks 
were left only the grudge to harbor. Hence, the Cyprus 
issue was no cause of Greco-Turkish discord, it was merely 
a continuation, when it came, of something that had its 
roots far back in history.
One of the many liberation organizations in Cyprus,
which was a forerunner of Ef lA, published in the early 1950's
the Cypriot-Greek attitude of the Cypriot-Turks:
Vo look upon the Turks as our brothers. ¥e have 
nothing against them and we will do nothing to 
harm them. Ve ask them not to create difficulties 
for us, nor stand in our way be becoming tools of 
the British.
Accordingly the early attitude of Turkey in 1951 was one of 
opposing the claims of Greece, in principle, while not ven­
turing forth any positive Cyprus proposals of her own.
Prom the beginning of the resuscitation of militant Greek 
Cypriot demands for enosis in 1950, Turkey had regarded 
Great Britain as her true friend and trusted ally; thus, 
Turkey felt she needed no Cyprus policy of her own. The 
official Turkish view from that time until 1957 was expres­
sed like this:
The status of Cyprus is a domestic question for 
Great Britain. That being assumed, in case Great 
Britain deemed it convenient to confer with or con­
sult other countries on this subject, or, if of 
her own free will she waived her right to consider 
the question a domestic one, Turkey before and
68
Alastos, op. cit., p. 5^*
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above all others, should be the one to be-conferred 
with or consulted.
Nevertheless, this official view does not show 
the apprehensions with which Turkey regarded the Cyprus 
question, especially after Greece became so active in the 
matter. In an interview in July of 1956, the Turkish 
Prime Minister, Adnan Menderos, reaffirmed the official 
line, yet he hinted at a possible course of action undoubt­
edly being considered at the time in Ankara:
We have not been called upon to accept or reject a 
specific British plan for the future of Cyprus, but 
it is true to say that conversations have been con­
ducted with our British friends. In the course of 
these talks our views have, of course, been made 
clear. We have presented no Turkish plan for the 
future of Cyprus because we are fully convinced there 
can be nothing better than the constitutional status 
quo.70
Despite the seemingly negative approach that Turkey took 
toward the Cyprus question, i.e., the status quo, tension 
was mounting between Turkey and her Mediterranean neighbor, 
Greece. Greece had tried to show that Turkey had no part 
in the question of the future of Cyprus. When Turkey tried 
to comment on the situation, Greece retorted with the charge 
that Turkey had no rights in Cyprus— though the potential 
validity of Turkey's "interests" in Cyprus was never
6°
Office, Turkish Embassy, 1956), p. 26.
^^The Daily Telegraph, (London), July 2, 1956, 
quoted ibid., p. 70.
^Turkey and Cyprus, (London; Press Attache's
103
formally considered by the Greek government. In 1955t 
there were bombings and riots in both Salonika and Istan­
bul, and the two governments accused one another of pro­
voking them for devious reasons. The Turkish Foreign 
Minister at the time, Fuad Koprulu, made this summary of 
the events:
The Greek efforts to show that the Salonika explosion 
was engineered by Turkey in order to provide a_pro- 
text for_the anti-Greek riots which followed /in 
Istanbul/, and then to present these riots as unparai­
led acts of barbarism, were clearly an attempt to dis­
qualify Turkey from having any voice in the Cyprus 
dispute.71
These two particular disturbances happened at a very inop­
portune time. The first Tripartite Conference was in 
progress when the news of the Istanbul riot and another at 
Izmir reached London. The Turkish government was most 
apologetic about the damage that was done to the Greek 
property in those two cities, and offered to pay compen­
sation. Even so, this did little to close the breach that 
was made in Greco-Turkish relations.
The Tripartite Conference in 1955 was the first 
attempt by Great Britain to find an equitable solution—
71From a speech by Fuad Koprulu, to the Grand 
National Assembly, Ankara, February 25, 1956, quoted in 
a press release, (Washington: Office of the Turkish Press
Attache, 1956). There were some allegations and "proofs" 
during the trial of deposed Prime Minister Menderes in 
i960, that he engineered the whole plot for the expressed 
purpose of provoking a muddled condition that would take 
the Turkish citizenry's mind off domestic problems. See 
The New York Times. November 1-6, I96Ô .
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in better words, an end to hostilities— in Cyprus. Prior 
to that time Great Britain had only carried on bi-lateral 
negotiations with the powers concerned and the year before 
had expressed her stand on Cyprus to the Political Commit­
tee of the UN, thus, the Tripartite Conference marked a 
new Cyprus approach by Great Britain.
At the time of the Conference few persons real­
ized the strength of the Turkish feeling over the Cyprus 
issue. The calm and conciliatory Cyprus policy, which the 
Turks had adopted from the onset, clouded over the real 
concern of the Turkish public. It was during the Tripar­
tite Conference that the Turkish Foreign Minister first 
made known the fears his government had on Cyprus' falling 
into Greek hands:
. . .strategically the vital interests of Turkey 
and the requirements of defence and logistics 
made it imperative that the island should belong 
either to Turkey or to a country which was closely 
interested in Turkey and in the fate of Turkey's 
Eastern neighbors. In case of war Turkey could be 
supplied only through her southern ports and who­
ever controlled Cyprus was in a position to control
those ports.72
By the time the Tripartite Conference was called 
in 1955» Turkey had already began to doubt if Great Britain 
wera a&ting in Turkey's best interests. Turkey made no 
outright accusation to this effect, but at the Conference 
the acting Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, directed two
72Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs. No. 30,
Aug. and Sept., 1955*
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questions to the British Foreign Secretary, then Harold
Macmillan, which showed easily where Turkish interests 
73resided. The first question:
Does the British Government intend to maintain in 
the present and in the future the right of sover­
eignty on the island of Cyprus, devolved upon Great 
Britain by the Treaty of Lausanne?
Mr. Macmillan's answer was to the effect that nothing was 
permanent in a world such as ours, but "we face facts as 
they are." He did stress that Britain's "sovereignty over 
Cyprus was beyond dispute" and that the island was essen­
tial to Britain's "obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
as well as in the Middle East." Moreover, he stated that 
he could forsee no condition in the future "enabling us 
to abandon" this policy position. The second question 
asked by the Turkish Foreign Minister was:
If the British Government is determined to maintain 
sovereignty on the island, does it for the present 
or for the future accept any principle of self- 
determination which might lead to the independence 
of the island or to its accession to any other coun­
try?
Foreign Secretary Macmillan's reply was to the point:
Ve do not accept the principle of self-determination 
as one of universal application. We think that 
exceptions must be made in favor of geographical, 
traditional, historical, strategical, and other con­
siderations.
These two incisive questions and their authoritative answers 
by the Foreign Secretary made the British Government accept
73Ibid. See also Cyprus. The Background, op. cit., 
pp. 18, 36, and 37.
106
Mr. Macmillan's remarks as a virtual statement of policy
on Cyprus and the full exchange was published in a special 
7 kWhite Paper, which was issued at the same time the British 
consitutional proposals for Cyprus were made public.
The 1955 British constitutional proposals for 
Cyprus were rejected by both the Turkish and Greek govern­
ment, but for entirely different reasons. The Greeks main­
tained that the elaborate plan for eventual self-government 
for the Cypriots, as proposed by the British, failed to 
take into account the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots
75
"of the right to choose the regime they prefer." The 
Turks, in contrast, felt the proposals were too liberal and 
maintained "if any changes were to take place in the status
76quo of the island, this island should come back to Turkey."
)
The Tripartite Conference failed to produce an agreement, 
but it did produce a "get-tough" Cyprus policy for Great 
Britain and Sir John Harding was soon after appointed gov­
ernor of the island.
A Unique Policy for Turkey 
The original policy that Turkey took on Cyprus 
confined her to the narrow stand that the island should
^^Cmnd. 9594, 1955, quoted, ibid.. p. 1?.
^^Rossides, Zenon, The Problems of Cyprus. (Athens^ 
Greek Information Office), 1957» P* 18.
^^In a speech, Fatin Zorlu at London Conference 
on Cyprus, 1955, Cmnd. 9594, op. cit.
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forever remain a British Crown Colony. As long as Tur­
kish interest were protected by this strict policy, there 
was no need for concern on the part of the Turks. The 
Turks purposely withheld a positive plan and felt that 
British intransigence would keep the case of Cyprus a closed 
issue. As pointed out above, Turkey for the first time sug­
gested something other than the British policy at the Tri­
partite Conference, i.e., that Cyprus should go to Turkey 
if any change is made in the administration of the island. 
Indeed, the Conference marked a turning point, but it did 
little to bolster Turkey's faith in the future British 
policy for Cyprus. Prime Minister Menderes later explained 
how Turkey felt in this period:
Following the Tripartite Conference held in London 
in 1955f the appeasing and tolerant attitude of the 
United Kingdom towards Greece, on the one hand, con­
vinced Turkish public opinion of the necessity of 
protecting Turkey's own rights and interests, the 
general feeling on this respect reached such a high 
point that it became difficult to resist the pres­
sure, and on the other hand produced inevitable reac­
tions on the part of the Turkish community in Cyprus 
which had to resort to self-defense against these 
terrorist activities.77
Terrorist activities did rage on Cyprus ddring 
the early part of 1956, and Turkey consequently foirmed 
another policy position in July of that year. Prime
77In a letter from Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, June l4, 1958, quoted 
in Documents on Cyprus. (Lon<$on: Turkish Information Office,
1958), p. 1.
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Minister Menderes, who was truly the chief Turkish policy 
maker and spokesman while he was in power, insisted that 
his country could take no part in negotiations regarding 
Cyprus while the terrorism continued in the island. In 
his words: "Lot calm first return and this artificial
agitation first be discontinued, then it might be possible 
for us all to talk matters over. Certainly not before." 
Publicly, Menderes also lauded the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), 
emphasized the absence of Turkish desire for more territory,
and looked to Britain to "remain firm and strong...in the
78Mediterranean and Middle East." Privately, he and his 
government must have considered the alternatives that Tur­
key could employ especially against Greece and even against 
Britain. There was no positive declaration on the part of 
Turkey, however, until after the Radoliffe Proposals were 
published in December, 1956.^^
Lord Radcliffe's elaborate proposals would have 
brought about a gradual process of self-government to Cyprus, 
and at the end of an unspecified period of time there would 
be appropriate steps toward self-determination. On Decem­
ber 19, 1956, the Colonial Secretary Mr. Lennox-Boyd, made 
this promise for the future, to the members of the House of
78.The Daily Telegranh, (London). July 2, 1956.
C^ommonwei 
January, 1957. p. 5*
79 onwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. hk,
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Commons, that "Cyprus must include partition among the
80eventual options." In 1957> Turkey stated unequivocally 
that she had abandoned her former position that Cyprus 
would always remain under British colonial rule, and "at 
the- greatest possible sacrifice" had accepted the idea of 
partition as a compromise solution. For the two year period 
following the official announcement of the Turkish policy 
of partition until the London Agreements in 1959» Turkey 
would hear no suggestion on a future plan for Cyprus unless 
it contained some sort of partition arrangement. To Turkey, 
partition was^ à final solution and an inevitable solution. 
Some Turkish extremists had maps drawn showing the north­
ern portion of the island as Turkish domain, and other 
extremists even began to encourage trans-migration of the 
Turkish Cypriots to the northern part of the island. Tur­
key now had her turn to become intransigent. She was then 
to play the partition issue to the hilt, in the same man- 
mer as Greece had demanded enosis for so long and as Great
Britain had tenaciously held to her insistence on the colon-
81
ial status for Cyprus.
^^Hansard. (Commons), 1956, Vol. 562, Col. 1268.
®^In reality, the British government had no 
thought of partition. Foreign Secretary Selwyn-Ldoyd, speak­
ing about the difficulties of self-determination at the time 
stated, "If it were to be accepted that people have a right 
to self-determination whenever they ask for it, it would 
make nonsense of organized international society. I-have 
never heard the most virulent supporters of self-determina­
tion suggest that the Turkish Cypriots should have the right 
of self-determination." ^hoted in, Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and 
Makarios, (London; Putnam, 1960), p. 95
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Partition as a Practicality 
"Th® monster of partition" was the favorite expres­
sion of the Greeks whenever they made reference to the Turk- 
82ish plan. The fact was that the Greeks were forgetting
they were the first ever to suggest partition. Prior to
the 1956 British statement, progressive Greek Foreign
Minister Averoff had suggested partition as a solution to
the Cyprus tangle, just as he had also suggested indepen-
8 T
dene® for the island at an early date. In spite of these 
conciliatory offers by her Foreign Minister, Greek public 
opinion would not accept anything but enosis in the five 
earlier years of her struggle over Cyprus. The British 
Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, make a visit to Istanbul 
in the summer of 1956 in order to urge the Turkish govern­
ment to accept partition as a final solution to the Cyprus 
problem. When Turkey at last formally suscribed to this 
original Greek, later British, plan and demanded immediate 
partition, Greece and Britain looked upon their former 
plans as completely unrealistic. (See footnote #81.)
At the same time, Turkey considered that she had
adopted a most constructive attitude. Greece had disavowed
her original idea of partition in the meantime, and tried
to show the world that Turkey's adopted partition policy
  - -  ’ - -   - - - -      -        -
82Cyprus. Touchstone for Democracy, op. cit.. p. 19.
81
Letter of Adnan Menderes, July l4, 195&, op. cit.
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had led to tragedy wherever it had been applied, "in places
Q fjL ,
like Ireland, Palestine, and Corea /sijc/" In addition, 
Greece asserted that partition would deny "self-determination 
to a people as a whole"; that it would establish "a danger­
ous precedent" in the troubled Middle East; that it was 
"a logical paradox" because it uses "undemocratic methods 
in the pursuit of democracy" and finally that partition was
o e
simply "unjust and impracticable."  ^ To these arguments, 
Turkey merely replied that Greco-Turkish tensions were tear­
ing the island apart anyway, and the only way to stop hos-
\
tilities would be "by separating the two communities juris-
86dically and actually from each other."
Continually, Turkey had to dispel the many mis­
conceptions which arose when the people of the world con­
sidered the plan of partition for Cyprus. Regardless of 
what Turkey may have thought initially of partition, her 
views by 1958 could certainly not have been considered as 
extreme as the Greeks had alleged. Turkey did not want 
two separate independent entities in Cyprus, rathe.r she 
wanted a recognition of Cypriot basic rights— separately 
for both communities on the island. The Turks were most 
84
Cyprus. Touchstone for Democracy, loc. cit. 
G^ibid.
Cyprus and Turkey- (Washington: Turkish Infor­
mation Office), p . l4. This pamphlet contains reprints of 
interviews with Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu 
in 1957.
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open-minded of how their partition idea could be effected. 
The Turks realistically acknowledged that th® island had 
traditionally been divided into two communities, with 
separate organizations and communal authority. Thus, when
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan offered his "seven-year
\
plan" in June of 1958, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu in
the official Turkish response showed his government's
compromising nature:
. . .this problem of Cyprus is, above, all, clearly a 
topic of conflict and intransigence among the three 
states. There is no possibility of trying to hide 
behind the communities on the Island. There should 
be a tripartite conference at which the new British 
plan could be used not as a basis but as a document. 
The principle of co-operation could very well be 
compatible with partition.
Turkey always felt there was a geo-political
rationale for her demand of partition for Cyprus. As long
as strife had torn the island assundsr, it was a fertile
field for Communist intrigue. Partition, which would treat
both Greek and Turk equitably, was in the Turkish mind the
only practical solution. Turkey had pleasure in citing the
examples of places in the world— to refute the examples
the Greeks gave against— where partition did function as a
political reality, and one of the most widely used was the
island of Hispanola in the Carribean, where "the Dominican
I 88Republic and Haiti' is a happily going concern."
Cyprus. (London: Reference, Central Office of
Information, July, 1958), Quote No. 3932, p. 18.
88
Cyprus and Turkey, op. cit. p. 15.
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Th® Turkish argument was perhaps the stronger 
during 1957 and early 1958, when it appeared that th® two 
communities on Cyprus could no longer live peacefully on 
the island together. The Turkish Cypriot underground move­
ment VOLKAN had pledged in November, 1957, that five Greeks
89
would be killed for every Turk murdered on the island. 
Moreover, British rule could not bring peace to the island 
short of a full-scale commando operation, and Great Britain 
did not intend to do this on Cyprus, because of the poten­
tial world censure. In view of this, the Turks gr©w\ftir- 
ther away from their status quo argument— though they did 
not entirèjLy give it up— and stressed partition all the more. 
The leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, was 
in deep agreement with the Turkish government throughout
the years of negotiations prior to the final settlement of
90the Cyprus issue.
The Turkish Case before the United Nations was 
essentially one of refuting the claim of the Greek govern­
ment. There was no notable change between what the Turks
89
The Manchester Guardian, Nov. 12, 1957, quoted 
in Cyprus (R.I.I.A.), op. cit., p. 4o. Volkan was organ­
ized after its Greek counterpart EOKA. The Turkish group 
later became known as T.M.T., Turk Mudafa Tosklat, (Turkish 
Defense Organization).
90Dr. Kutchuk, and his colleague, Rauf Denktash, 
with help from the Turkish mainland had formed the "Cyprus- 
i8-Turkish Party" by 1958. The Prime purpose of this group 
was to disseninate Turkish propaganda directly from Cyprus.
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presented in 1954, when the Cyprus question was first
91debated, and what they offered in the last debate in 1958.
The Turkish Case was three-fold: first, Turkey emphasized
that Cyprus was made up of two different people, who lacked 
the characteristics of a nation as well as that of juris- 
dical state organization; secondly, Turkey stressed her 
strategic interest in Cyprus; and thirdly, the Lausanne 
Treaty of 1923 had, according to Turkey, decided the sover­
eignty of Cyprus, since this valid international document, 
which had been signed by all three disputing powers, was 
still good international law today. Turkey added her char­
ges of unmitigated terrorism being directed at her "brothers" 
by the devious Athens government, but this was interjected 
purely for self-defense of similar charges hurled at her by 
Greece. Lastly, Turkey tried to impress on the minds of 
the UN representatives that self-determination in the Greek 
manner would bring Cyprus into Greece's "island empire," 
and that annexation was the only interest Greece had in 
Cyprus.
Turkey was more amenable than Greece to the 
attempts of NATO to bring about a Cyprus settlement. Tur­
key has always been regarded as a valuable part of the 
Western defense arrangement and had taken pride in full and 
continued cooperation with NATO strategists. It was only
^^The New York Times. November 7» 1958, p. 3*
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logical that Turkey would warmly receive both offers of 
the good offices of the Secretary-General of NATO. The 
attempts of Secretary-General Spaak to negotiate a settle­
ment of the Cyprus question, of course, failed and the
Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers charged one another
92with the failure. The failure was due, in actuality,
to the futile patriotic stands of both Greece and Turkey—
a condition which had existed throughout the whole era of
93the question of Cyprus.
The Turkish case in its gestation was exactly the
same as that of the British. Gradually, the two cases grew
apart and eight years later, 1958, the Turks had this to
say about the British:
London is certainly to blame for its irresolute pol­
icies, consisting one day in ineffectual repression, 
the other in far-reaching appeasement, and never 
cleaving for- a long time to a clearly stated, unde- 
viating line. It would seem that here as elsewhere 
the British are over-sensitive to the propagandistio 
reproach of being old fashioned "colonialists."
They behave as though some perverse guilt-complex 
prevented them from clinging as firmly as they should 
to this essential base of their once proud Empire.
Yet the issue of Cyprus transoestâs all questions of 
British political psychoanalysis; nor has it much to 
do with the fashionable dispute of colonialism versus
92%bid.
93"It must be pointed out that in reality the Cyprus 
question has nothing to do with NATO and that the island 
is not even included among the territories covered by the 
NATO agreements." Background Papers on Cyprus VI, Respon­
sibility for the Failure of Efforts to Convene a Conference 
on the Cyprus Question, Office of the Turkish Press Attache, 
Washington, D. C .
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antl-oolonlalism. The island is not a colony in 
the usual sense, but rather a strategic aero-naval 
stronghold— a Gibraltar or a Malta of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. As such, its safety is of concern 
to all free nations, particularly to those of the 
Levant and Asia Minor.
The Turkish case grew so concrete by 1958, that 
they had made geographical suggestions of an acceptable 
partition of Cyprus by means of a line "roughly from Fama­
gusta through Nicosia to Lefka." They would not object to 
British military bases, and would even grant extraterritor­
ial rights to the British. Such an elaborate scheme was 
admittedly no simple matter to implement, and would need 
years in the initial stages. Turkey used the time argument 
as a substantiation for their demeuid partition proceedings 
should be instituted immediately. Up until the time of 
the Zurich Meeting, the Turks, despite their national cry, 
of taksim (Partition) admitted there were still two alter­
natives left for Cyprus:
1. Either the British continue administering Cyprus 
while furthering in the isleuid the development
of such forms of home rule as might be acceptable 
to both the Greek and the Turkish communities there.
2. Or, barring that,, a partition of Cyprus between 
Greece and Turkey will have to be accepted by 
all parties concerned, and— if need be— imposed 
by the major powers of the Western World as well 
as those of the UN.9'-'
9k "The Cyprus Question," Mediterramean Documents, 
Vol. 1, No. 3» November, 1958, p.
^^Mayes, op. cit., especially Chap. 4, "Makarios 
Eind the Turks," pp. 82-103.
96
"The Cyprus Question," loc. cit.
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Summary and Analysis of the Turkish Involvement
The Turks had b&sed their case on the legal rights 
granted by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Their strategic con­
cern for Cyprus was also on second footing. Hans Kohn obser­
ved in the case of Cyprus, "the strategic interests of the 
Turks and their well-founded fears should be taken as much 
into consideration as those of the French interests and fears 
in the Saar." Further, the welfare of upward of 100,000 
Cypriot Turk "brothers" was a matter that Turkey could not 
turn her back upon. Under these circumstances, Turkey could 
not help but assume the active role which was meant for her 
in the Cyprus question and its solution.
Turkey had justified fears of a possible revival 
movement of the "Megali Idea" in Greece. She reasoned what 
else could cause the small number of fanatical enosists on 
Cyprus, backed by a country such as Greece to defy a power 
so formidable as Great Britain? If that was to mean that 
the Greeks had intentions of renewing their antiquated claims 
on Istanbul and Asia Minor, as they had tried in 1921, then 
Turkey would be fully prepared this time.
Moreover, Turkey, though a God-fearing Moslem 
nation, had maintained a strict separation of church and 
state ever since its inception under Ataturk. For this rea­
son, the prosaic, medieval indulgences of the Cypriot Greek 
Orthodox Church, undeniably in politics and allegedly in the 
murders and terrorism of EOKA, were resented and resisted by
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the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals living just forty 
miles off the shores of their mother-country. If Turkey 
would have administered the island in place of Great Britain, 
one of the earliest reforms the new government would have 
instituted would probably have been a ban of the church in 
politics and an encouragement for the clergy to go back to 
the proper place in the spiritual life of the Greek Cy- 
priots.”
Turkey had never garnered near as much support in 
America, or in other places of the world, as did the Greeks 
in the Cyprus struggle. The reasons are obvious: first,
to most Americans Turkey is a mysterious nation, still per­
ched on the brink of the modern industrial world and the 
old Ottoman world of the sultan ; second, the Turkish-American 
population is quite small compared to that of the Greek- 
American, and this was a big factor in the Greek support in 
the U. S. Congress; third, Turkey entered the Cyprus picture 
late and with little fanfare, thus many people all over the 
world believed in the Greek claim that Turkey had no business 
regarding the considerations of Cyprus; fourth, after Turkey 
had entered the struggle actively, she did not use effective
Q_
While Makarios was deeply involved in Cypriot poli­
tics most objective viewers felt he was "too politically im­
mature" for the task, this was demonstrated by the fact that 
he totally ignored the Turkish factor in the island, "where a 
subtler mind would have paid court to the Turkish Cypriots 
and made every effort to convince them that they would not 
be at a disadvantage under Greek rule . . . "  Mayes, op. cit.
p. 87.
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nor extensive propaganda devices immediately, and her case, 
though honest and valid, appeared weaker than it should 
have; fifth, Turkey associated her Cyprus policy too long 
with that of Great Britain's and many thought Turkey to be 
a pawn of the colonial powers; and lastly, Ataturk's "Turkey 
for the Turks" program had kept Turkey busy with internal 
developments and the demands of her progressing economy,
98e.g., oil, steel, construction and agricultural advancements. 
The Turkish people, though concerned, were never as fanatic 
about possessing the island of Cyprus as the Greeks.
Considering these factors, in the light of the 
final outcome, one must conclude that Turkey made an excep­
tionally good return on her investment in the Cyprus issue.
The British Current 
Events in the history of Cyprus since I878 have 
forced the British to adopt numerous policy positions in 
regard to their interest on the islsuid. Still and all, 
throughout the years there have been certain general tenets 
to which British policy on Cyprus has adhered. Moreover, 
the demands of the Greek and Turkish governments added an 
additional factor in the 1950's to this list of traditional
98T. W. Adams, "A Profile on the Turkish Petroleum 
Industry," Lands East (Middle East Institute, Washington), 
October, 1959, pp. 7 ff. Turkey is currently engaged in a 
vast economic revitalization and petroleum exploration, which 
was initiated before the overthrow of the Menderes government.
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considerations. Thus by the middle of 1958, the British 
government had four main purposes which controlled her 
Cyprus policy. On the floor of the House of Commons on June 
19, 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan outlined these 
purposes :
(a) To serve the best interests of all the people 
of the island;
(b) To achieve a perm ament settlement acceptable
to the two communities in the islamd and to the 
Greek and Turkish Governments;
(c) To safeguard the British bases amd installations 
in the islamd, which are necessary to enable
the United Kingdom to carry out her international 
obligations;
(d) To strengthen peace and security, and coopera­
tion between the United Kingdom and her allies, 
in a vital area.
The Prime Minister then added that "these are the 
aims which Her Majesty's Government have consistently pur­
sued," in regard to Cyprus. With the exception of Point 
(b) supra, the Prime Minister could have easily said that 
these were the aims always pursued by the British in their 
Cyprus policy. By and large the underlying elements affect­
ing the British attitudes toward Cyprus were substantially 
unchanged from 1^78 up till 195^. Cyprus, to the British, 
had always been a domestic problem of administering a non- 
cooperative native population; but when the UN chose in 195^ 
to debate the Cyprus question as presented by the Greek
99Cyprus. Official Text of the statement by Prime 
Minister, The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P., in the House 
of Commons, June 19, 1958, (New York: British Information
Services, 1958), p. 1.
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gqyerninent, the British knew that their former domestic 
issue had grown to international stature.
British administration on Cyprus, as noted supra, 
was quite liberal from the beginning of the occupation. It 
can therefore be properly deduced from that fact that the 
policy behind the administration was equally as liberal. 
Britain's early position on Cyprus was one that developed 
within the strict legal terms of the Cyprus Convention of 
1878. Sir George Hill claimed that Great Britain "acquired 
d^ facto, if not ^  jure sovereignty in Cyprus" by the terms 
of the Convention; and he goes on to substantiate this claim 
by quoting the renowned publicist, L. Oppenheim, who com­
mented on the rule in Cyprus between I878 and 19l4.
a cession of pieces of territory had for all practi­
cal purposes taken place, although in law it still 
belonged to the former ownerstate. Anyhow, only one
3^ 'Cj.SGu..
the State which exercised administration.
S C V S I * S J . g n  V y  W U U .J L U .  UX3  .  .  l A c u a i o X  u  u j l .
This weight of evidence would lead one to believe 
that Great Britain formed her Cyprus policy as if she had 
a free hand in the matter, but this is far from the actual 
case. Up till the annexation of the island in 1914, Great 
Britain had honored the legal sovereignty of Turkey over 
Cyprus. When any consideration arose over Cyprus, Britain 
felt she had at least to take into account the feelings of
^^^Oppenheim, International Law. (l928), p. 363. 
quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 285, Turkey's rights in Cyprus 
had come'about de facto in 1914 (British annexation), and 
de jure in 1923"%the Lausanne Treaty.)
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the Sultan, even if she did not consult the Porte directly 
on the matter. Moreover, the obstacle of the Ottoman Empire 
was used as a convenient scapegoat when internal situations 
on Cyprus would become rather difficult. The Colonial Office 
in London turned aside the many pleas of early enosists by 
stating British hands were tied because of the interests of 
Turkey in the island. By this same sophistry, Britain justi­
fied the Tribute as a rental supposedly paid to the Porte 
for the use of Cyprus. Therefore, prior to 1914, the place 
of Turkey in the Cyprus issue relieved Great Britain of 
actually having to form a policy on Cyprus. Britain soon 
found out, after the annexation, that meiny of the problems 
which were avoided before then had to be faced.
Of all the old Cypriot problems that were to be 
faced with a new approach after the annexation, the most 
pressing was that of enosis. After Great Britain had lost 
the excuse she had been using for decades to ward off the 
enosists, i.e., the legal ownership of Cyprus by Turkey, the 
British Colonial Office undoubtedly anticipated the trouble 
the Cypriots were going to make with their demands of union 
with Greece. It might have been this reason alone which 
caused Britain to offer Cyprus to Greece in 1915* Regard­
less of why the offer was made, it showed that Britain was 
unsure of her status in Cyprus immediately after 1914. Thus 
one of her chief policy aims regarding the island at this 
time was to get an official recognition from Turkey of the
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British ownership of Cyprus, which was never forth coming 
from the Ottoman Government. Cypriot discontent at that 
time seemed quite insignificant.
At the end of the First World War, the British 
included in the first peace settlement between the Allies 
and Turkey, the Treaty of Sevres, a provision that the Otto­
man government recognized British suzerainty over Cyprus. 
When the Ottoman government failed to ratify the Treaty and 
new hostilities broke out between the Allies and what was 
to be the new Turkish Nationalist government. Great Britain 
was more than ever concerned about her claim to Cyprus. At 
the end of the belligerency in 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne 
was signed. It was in this document that Britain finally 
got from Turkey the legal transfer of title to Cyprus, some 
nine years after the British had annexed the island.
Internal Cypriot Policy 
Once the British sovereignty over Cyprus was 
legally acquired. Great Britain could then turn her atten­
tion to the internal problems which had developed on the 
island. Two years after the British title to the island 
was secured, it was made a Crown Colony. This act did not 
end any of the monotonous, yet peaceful, protesting that the 
Greek nationalist movement had demonstrated in Cyprus ever
^^^Treaty of Sevres, Article 113-11?. See J. C. 
Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 86.
124
since the signing of the Armistice. If anything, formal 
colonization exacerbated the potential violent situation 
which was building up in Cyprus, and contributed directly 
to the anti-British uprising in 1931- Before the Consti­
tution was abrogated in 1931— and even afterwards, for that 
matter— the favorite tactic of the Cypriot Greeks to express 
their enosis desires was by sending "memorials" to the Secre­
tary of State for the Colonies, which were "almost invari­
ably followed by counter-memorials from the Turks of Cyprus,
urgently requesting assurances that no change of sovereignty
102was contemplated." Each time the Colonial Secretary 
would send back an unfavorable response to the effect that 
"the Cyprus issue was closed," the enosists would retort 
that "the British connection /to Cyprus/ was an anathema". 
This unhealthy exchange of feelings typified the Anglo- 
Cypriot relationship during the 1930's.
Constitutional reform was always a subject of dis­
cussion whenever the Cyprus policy was mentioned in Parli­
ament. The various Cypriot pressure groups, which were or­
ganized in London for the purpose of making their c?<se known 
to members of Parliament, had made some noticeable inroads 
in that august body, especially with the Opposition Party. 
Consequently, the Colonial Secretary always had to be ready 
to answer critical questions about the government's Cyprus
102Mayes, op. cit.. p. 86.
103R.I.I.A., Cyprus. op. cit., p. 4.
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policy. One of the best justifications of the British lack
of policy toward enosis was given by Malcolm Macdonald, the
Colonial Secretary on July 5» 1939;
There has been a great deal of discussion in Cyprus 
regarding constitutional reform . . . /however/ I 
am satisfied that the great majority of the people 
of Cyprus are not discontented under the present 
administration. The policy of the administration 
is to work in the direction of more respresentative 
government; but this process cannot be hurried, and 
in my view must proceed first through a gradual in­
crease of responsibility in local government.
This excerpt is a good illustration of the usual old-type 
reports on Cyprus which "curiosly omit all reference to 
what is the most intractable problem on the political side," 
namely the enosis m o v e m e n t . T h e  movement was not men­
tioned during this pre-Vorld War II period, nor during the 
war, and was conveniently forgotten after the war. This is 
clear proof that "successive British Government have regarded 
enosis as a contingency which cannot be contemplated and 
which is, therefore, undiscussable.
By 1946, the island of Cyprus had been administered 
for fifteen years by "diredt rule"— an authoritarian manner 
by means of governor with the aid of an Executive Council, 
but without the encumbrance of a legislature end a consti­
tution. In 1946, a Cypriot delegation to London was refused
^^^Hansard. (Commons), 1939, Vol. 349, Col. 1285-
1051954 p ^^Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. I5 , March,
lO^Ibid.. p. 7.
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Its request for enosis by the Socialist government in power 
at that time. Yet the Socialists did concede that Cyprus 
had had enough of so undemocratic a form of government.
The Labor Government made every effort to get the Cypriots 
to meet at a consultative assembly and assist in the draf­
ting of a new constitution. But as every effort of the 
Conservative government in the 1930's had met with failure, 
so did this attempt by the Labor Party end up to be abortive. 
Strangely enough, the Communists were the only ones who 
did not boycott the assembly, but they came with the sole
purpose of chanting "Enosis and nothing else" in the midst
107of the proceedings. The Socialists were not discouraged
and proceeded to draw up a proposed constitution, which they 
presented in 1948.
At this time there were still no external condi­
tions, as such, which would affect in any way the British 
policy for Cyprus. The Socialist proposals were not accep­
ted by the Cypriots because there was no mention of future
enosis. The proposals were not withdrawn and stood, for 
all intents and purposes, until 1954 when the next proposal 
was ventured by the Conservative government. All that was
107The Turks have alleged that the Communists, with 
the obvious purpose of creating tensions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, took the initiative of the enosis movement 
both in Cyprus and Greece. See Cyprus and Turkey, op. cit.« 
p. 12. See also Mayes, op. cit.. especially Chapter III 
"Makarios and the Communists," pp. 6l-8l.
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lacking was for some enterprising Cypriot political leader 
to come forth and accept the British offer to bring about 
a more representative government for his people. But such 
an act by a Cypriot would have been political suicide, if 
not actual suicide. The militant enosis movement was well 
into the first stage of its development at this time, and 
could easily devise some sort of punishment for anyone who 
was too cooperative with the British. The Socialists too 
felt the growing discontent and made their policy declara­
tion in 1948: "no change in the sovereignty of the island
is intended.
The tenets of the British policy for Cyprus, as 
referred to supra. can now be shown by means of a recapi­
tulation of the British stands on Cyprus up to the elections 
of 1949. The MacDonald government in 1924 refused enosis 
because of the strategic importance Cyprus had assumed in 
view of the unrest in India. Also, it was alleged that the 
best interests of the people would not be served if the 
Cypriots were allowed to unite with Greece, as Greece had 
not even expressed the desire to incorporate Cyprus. Colon­
ial Secretary Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) in 1929 said the 
question of Union with Greece was definitely closed. In 
the 1930's, the refusals of enosis were based on the conten­
tion that the idea was not completely acceptable to the
108Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 20, August 
and September, 1954, p.
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109whole Island population; thus the best interest of the 
people would not be served. During the Second World War, 
the strategic importance and the need for maintaining peace 
and security in the area were given as overriding reasons 
for the refusal of the British to recognise any forms of 
self-determination in Cyprus. In 1946, Cyprus had strate­
gic value, not because of any war, but primarily as a link 
to the important base at Suez, as well as for other British 
commitments in the vital Middle East.^^^ To fulfill the 
goal of working for the best interests of the Cypriot people, 
the British policy was designed to bring about a gradual 
system of self-government first, and then to consent to 
self-determination at a future time. When these constitu­
tional proposals were refused by the enosists, the aims of 
the British policy for Cyprus were in no way affected. As 
long as Cyprus was a colony, Britian felt that the Cypriots 
were living a far better life than if they were under the 
Greeks, or independent for that matter. By this clever sort 
of beguiling, the British could look at their Cyprus policy 
before 1950 as one that was completely successful.
109There could be no doubt that the Turkish minority 
was opposed to enosis definitely, while there doubtless was 
a great number of Greek Cypriots who were opposed or did not 
care one way or the other.
^^Qfiritish Interests in the Mediterranean and Mid­
dle East. (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 25-
35.
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The Change in British Policy 
The first indication that- the British would even­
tually have to revamp their approach to meet the internal 
conditions on Cyprus came in 19^7» when the Greek Parliament 
passed a resolution expressing the hope that "Greece's 
national claim to Cyprus would be met within the framework 
of Greco-British f r i e n d s h i p . G r e e k  demands were in full 
swing by 1951» but Great Britain chose to avoid all negotia­
tions on the future of Cyprus. To Britain, any problem 
occuring on Cyprus were domestic matters and should be 
treated without interference from an outside country, viz. 
Greece. Moreover, before 195^> Britain refused to acknow­
ledge that there was any problem at all on Cyprus and the 
matter to her was a "closed one". In 195^» the British 
Conservative government offered another proposal for a 
Cyprus constitution. This offer gave the Cypriots a chance 
to form a representative legislature, but there were so 
many of the usual British restrictions (e.g., the appointed 
and official members were to form a majority of the legis­
lature and there was no mention of a future system of self-
government) that it was little wonder that the proposal was
112rejected by the Cypriots. When the refusal of the const!-
^^^Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 6, 
112R.I.I.A., Cyprus. op. cit.. p. 11.
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tutional proposals was followed by unrest, the British en­
forced the rather severe, existing sedition laws on the 
island.
Later that same year, the Cyprus question was de­
bated before the UN, and the British delegation argued that 
Article II, Section 7 of the UN Charter precluded any dis­
cussion of "matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
113any State," The Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, appeared
before the Steering Committee of the General Assembly, and 
made the Greek claim out as one of asking the UN "to inter­
fere in the domestic affairs of a foreign Power, so as to
Ilk
effect a territorial change favourable to herself." The 
British thought that their case for Cyprus was so airtight 
in the legal aspect, by virtue of the Lausanne Treaty, that 
if the UN approved the Greek position "the flood gates would 
be opened to claim and counterclaim; friction, bad feeling 
and subversive activization /sio7 everywhere be encouraged.
While this apparently sound position was being 
defended in New York by the Tory Foréign Minister, the Soc­
ialist Party back home was deploring the Government's policy 
for Cyprus. The Party's policy conference had agreed that
^^^Yearbook of the UN, 1954, op. cit., p. 73- 
ll4Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 21, Octo­
ber, 1954, p. 9.
^^^Ibid., p. 10.
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self-determination should replace the present Conservative 
position of retaining the status quo. When the Socialists 
were asked in the debate which followed, how they expected 
to safeguard the strategic position of the island, the Soc­
ialist members were split in their answers. One Labor M. P. 
admitted that "it would be very serious to abandon the bases 
on Cyprus," while another hypothesized that "in an atomic 
age the strategic importanace of Cyprus could be exagger­
ated. Though the "out-party" members made an eloquent
attempt to tear down the Conservative policy in 1954, the 
Tories' stand for maintaining the status quo and handling 
the Cyprus issue as a domestic matter did successfully 
weather the barrage against it.
During the following year the firm British policy 
for Cyprus eased up somewhat. Prime Minister Eden took 
the initiative and invited representatives of the Greek 
and Turkish governments to London for a conference "on
the political and defense questions which affect the East-
117e m  Mediterranean, including Cyprus," After the invita­
tions were accepted by both of the governments, tension on 
Cyprus was not as marked as it had been. The Colonial Sec­
retary then visited the Archbishop for the first time 
since the burning of the Government House in 1931" 
This meeting could not have been too decidedly fruit-
^^^Ibid.. p. 11.
117Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs. No. 29, July,
1955, p. 6.
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fui, because the Archbishop went off to Athens soon after 
to urge that the Greek government not give up its efforts
118to have the Cyprus questions heard before the UN.
The reason for the calling of the Tripartite 
Conference was to make the Cyprus case swell to international 
importance. By so doing, Great Britain had abandoned her 
contention that Cyprus was purely a domestic issue. The 
assumption was, "while the parties concerned disagreed 
about the ultimate status of Cyprus, they might yet agree
119on limited self-government." Moreover, intentionally
bringing Turkey into the struggle was not done so muoh as 
an acknowledgement of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots on 
the island; rather it was merely a tactical move to meike the 
problem seem more complicated than it was. At the time, 
Britain, more than likely, never dreamed that Turkey would
ever take an independent policy on the Cyprus question. The
Turkish position in its final form was to cause Great Britain 
almost as much worry as that of the Greeks. The only lasting 
effect of the Tripartite Conference of 1955 was to establish
Turkey as one of the disputants in the Cyprus problem, which
prior to the Conference had been strictly a Greco-British 
hassle.
118Rossides, op. cit.. pp. 3O-31.
119Mayes, op. cit.. p. 208. The new proposals for 
a degree of self-government were presented in the hope that 
the Conference would not end in a complete failure, but, 
notwithstanding, it did just that.
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The State of Emergency in Cyprus 
Ifhen the London Tripartite Conference broke down, 
the British decided they had better rid Cyprus of all its 
trouble-makers. The tough veteran Field-Marshal Sir John 
Harding, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was 
made the new governor. Violence had been so widespread 
on the island that a state of emergency was proclaimed by 
the new governor. Under these conditions. Sir John (now 
Lord Harding of Petherton) was given sweeping powers, e.g., 
to impose the death penalty as he saw fit and to levy col­
lective fines on communities or groups of suspected persons. 
Though the governor was encouraged by the Colonial Office 
to adopt a severe policy for the island, Harding did not 
use the full extent of his powers until the Archbishop had 
been deported in March of 1936. Soon after Makarios' de­
portation, the Communist-controlled AKEL party was proscri­
bed as an "unlawful association", and the campaign against 
EOKA was intensified (even as far as to the searching of
X20monasteries, where firearms caches were often uncovered.)
120Harding could not afford to pay homage to the 
unwritten law that the Church should not be desecrated. It 
was proven that the clergy had a direct hand in the ter­
rorist movement, so the governor, took no chances with them. 
Thus even Greek Orthodox nuns were searched by female secu­
rity officers at the airports and harbors after the nuns 
had returned to the island from abroad, Greece in particular. 
See especially, Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, op. cit., pp. 97- 
119.
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While Makarios was in exile in the Seychelles, the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal was effected by the Presi­
dent of Egypt, Gamal Adbul Nasser. This particular action 
by Nasser came on the heels of his campaign in Jordan against 
the Baghdad Pact. As a result of Nasser’s influence in Jor­
dan, Great Britain lost her command of the Arab Legion, and 
consequently much of her sphere of influence in the small 
Arab kingdom. Britain was still nursing her wounds from 
Jordan when Nasser surprised the world with his sudden move 
in Suez; It was then Britain took it on herself, with the, 
aid of France, to stop Nasser before he would do any more 
damage to Britain’s interest. With this turn of events, the 
perspective on Cyprus was now changed:
Tension and violence in Cyprus and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and the search for a solution of 
their problems satisfactory to the inhabitants 
of the island and to the British, Greek, and 
Turkish Governments, became part of a wider Mid­
dle East crisis.121
Cyprus was a key base in what could have been a 
major operation in Suez and the Middle East had the United 
States' intervention not disrupted what the British had plan­
ned to do. Cyprus had demonstrated her potentialities as 
a "bastion of the Eastern Mediterranean,’ and this gave even 
more weight to the British argument of the isleuid's strate­
gic value. Despite the chaotic happenings on the island auid 
in the Middle East in general, Great Britain went ahead with
^^^H.I.I.A., Cyprus. p. 2k .
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her series of plans to give the island a constitution that 
would be acceptable to all interest in Cyprus. (See Chapter 
III, infra.)
Summary and Analysis of the British Involvement
The British case was, in comparison to either the 
Greek or Turkish cases, the only one which had a sound legal 
justification. Great Britain had been administrator of Cy­
prus forty-five years before the island was officially ceded 
to her. It was twenty-seven years later before another sove­
reign nation actually made a claim to Cyprus in defiance of 
the British right of ownership. Thus, the legality of 
British suzeranity over Cyprus was hardly a point of conten­
tion when it was officially challenged in 195^* The question 
which remained unanswered was whether any other nation had 
a legal, or even moral, right to the island. The answer to 
this was never forthcoming, as the question was conveniently 
skirted in the final settlement of the Cyprus problem.
In view of the way the Cyprus issue was finally 
settled, one might be led to believe that none of the dis­
putants had legitimate claims to Cyprus. On the other hand, 
if the Gordion knot had not been cut and the question had 
been solved purely by existing international law standards, 
there is little doubt that the British could have continued 
sovereignty over the islamd as long as they might have de­
sired. Possibly the situation was too complex for so sim-
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pie an application of international law. The juridically 
proper solution would have, in actuality, satisfied none 
of the parties, including the British. Thus, the peculiar 
circumstances surrounding the Cyprus imbroglio might have 
called for a novel, and in some ways rash, solution. Such 
a thing was precisely what was to emerge.
The British policy toward Cyprus passed through 
clearly discernable periods. The historic view was that 
Cyprus was in internal matter that concerned Great Britain 
alone. When this no longer proved tenable, by the 1950's, 
the issue was elevated to the international level with the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in conferences designed to 
reach a just solution through discussion and compromise.
When these attempts appeared futile, Britain then embarked 
on a policy of direct negotiation with the Cypriot populace, 
via Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutohuk. By that time the 
Greek-Cypriots were well into their guerilla warfare and had 
sufficiently convinced Makarios that anything less than self- 
determination was to be considered a defeat. This intransi­
gence, coupled with the turmoil the Eastern Mediterranean 
faced during 1956, forced the British to break off parleys 
with the Cypriots and reaffirm the strategic need of British 
bases in Cyprus.
The claim that the island was a strategic link in 
the defense picture of the Eastern Mediterranean was the 
most consistent aspect of British policy toward Cyprus. It
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has not only proven traditionally sound throqghout history, 
but the claim is even more valid today. Beyond the legal 
argument, the British insistence on the strategic value of 
Cyprus was her strongest and most effective plea for the con­
tinuation of the status quo. Prime Minister Eden in 1956 
told the House of Commons :
Neither NATO obligations, nor the Tripartite de^ 
derations of 1950 (in relation to Israel), nor 
the Baghdad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle 
East area on the Persian Gulf could be speedily and 
effectively carried out unless Britain had the 
assured and unfettered use of bases in Cyprus.
A look at the treaty commitments in this area and the use 
Britain has made of Cyprus to fulfill these obligations so 
far will sufficiently prove the point, e.g., the Anglo- 
French attack on Suez, landing of paratroops in Jordan in 
1958, and the potential use of British troops to prevent 
the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. These military factors com­
pelled Britain to keep the strategy argument in the fore­
front of all negotiations on Cyprus, and the British insis­
tence was ultimately rewarded by the guarantee of her bases 
in the Cyprus settlement.
Though Britain was as guilty as both Greece and 
Turkey, as far as clinging tenaciously for long periods to 
one basis policy for Cyprus, it must also be conceded that 
Britain made the Cyprus settlement possible by her willing-
122
Quoted in Alastos, op. cit., p. II3 .
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ness to explore all avenues of peaceful negotiations. Per­
haps Britain did recognize too late the position the Ethn- 
archy commanded over the internal affairs in Cyprus, but 
this was nothing in comparison to their classic inability 
of the British to evaluate the strength of the enosis move­
ment. Whether these failures can be attributed to obsti- 
nance or ignorance is unimportant, the crucial fact is that 
such neglect contributed significantly to the cohesiveness 
of the mass social movement that tore Cyprus asunder during 
the four years of terrorist activities. Throughout these 
trying times, Britain was patently seeking a peaceful and 
just solution for Cyprus, but the British motives were con­
tinually suspected by the parties in the conflict and this 
aura was hardly conducive to successful negotiations. The 
bold move that lead to the Cyprus settlement, i.e., the 
Zurich agreement, was taken by Greece and Turkey, with little 
or no encouragement from Great Britain. Nevertheless, Bri­
tain consented to discuss the Greco-Turkish accord, and this 
concession along with the accedence of Makarics, allowed the 
plan for Cypriot independence to reach fruition.
Chapter III
THE CYPRUS AGREEMENTS AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
By the time the 20th Century had passed its mid- 
way point, Cyprus had fully recovered from any ill-effacts 
of World War II and was on its way to become a profitable 
little colony for the British Empire. Exports had reached 
an all-time high and the problem of unemployment in the 
island was negligible factor in its economy. The building 
and agricultural industries wore operating at full capaci­
ties, and the tourist trade had returned to a flourishing 
stage. All indications pointed toward a rosy future for 
the Cypriots, but this was not to be. Instead of taking 
advantage of the optimistic outlook, the people of the island 
were once again to be t o m  asunder by a complex interplay 
of internal dissention and external rivalries.
Despite the apparent high standard of living 
enjoyed by the indigenous population, the germs of discon­
tent were lying quiescent in the bosoms of the Cypriots—  
especially within the Greek Cypriots. The bitter memories 
of the frustrating attempts to bring the dream of enosis to 
a reality was too vividly implanted in the minds of the 
Greek Cypriots, and this delusion clouded the rational 
thought processes of an otherwise clever people. Moreover,
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the issue had reached grave international proportions, and 
it was apparent that the matter of the status of Cyprus had 
to be resolved once and for all before secondary affairs 
could be undertaken. The British government was indeed 
aware of the conflicting political currents and, conse­
quently, pledged itself to work out a solution which would 
reconcile the interests of all parties concerned, while still 
guaranteeing the British strategic requirements in Cyprus.
The conundrum was thus spelled out, all that was needed 
was a denouement.
Attempted British Solutions Prior to 1959
It is not difficult to highlight the events which 
led up to the prolonged onslaught of violence and bloodshed 
that was launched in Cyprus during 1955* (Chapters I and II 
traced these events in detail.) The terrorist operations 
were not spontaneous quirks of an emotional populace or an 
opportunistic leadership rather they were a mass protest of 
the seven decades the British government had arbitrarily 
ruled Cyprus. The riots of 1931 presaged the clashes which 
were to come twenty-four years later. But it was not until 
the Zionist Jews in Palestine proved to the Cypriots after 
1948 that a "campaign of terrorism succeeded in driving 
Britain to relinquish the mandate," that a similar pathway
^Vera Micheles Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western 
World, (New York: Mentor Books'^  1957) > P* 63I
l4l
was contemplated for the cause of enosis.
The reaction in Britain to the turmoil in Cyprus 
was one of increasing concern to the more reasonable English­
men. Why a great democratic nation, such as England, would
have to resort to methods that the Greek press likened to
2
"the Gestapo and the S.S." mystified the students of 
international relations. In particular, the members of the 
Labour Party's "loyal opposition" expressed on May 5> 1955 
in the House of Commons that the government should seek an 
immediate modus vivendi by offering a constitution that 
would allow the Cypriots a chance to develop a self-govern­
ing "political set-up on the British model." At the same 
time, the government should agree to a future time at which 
the Cypriots would be permitted to vote on self-determina-
3
tion. This procedure was to be employed with a scrupulous
concern for the interest of both Greece and Turkey, who were
allied with Britain in NATO. There was little disagreement
that the obvious "democratic" solution was to determine the
question of Cyprus' future by a general plebiscite in the
island, but the result of this would be, much to Turkey's
kdismay, an overwhelming vote for enosis. Therefore, in 
2
Scotsman, Au^st 3» 1955, quoted in R.I.I.A., 
Cyprus the Background. (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1959),
p. l4.
^Hansard (Commons), 1955, Vol. 5^0, col. 1972. 
kThe first unofficial plebiscite in 1950 showed 
the Greok-Cypriot majority to be sufficiently intimidated 
by the Ethnarchy, so as to vote for nothing other than 
enosis.
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view of the Turkish involvement in both Cyprus and NATO, 
the Labour Party officially adopted the policy that both 
Greece and Turkey ("two good Allies"), should be included
5
in a conference on the future of Cyprus.
The Tripartite Conference, London, 1955
The Government .of Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
was as anxious as the opposition to reach some sort of a 
compromise in the case of Cyprus, in particualr to end 
the hostilities that had aroused world-wide criticism of 
British colonial administration. To this end, the Conser­
vative government invited bcth Greece and Turkey to a 
conference on the broad question of strategic and political 
conditions in the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The scope 
of the area of study would naturally include Cyprus, but 
Great Britain was still insisting the problem of the island 
to be a domestic matter and, hence, a representative of the 
Cypriots was certainly conspicuous by his absence. Britain 
had been dilatory about openly stating her case on Cyprus. 
She had been put on the defensive between 1950 and 1955 
by the ambitious Greeks who were quicker to seize the Cyparus 
issue with a view to political gain. The whole British 
defense of her stand in Cyprus was the strategic argument—  
but this was an anathema to the British anti-colonialists 
and to the Communists as well. Instead of trying to expose
^Ibid.. Col 1943.
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the duplicity behind the claims of the Enosists, especially 
the rigged plebicit® of 1950» Britain had lost valuable 
ground by turning a deaf ear so long to the clamorings of 
both the Cypriots and interested nations. As one contem­
porary observer in England later wrote;
It must be a matter of regret that the Labour 
Government first, and the Conservative Government 
later, failed to grasp the nettle firmly after the 
Greek Cypriot Left had rejected constitutional 
advances by stages— so denying it to the Cypriot 
Turks— and when the Church resurgent showed it 
would not hesitate to use force to achieve its 
political aims. That was the time when Britain 
might have set out fully for Greece and Turkey, 
and perhaps for the rest of the world, the reasons 
why she could not contemplate a change of sover­
eignty in Cyprus within the foreseeable future and 
lines along which she intended that pdlitioal and 
economic development should move.®
The important fact regarding the Tripartite Conference was
simply that Grhat Britain had at long last conceded that
Cyprus had ramifications on the international level and
not merely within the Colonial Office.
The concession Great Britain made in inviting 
two foreign powers into discussion on Cyprus cannot be mini­
mized. The year before, the Ninth Session of the UN General 
Assembly had first consented to hear Greece's plea for self- 
determination in Cyprus. The resolution which finally pas­
sed stated: "considering that for the time being it does
not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question
^Stanley Mayas, Cyprus and Makarios. (London: 
Putnam, i960), p. 176.
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of Cyprus, /the General Assembly/ decides not to consider
7further the item." This resolution could not have been 
better stated for Britain's purposes, not withstanding the 
"for the time being" phrase. Before the resolution, the 
official British opinion of Greece's lack of legal right 
to take the case of Cypriot self-determination to the UN 
was presented in no uncertain terms: "... in effect asking
the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
a foreign power in order to effect a territorial change
g
favourable to herself." Only one year had passed from 
that statement until the invitation to Greece to join Tur­
key and Great Britain in dealing with what the UN seemed 
reluctant to undertake, i.e., the future of Cyprus. It 
was less a change of attitude on the part of British that 
provoked this action, and more the acknowledgment of the 
disfavor with which the Cyprus policy had been met both 
at home and abroad.
The Conference itself opened most cordially, 
but it was soon apparent to the two invited nations that 
Britain planned to dictate its terms and expect nothing 
more than pro forma ratifications from both Greece and Tur-
9
key. The terms in themselves, however, were not inordinate.
^Yearbook of the UN, 1956. p. 125.
8
Cyprus. Cmnd. 9300, Sept. 24, 1954. p. 5.
9
Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmnd. 9594,
Sept. 7, 1955, pp. 28-35.
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An orderly constitutional progression toward self-government 
was proposed in the British plan. The new constitution • 
would have created a general assembly with an elected major­
ity— obviously Greek Cypriot— with a specified number of 
seats for the Turkish minority. A cabinet responsible to 
the assembly would assume all policy-making, with the excep­
tion of foreign affairs, defense, and public security which 
were still to remain in -Kho hands of the Royal Governor.
A percentage of the civil service and a number of the minis­
tries were to be reserved for the Turks, but a chief minis­
ter was to be elected by the assembly in order to head-up
the local government.
The plan proposed the creation of a unique insti­
tution of Greek, Turkish, and British representatives, 
working in London to examine the functioning of the new 
Cypriot administration. This committee's job was to guar­
antee the rights of the two communities in the island and 
was to remain in existence during, as well as after, the 
constitution had been put into operation. Any matter that 
could not be resolved in the Cypriet assembly was to be 
referred to the committee and the three governments would 
jointly decide the proper path to pursue. The crucial issue 
of the future of Cyprus was thus nearly side-stepped in the 
proposals since the three governments held such a "divergence 
of views" on what should eventually become of the island.
The British postponed such discussion at the time, but
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promised to call another tripartite conference to deal with 
that and other problems in the Eastern Mediterranean after 
local self-government in Cyprus had been shown to work.
When the presentation of the British plan had 
been concluded it was apparent the Greek delegation was 
far from satisfied. The Greeks expressed regret that the 
plan did not include "the recognition in favour of the 
people of Cyprus of the right to choose the regime they 
preferred." Yet, at the same time, the Greek Foreign 
Minister, Averoff, lauded the British for finally "facing 
up to the problem of Cyprus." The Turks, on the other 
hand, were quite a bit more receptive to the scheme. This 
was especially so alfter Foreign Minister Macmillan stated 
the principle of self-determination was not "one of uni­
versal application." Rather it "must be made in view of
geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and
11other considerations." The Turks, nonetheless, could 
do little to convince their traditional enemies, the 
Greeks, to consent to the plan. Essentially, there was
little contact between these two delegations, since the
Greeks felt the Turks had no right whatsoever to be in a
conference discussing the future of a territory "in which
they /the Turks/ has so little justifiable interest."
1 n
Ibid., p. 36.
^^Ibid.. p. 37.
I k 7
The Tripartite Conference thus ended in creating 
more tensions than existed at its inception. The question 
of Cyprus was brought up at the Tenth UN General Assembly 
shortly after the London Conference had broken down. When 
the Greek Foreign Minister had described to the General 
Assembly that the British proposals were a "negation of 
democracy," the British representative, Anthony Nutting, 
expressed surprise that Greece was not more grateful for 
at least being invited to a conference in which she could 
have a hand in the future affairs of Cyprus. Nutting 
insisted that the Greeks had distorted the true aim of the 
British proposals and, by so doing, unfortunately had crea­
ted a situation which
can only go to prove once more that the real aim 
of Greece— and I say this with a heavy heart about 
a friend— is the acquisition of Cyprus and not the 
development of constitutional self-government in 
the island. This is the root of the matter. What 
we are here confronted with is not a colonial issue. 
This is a straight, if disguised, bid for Enosis—  
that is, for the union of Cyprus with Greece.1%
The British were quite possibly more hurt, than affronted, 
by the Greek allegations. What was thought by the British 
to be an magnamimous gesture had turned out to be an imbrog­
lio that reaped them far more international damnation than 
good will.
The British Policy During the Emergency in Cyprus
The failure of the Tripartite Conference might
^^Ibid.. p. 46.
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have been used as the excuse for the extreme attitudes 
which were manifested during the last quarter of 1955* The 
Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus were felt not only in 
the island, but on the mainlands as well. The British 
had tried, but accomplished little to mitigate the inter­
national implications of the Cyprus issue. This frustra­
tion, however, was not faced in the island itself. Still 
acting under the traditional belief that Cyprus was an 
internal matter of the British Empire, Her Majesty's Gov­
ernment did not hesitate to impose severe restrictions in 
Cyprus when it was shown that the terrorism and rampant 
disorder was seriously threatening life and property. An 
emergency proclamation gave the Royal Governor the power 
to impose the death penalty for being in possession of 
firearms, the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus', 
the discretion to deport, and finally the privilege to 
impose collective fines. To carry out the new policy— or 
the lack of policy, as some saw it--for Cyprus, Field-
Marshal Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.,
13was appointed governor.
Field-Marshal Harding was primarily a military 
man and constantly kept the matter of the strategic impor­
tance of Cyprus uppermost in his thinking. He was, therefore,
Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla. (London: Heine-
mann, i960), p. 97- The chapter of this book entitled, 
"Archbishop versus Field-Marshal," is a pro-Cypriot Greek 
account of this period.
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personally dedicated to th® dual-task of securing the Bri­
tish bases in Cyprus, and the restoration of peace and 
order in the island. Still Harding was far from opposed 
to the idea of diplomatic negotiations with the acknowledged 
leader of the majority of the Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. 
Shortly after his assumptions of the duties of Governor, 
Harding held several meetings with Makarios. In some 
respects, Makarios was taking a great risk entering into 
these parleys with the British Governor. By th® end of 
1955» the terrorist organization, EOKA, had committed 
itself to the all-out fight for independence— or enosis 
would be the more accurate principle— and those who had 
any dealing with the British were suspect of being traitors 
to the cause. Consequently, the Archbishop tactfully kept 
many of the meetings secret and the result was that much of 
what the British had proposed through Harding was never 
revealed to the Cypriot people. Whether news of the con­
tinuous British attempts to reach "a final settlement of 
the problem of Cyprus" could or could not have prevented 
much of the violence and loss of life in the following 
three years, is highly speculative. What should be borne 
in mind in an analysis of this period is thsr fact that the 
stem British attitude could have been a direct reaction 
to the equally uncompromising stand of EOKA and the Eth- 
narchy.
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That which transpired between Harding and 
Makarios was essentially an endeavor to foist on the 
Cypriots what Greece and Turkey had turned down at th® 
London Tripartite Conference. The statements from the 
Colonial Office, however, did indicate an obvious relaxa­
tion of the "never" position on self-determination. A 
letter from Harding to Makarios in January, 1956 declared 
in part :
Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Potomac Charter, and the Pacific Charter, to 
which they have subscribed. It is not therefore 
their position that the principle of self-determina­
tion can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their 
position that it is not now a practical proposition 
on account of the present situatioin in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. /Italics supplied^/l^
The British felt that this concession only rated another
from the Cypriots, thus Her Majesty's Government
will be prepared to discuss the future of the island 
with representatives of the people of Cyprus when 
self-government has proved itself capable of safe­
guarding the interests of all sections of the com­
munity. 15
Nevertheless, the British had, at long last, decided to 
talk directly with the Cypriots— an alternative that had 
been rejected in actuality ever since 1878.
The Harding proposals, as the previous tripartite 
plan, were designed first to create self-government in the
^^Cyprus; Correspondence Exchanged Between the 
Governor and Archbishop Makarios. Cmnd. 9708, 1956, p. 3.
^Ibid.
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island before self-determination could be considered. Th® 
concept of a "liberal and democratic constitution" was per­
fectly acceptable to the Archbishop, but he insisted that 
the essential prerequisite to the framing of the constitu­
tion would have to be a general amnesty for the political 
prisoners then being detained by the colonial government.
The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, made a special 
visit to the Archbishop to urge him to drop this reserva­
tion since the detainees had been convicted via a "legal" 
process. On the return of the Colonial Secretary, the 
House of Commons was told that the Archbishop was even more 
insistent on the amnesty terms and had even introduced 
demands that the Governor be stripped of security powers.
The House of Commons made no declaration of policy at this 
point, but it was apparent to every member of Parliament 
that Makarios had to be dealt with before any changes in 
Cyprus could be effected.
The Emergency Period in Cyprus was first compli­
cated by the deportation of the Archbishop on March 9, 1956 
and then by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, on 
July 26 of the same year. Prime Minister Anthony Eden in 
a speech before the House of Commons stressed that the gov­
ernment was slow to take action against Makarios and certain 
of his Prelates, but "it was established beyond all reason­
able doubt that the Archbishop had not only countenanced
Hansard. (Commons), 1956, Vol. 5^9, Cols. 1715-19.
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but actively fostered terrorism in order to promote his
17political ends." The strategic argument was again 
alluded to,^but the "loyal opposition" avoided that matter 
and could only see in the deportation egregious aggravation 
to the internal chaos in Cyprus. Moreover, the deportation 
concurrently meant the bresik-down of negotiations, since 
Makarios was the only person through whcm any sort of 
rapproachement could be attained. The Royal Greek Govern­
ment was quick to react by recalling its ambassador from 
London and then proceeded to lodge a formal protest with 
the UN Security Council. Despite the furor the deportation 
of Makarios caused, the extreme action was soon to be justi­
fied as the only possible step toward securing the unemcum- 
bered use of the British bases in Cyprus. Especially after 
Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, the classic claim about 
the strategic value of Cyprus was brought into sharp focus.
By the middle of August, 1956, military action 
in the Suez had been planned a^ nd the security forces in 
Cyprus were augmented far beyond the number required to 
maintain order in the island. The abortive Anglo-French 
escapade into Egypt was thus launched from Cyprus, and the 
failure of it can be more attributed to the United States'
i
policy against the use of force in the Middle East, rather 
than an over-estimation of the value of Cyprus as a base
^^Hansard, (Commons), 1956, Vol. 550, Col. 4l?.
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of operations. While the Suez campaign did not succeed 
in its original intent, it did demonstrate that Cyprus 
had grown with the air-age. Also the old 19th Century 
skepticism about the effectiveness of Cyprus as a naval 
base was corroborated during the Suez crisis, since naval 
forces had played such a minor role. The logistical limi­
tations Cyprus might have in campaigns toward the north 
against Russia, or east toward the oil-fields of Arabia 
are apparent, but the same arguments could not be used as 
far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned. Instead 
there existed in England among students of history
a general consensus of opinion that, whatever stra­
tegic value Cyprus had for Britain when Disraeli 
acquired it, a good deal was lost only four years 
later when Britain occupied Egypt. Equally, it 
was the loss of the Suez base in 195^ that gave a 
new strategic importance to Cyprus.
The consequences of the Suez crisis wore disastrous to the 
British Foreign Office, but they did, one and at the same 
time, allow validity of the claim regarding Cyprus' stra­
tegic value to be enhanced greatly.
Neither the Archbishop's deportation nor the 
Suez struggle forced the British to take novel policy posi­
tions on Cyprus. On the contrary, throughout the complexi­
ties of 1956 the British still made sincere efforts to write 
a constitution for Cyprus. On July 12, 1956, Lord Radcliffe 
was appointed British Constitutional Commissioner with the 
18
Mayes, op. cit.. 158.
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assignment to ffame a liberal constitution for the island, 
while guaranteeing simultaneously, and primarily, the Bri­
tish base rights in the island. Radcliffe left for Cyprus 
immediately, but the mounting unrest in the island was by
then an augury of what the future had in store for the
19Constitutional Commissioner. Lord Radcliffe worked from 
July until November, 1956, under the most adverse conditions, 
but he was nonetheless able to present to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies a plein that represented "a fair bal­
ance between the different and often conflicting interests" 
which were evident in the contemporary picture of Cyprus.
The Radcliffe Proposals
Lord Radcliffe could hardly have been described
as having carte blanche privileges in his undertaking for
Cyprus. He had a definite frame of reference laid down
20for him by the Foreign amd Colonial Offices. First,
Cyprus was to remain under British sovereignty as long as 
the constitution was in force; secondly, Cyprus was always
19The acts of violence in the four months prior 
to Radcliffe's appointment wore far from conducive to peace­
ful negotiations. In March there were 246 incidents of 
various degrees of severity; in April, 234; in May, 395» 
and in June, 276. Hansard, (Commons), 1957» Vol. 565»
Col. 104.
20Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus. Report 
Submitted by Lord Radcliffe, November 12, 1956, Cmnd. 42, 
1956, p. 6. The tpxt of the whole constitution is given 
on pp. 25-48, ibid.
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to be able to fulfill the demands made upon her as a base, 
as necessitated by Britain's international obligations; 
thirdly, all external affairs, defense, and internal secur­
ity, were to be in the hands of the Royal Governor; fourthly, 
the constitution was to allow for a "wide measure of respon­
sible self-government to the elected representatives of the 
Cypriots;" and lastly, the constitution was to embody prin­
ciples of eventual self-determination, along with guaran­
tees for the minorities in the island. With these points 
as his guide, Lord Radcliffe went ahead with the task of 
devising a fundamental body of laws for the troubled island 
of Cyprus, On December 19— after the Colonial Office had 
checked each provision thoroughly— a White Paper was pub­
lished and became the official government policy for Cyprus.
Basically, the Radcliffe Proposals followed the 
instructions given by Her Majesty's Government. Prom the 
beginning. Lord Radcliffe made it clear that some of the 
measures would take a transitional period before their act­
ual institutionalisation, but the reward for a patient, 
conscientious effort on the part of the Cypriots would be 
self-determination once self-government had been achieved. 
The difficulties of the oonsitution were readily apparent. 
The basic form of government was a diarchy system, with 
two separate law-making authorities and two distinoe forms
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21of administrative bodies. The legislature was to be
composed of a speaker, a deputy speaker, and thirty-six
other members: twenty-four were to be elected from the
Cypriot Greek majority, six seats were allotted for the
Cypriot Turks, and the other six were to be appointed by 
22the Governor. The Governor was to have control of all 
external matters and was to be assisted by a chief minis­
ter, supposedly cm of the legislature members who appeared
to the Governor to command "the largest measure of general
23support in the Legislative Assembly."
Radcliffe made an interesting proposal for the 
composition of the Supreme court which was to have judicial 
review of the acts of the legislature. The chief justice, 
under the terms of the constitution, was to be appointed 
from outside Cyprus and the remaining Justices were to 
have been equally balanced between the Greek and Turkish 
elements. Radcliffe claimed he saw a great possibility 
for the judicial power in the island to bring about the
21This system was patterned after that of Malta's; 
see Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs. No. h k ,  January, 1957»
p. 2.
22To safeguard the interests of the expatriated 
Britishers in Cyprus, one of the appointed members was to 
be, if possible, a British subject resident from one of the 
indigenous communities in the island. Cmnd. 42, 1956, 
op. cit.. p. 36.
Cyprus. (London: Central Office of Information,
July, 1958), Quote No. 3932, p. 18.
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24"resolution of inter-communal disputes." Part of the
legal apparatus for bringing this about was a Tribunal
of Guarantees, which Radcliffe himself once declared to be
the most novel aspect of the constitution, in comparison to
25any other such document derived from "British sources."
This particualr Tribunal was to be analogous to the Civil 
Rights Commission in the United States in theory, but was 
to be far more comprehensive in actual operation. The 
functions of this instrumentality were to investigate any 
charges of discrimination or deprivation of constitutional 
rights, as well as to carry out studies in basic civil 
rights as directed by the supreme court or the Governor.
The Tribunal was to have been composed of an equal number 
of Greeks and Turks, but it was not to have the power to 
review specific civil rights acts of the legislative assem­
bly, this function being left to the supreme court. To 
secure the greatest possible degree of impartiality in the 
Tribunal, the chairman was to be a representative of neither 
the Greek nor Turkish communities in the island.
The Radcliffe proposals were significant as the 
first departure from the former intransigent British policy
24
Cmnd. 42, 1956, op. cit., p. 1?.
^^R.I.I.A., dyprus. the Background, op. cit., p. 30.
^^It is a tribute to Radcliffe to see the number 
of provisions regarding the judicial system that were finally 
included in the final constitution for the Republic of Cyp­
rus. (infra.. Chapter IV).
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of maintaining the status quo. In commenting on the pro­
posals, the Colonial Secretary made this statement early 
in 1957:
Vhen the time comes for this review ^ d r  self-deter- 
mination7, that is, when these conditions have been 
fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's 
Government to ensure that any exercise of self-deter­
mination should be effected in such a manner that the 
Tnx4cish Cypriots community, no less than the Greek 
Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances 
of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves 
their future status. In other words...the exercise 
of self-determination in such a mixed^population must 
include partition among the eventual options.2?
Unwittingly, the Colonial Secretary had introduced into the 
Cyprus problem a new wrinkle. While not endorsing the prin­
ciple of partition as one of the alternatives after self- 
government had been shown to work in Cyprus, the British 
suggestion gave Turkey the first positive position which 
was to satisfy her combined demand for the protection of 
the Turkish minority and the security of her southern coastal 
region. The partition statement, which was reluctantly 
received by Turkey initially, was soon to be the cause of 
much worry for the British in the two years of futile nego­
tiations that were to follow the Radcliffe Proposals. Tur­
key did not care for the gradual process of self-government 
preceding self-determination, but rather pressed for imme­
diate partition if any change in the status of Cyprus were 
contemplated. The Greeks, on the oth^r hand, would not
27Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs. No. 44, January, 
1957, p. 5.
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consider anything other than immediate self-determination,
which then would have brought about gnosis. As a result,
the British were to find themselves between the proverbial
Scylla and Charybdis, still trying to chart a course that
would avoid either of the "monsters" of partition or enosis.
28The "brilliantly-conceived constitution" of 
Lord Radcliffe was to meet an unmerited fate. The Royal 
Greek Government immediately rejected the proposals even 
before the Cypriots had a chance to pass judgment on it. 
Their contention was that the constitution did not provide 
for self-determination at any specified future date and tl^ is 
was tantamount to no guarantee whatsoever. The Greek For­
eign Office made a captious criticism of the document and
insisted that it "aimed at the continuation of a colonial
29status in Cyprus." The Turkish government, as expected, 
accepted the entire proposition, provided certain provi­
sions of the constitution were re-phrased so as more clearly 
to spell out the rights the Turkish Cypriot community were 
to be guaranteed. Even Archbishop Makarios, ten months 
after his deportation, was sent a copy of the constitution, 
but he declared, after having studied the proposals, that 
the Seychelles Islands were not the proper place to discuss 
28Mayes, op. cit., p. 214.
29The Manchester Guardian Weekley, February 25,
1957, p. 2.
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30th® futur© of Cyprus. The Secretary-General of NATO
urged, for the first time in public, that the feuding allies
try this plan temporarily in order that the eastern flank
of the West's collective security arrangement might once
31again be stabilized. No such compromise was to be effec­
ted, however, and the Radcliffe Proposals were finally to 
survive merely as another landmark in the frustrating record 
of the British efforts to solve the Cyprus question.
Most observers blamed the Greek Government for 
defeating the Radcliffe proposals, and by so doing, com­
mitting a "political folly...matched only by the political
ineptitude of the Ethnarchy in turning down the 1948 offer"
32of the Labour Government. The Government of Prime Minis­
ter Eden had to cope with this embarrassment along with 
the ridicule of the Suez fiasco, and no one is sure how 
much the Cyprus issue contributed to Eden's humiliating 
decision to resign his post. In the final analysis, it 
was the Royal Greek Government which was to feel the great­
est loss by the failure of the Radcliffe constitution.
This conclusion was definitely proven three years later, 
looking back to the miscalculation of the Greek Government :
^^Hansard. (Commons), 1957, Vol. 565, Col. 246.
31The Cvprus Question. Discussion at the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Athens: Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1958), p. 5»
32
Mayes, op. cit., p. 215.
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The constitution devised by Lord Radcliffe and pub­
lished in December, 1956, had the jewelled precision 
of a fine watch, yet was sturdy and sensible enough 
for everyday use. It deserved better fate than to 
be thrown aside, unlooked at, by the Greeks, because 
it did not do what it was not designed to do— pro­
mote Enosis. The speed with which the Greek Govern­
ment rejected it showed that the Greeks had no real 
answer to such fair-minded proposals. So the press 
and radio were given their cue to bury them in abuse, 
and arguments were found later to justify the rejec­
tion. Yet the time was to come when the Greeks looked 
back with genuine regret that they had not accepted
this offer of self-government.33
Now that the union of Cyprus with Greece had been effec­
tively barred forever, this summary is far from exaggerated. 
(See Chapter IV, infra.)
The next offer from the British did not come 
until fully eighteen months had ©lapsed after Lord Radcliffe's 
attempt. In the interim much had happened to change the pic­
ture of Cyprus: Makarios had been released and had beguB
personally to propagandize the cause of enosis; the UN 
General Assembly became more sympathetic to the cause of 
colonial Cyprus; NATO had offered "good Offices" of media­
tion; violence had increased in Cyprus with the formation 
of the Turkish terrorist group, Volkan (t .M.T.), to coun­
terbalance EOKA; and finally the harsh administration of 
Field Marshal Harding was succeeded by the more moderate 
governorship of Sir Hugh Foot. In view of those changes.
Her Majesty's Government was ready again by early 1958 to 
initiate efforts to reach a settlement for Cyprus.
^^Ibid.. p. 213.
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The Macsalllari Plan 
The last policy stand taken by Great Britain 
before the final Cyprus settlement was the "seven-year part­
nership plan," which was announced by Prime Minister Mac­
millan on June 19, 1958. In this announcessent, Britain 
declared a new policy "which represents an adventure in
partnership— partnership between the communities in the
34island and also between Greece, Turkey, and the UK."
The Macmillan Plan presented a unique offer of a tri­
dominium of Cyprus in an international status to remain
35unchanged for the period of seven years. Among other 
provisions: Greek and Turkish representatives were to be
on an advisory council with the British Governor; the resi­
dents would assume Greek or Turkish citizenship or retain 
British nationality if they wished; a system of represen­
tative government would be worked out and local autonomy 
would be guaranteed; and finally a constitution respecting 
each community's rights would be written. The essential 
provisions of the new constitution, as specified by the 
British government, would have been:
(a) There will be a separate House of Representatives 
for each of the two communities, and these Houses 
will have final legislative authority in communal 
affairs;
34COI, Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 1$.
^^Hansard, (Commons), 1958, Vol. 589, Cols.
1321-24.
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(b) Authority for internal administration, other 
than communal affairs and internal security, 
will be undertaken by a Council presided over 
by the Governor and including the représenta­
tives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and 
six elected Ministers drawn from the House of 
Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and 
two Turkish Cypriots.
(c) The Governor, acting after consultation with 
the representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure 
that the interests of both communities are pro­
tected.
(d) External affairs, defense and internal security 
will be matters specifically reserved to the 
Governor acting after consultation with the 
representatives of the Greek and Turkish Gov­
ernments .
(e) The representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
Governments will have the right to require 
any legislation which they consider to be dis­
criminatory to be preserved for consideration 
by an impartial tribunal.36
When the Prime Minister concluded the presentation
of the proposal, he said that he wished "this imaginative
plan would be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit in
37which it is put forth." but the plan was doomed from its 
inception. The Macmillan Plan first met difficulty in the 
debate in the House of Commons, where the Opposition was 
won over, however, and the Plan was approved as the offi­
cial British policy. The Greeks rejected the Plan, as was 
feared by most members of Parliament, but the Turks endorsed 
it, and the British had decided to go ahead and put it into
Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 6l, July,
1958, p. 1
37Ibid.
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effect without the Greeks. This would have been a most 
embarrassing situation for Britain— to put the very intri­
cate tri-dominium rule of Cyprus into effect without Greek 
help. In view of this, NATO Secretary-General Spaak urged 
Great Britain in October, 1958 to postpone the implementa­
tion of the Macmillan Plan and call a three-power confer­
ence. This was the status of the Pleun when th® Zurich 
Agreement was reached in January, 1959.
NATO and the Cyprus Question 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization saw imme­
diately after the Eleventh Session of the UN General Assem­
bly in 1956 that there was little choice for a settlement 
of the Cyprus question through that body. In December,
1956 the North Atlantic Council passed a resolution that 
it would make the "good offices" of the Secretary-General
available for concilliation on the peaceful settlement of
39disputes. In accordance with this resolution, the
qg
The Greek rejection of the Macmillan Plan on 
August 19, 1958, was tendered on the grounds that it "con­
tained elements which would divide the Cypriot people." 
Asian Recorder. Vol. V, No. 11, March l4-20, 1959, p. 2503. 
A possible reason for Greek rejection of the plan is the 
simple fact that the Turks had previously accepted it.
39Survey on Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs,
No. 46, March, 1957> P> I6. The difference between "good 
offices" and mediation is that in the former the third 
state acts simply as an amicable go-between, while in the 
latter a mediator may make suggestions for settlement on 
his own without consulting the disputants.
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Secretary-General of NATO in March, 1957» Lord Ismay ten­
dered his good offices to the British, Greek and Turkish 
governments for talks on the Cyprus question. Both the 
British and the Turks were receptive to the idea, but 
"within a few hours of its announcement the Prime Minis­
ter of Greece issued an uncompromising refusal of the NATO 
4ooffer." The three powers did meet later in 1957 at
Paris during the NATO Council meeting but there was little
constructive discussion about Cyprus despite a personal
4lplea to that effect by President Eisenhower.
Terrorism ran amuck on Cyprus through the first 
half of 1958 and the NATO allies of Greece and Turkey grew 
further and further apart. In the meantime, Paul-Honri 
Spaak of Belgium had become Secretary-General of NATO.
He had encouraged friendly talks throughout the year for 
the three powers and suggested his good offices for pos­
sible negotiations loading to a settlement of the Cyprus 
question. All along Greece was reluctant because the talks 
were to include Turkey, whom she insisted, as late as the 
Fall of 1958, had no valid part in the problem. By Sept­
ember 23, 1958, Secretary-General Spaak could neither take 
the Greek nor the UN procrastination any longer, so made a 
surprise visit to Athens to urge the Greek government to
40Ibid.. p. 11.
41
The New York Times, December 22, 1957» p. 8.
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come to terms. The next day, September 24, he submitted 
a plan (subsequently and appropriately called the Spaak 
Plan) to the NATO Council Meeting in Paris and requested 
that the plan be accepted in principle immediately and 
later it could be disucssed in detail. The Spaak Plan 
was similar to the Macmillan Plan, or the "Seven-year 
Plan," in that it proposed two separate houses of repre­
sentatives, one for each community on Cyprus, both of 
whom would advise and aid the British governor for a per­
iod of seven years. The end of that period of time would
"mark important progress towards the possibility of the
42Cypriot community governing itself..." The British 
delayed acceptance of the Plan in order th&t Her Majesty's 
government could study the various proposals. The discus­
sion lasted another month. Though the participants (Greece, 
Turkey, and the UK) made concessions and finally agreed to 
have a future conference, they could not agree on what 
outside parties should be in attendance and whether the 
conference would lead to a final solution for Cyprus or 
merely a provisional solution. After the British Colonial 
Secretary Lennox-Boyd made a speech in England on October 9,
1958, in which he declared "Cyprus is Turkey's offshore 
43island" and the Turkish government on October 24, denied
42The Cyprus Question Discussion at the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 8.
43Ibid.. p. 22. See also The Manchester Guar­
dian Weekly. October I6 , 1958.
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a statement in Th® New York Times that she "has given up
44th® claim for partition"; the Greek government on
October 24, instructed thèir NATO representative that "Greece
would take no further steps, seeing that her efforts and
45concessions had not met with the least response." The 
NATO talks broke down without success by November 1, 1958. 
After the UN General Assembly failed to endorse a resolution 
on Cyprus in December, the Tripartite powers knew they would 
have to act on their own. At the NATO meeting in Paris 
later that month, Greece and Turkey scheduled bi-lateral 
talks which led to the Zurich Agreement and London Agree­
ment of the Cyprus question.
The Agreed Foundation for the Final 
Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus
The Cyprus question was at long last settled by 
the London Agreements of February 19, 1959. These Agree­
ments (basically on the structure of the Republic, a Treaty 
of Guarantee and a Treaty of Alliance) provided that one 
year after the date of signing, the independence of Cyprus 
as a Republic with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish 
Vice-President was to be granted. The Agreements specifi­
cally prohibit the union of Cyprus with any other state 
(the former Greek stand), as well as prohibit any future
44Ibid.. p. 23. See also The New York Times, 
October I6, 1958.
45^Ibid., p. 5 .
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partition of th» island (the former Turkish position). In 
addition British sovereignty would be continued over the 
two areas (Episkopi and Dhekelia, see Appendix l) where 
she has maintained military bases. During the last year 
of British control of Cyprus, Britain agreed to ©ass her 
stem internal Cypriot policy, release all political pri­
soners, and grant amnesty to all members of EOKA and 
T.M.T. The burning issues of Cyprus which had caused the 
loss of over 600 lives in a four-year period were thus 
amicably resolved in less than two-weeks’ time.
By the terms of the Agreements, three different 
committees were charged with the responsibility of laying 
the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. Two of the 
committees did their work on the island, while the other 
worked in London, in a triple effort to breath® life into 
the London Agreements. The first, a Constitution Commis­
sion in Cyprus, worked on a constitution for the Republic 
based on the structure agreed to at London. The second, 
a Transitional Committee, also operated in Cyprus, "with 
the responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting... 
the Governmental machinery" in order to prepare for the 
transfer of sovereignty to the independent Republic. The 
second Committee was headed by the British Governor, Sir 
Hugh Foot, and assisting him were the leader of the
k6
Conference on Cyprus. Cmnd. 679, 1957, pp. 14-15
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Greek Cypriot commimity, Archbishop Makarios, and the leader 
of the Turkish community, Dr. Fasil Kutchuk. The third, 
a Joint Committee in London, included representatives of
- f I
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot committees, as well as the 
Tripartite Powers. This last group had the "duty of pre­
paring the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions
48of the London Conference." The important details of the
British bases on Cyprus, the nationality of ©x-patriat©d
Cypriots and other related problems were ironed out by this
last committee.
The provision in the London Agreements regarding
security armed forces on the island were most interesting.
In the section of the Agreements on, the "Treaty of Alliance
between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey," there
were definite arrangements made for the stationing of Greek
and Turkish troops and the training of a Cypriot army.
Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty statei:
Greece shall take part in the (military) Headquarters 
...with a contingent of 950 officers and soldiers... 
and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers and sol­
diers (which) shall bo,responsible for the training 
of the Army of Cyprus.
Further provisions of this Treaty empower the Greek Presi­
dent and the Turkish Vice-President (who jointly share veto
^^Ibid.. p. 15.
48Ibid.. p. 7.
49This provision is contained in the first article 
of the Zurich Agreement, ibid.. p. 5*
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power of all legislation) to increase or decrease the size 
of the body of the Greek and Turkish troops, and to rotate 
command of the tripartite military headquarters yearly with 
a Cypriot, a Greek, and a Turkish general o f f i c e r . T h e  
creation of the military forces along these divided lines—  
though such a system must yet show itself to be practicable 
--did allay the "Turkish anxieties" which grew out of the 
fear that independence for Cyprus would soon be followed 
by its union with Greece.
The perpetual independence of Cyprus was provided
for in the "Treaty of Guarantee," which was signed by Great
52Britain, Greece and Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus.
This provision allows any of the guarantor nations to act 
from without the island if any direct or indirect subversion 
threatens the status quo. In fact, if joint action to guar­
antee peace is not possible, then any one of the guarantor 
nations may act unilaterally. This m'sans that Great Bri­
tain could send her armed forces to Cyprus from her bases 
there if she felt the government of the island was not con­
ducting itself according to the provisions of the London 
Agreements. The Manchester Guardian notes on this point 
that there must necessarily be a three-nation decision at
5°Ibid.. p. 11.
p. l46.
52
^^"Cyprus: Conflict and Reconciliation," op. cit..
Cmnd. 679, op. cit.. p. 10.
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all times on what constitutes th® status quo and "especially 
on what constitutes 'indirect subversion' of the status quo. 
Since Great Britain is supposed to be taking a back seat, 
compared to the roles of Greece and Turkey, in the affairs 
of Cyprus, the best hope for harmony in Cyprus "is the con­
tinuing agreement between Greece and Turkey on the chief 
aims of their respective foreign policies." The Guardian 
concludes that this unsure condition coupled with the 
"ambiguities contained in the treaties /London Agreement^/" 
carries within itself many unresolved conflicts as Cyprus 
copes with independence. There is no doubt that the Repub­
lic of Cyprus is destined for scores of problems, large and 
small; but, it may be added that few fledgling nations have 
ever proceeded on the road of self-government without con­
flicts of some sort (See Chapter IV).
Other provisions agreed to at the London Confer­
ence concerned the legislature and the civil service of the 
new Republic. Each of the two communities would hold 
separate elections and choose their representatives to the 
Legislature in the ratio of seven Greek Cypriots for every 
three Turkish Cypriots. The civil service was designed 
to operate with the same proportion of employees, i.e., 
two and one-third Greek Cypriot employees for every one
1959, p. 8.
5 3The Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 26,
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54Turkish Cypriot employee. It could be noted here that
the above ratio constitutes a virtual diplomatic victory
for the Turkish Foreign Office, for at no time since before
the British occupation in I878 have the Turks had anywhere
near 30 % of the island's population. The last official
census was in 1946, but current estimates show that there
are approximately 78.8% Greek Cypriots, 17-5% Turkish
Cypriots, and 3-7% made up by small minorities, i.e.,
55Armenians, Maronites, and British.
, Lastly, the London Agreements established separ­
ate Communal Chambers for the Greek and Turkish communities 
in Cyprus. Those local representative bodies are to con­
trol the religious, educational, cultural, and certain 
economic affairs of their respective communities. Moreover, 
each of these Chambers will have the authority to impose
taxes and levies on their own constitutencies to provide
56for operational needs. This proposal coupled with the
 ^ ^      :  ----------
Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7• The 
army in contrast to the Legislature and the civil service 
is to be made up in the ratio of 60 Greek Cypriots to 40 
Turkish Cypriots, ibid. Possibly this military ratio was 
an unconscious concession to the superior reputation of 
the "terrible Turks" in the bellicose art.
^^Colonial Office, Cyprus. 1957, (London; H.M.S.O., 
1958), p. 15. These estimates wore acquired chiefly because 
of mandatory registration with police of all residents over 
the age of 12, which was a carry-over of one of the stem 
policy measures instituted during the emergency period on 
Cyprus, 1955-57.
56Conference on Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 6.
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provision creating separate Turkish municipalities in the
57five largest towns, caused Archbishop Makarios, who was 
representing the Greek Cypriots, to balk initially and 
refuse to sign the London Agreements. Pressures by the 
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and a "night of prayer 
and reflection" apparently was all that it took to con­
vince the Archbishop that his objections were without foun-
e Q
dation. Still the tricky job of implementing the London 
Agreements was ahead for the three countries and Cyprus.
5?Ibid.. p. 8.
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For an interesting account of the diplomatic 
maneuevers behind the London Conference, see: Doros Alastos,
Cyprus Guerilla, op. cit., pp. 181-201.
Chapter IV
THE CYPRUS TREATY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
The Work of Transition in Cyprus 
The "agreed foundation for the final settlement 
of the problem of Cyprus," was initialled by the represen­
tatives of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Cyprus 
on February 19. 1959, but the greater task of implementing 
the agreements was still ahead for the nations concerned.
The colonial government of Cyprus, under the leadership of 
Governor Sir Hugh Foot, launched immediate attempts to 
bring the island back to the normality of the pre-emergency 
period. The Governor was empowered by the London Agreements 
to select the seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot 
members of the Transitional Committee, after he had con­
sulted with leaders of both communities in the island.
This was accomplished in a period of six weeks, when the 
full Committee met for the first time on April 5, 1959*
After this was accomplished, the Governor aided the work 
of the committee by appointing members of his Executive 
Council to sit in the meetings of the Committee, and this
^Manchester Guardian Weekly. April 9, 1959, p. 2,
1?4
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joint council was the administrative arm in Cyprus until 
the Republic was officially established on August l6, 
i960. It was also during that seventeen month period 
that certain members of the Transitional Committee were 
invited by the Governor to assume the duties of the var­
ious ministries and departments, thus carrying out some
2of the specific terms of the London Agreements.
The next step on the road to self-government was 
the formation of the Constitutional Commission,-which was 
to work in Cyprus parallel to the Transitional Committee.
The job for this Commission was to draft a constitution 
for the Republic of Cyprus, building on the basic struc­
ture agreed upon in the London Agreements. The commission 
met for the first time on April 13, 1959 under the informal 
leadership of Marcel Bridel, (professor of law and one­
time Rector of the University of Lausanne), who held the
3
official title of "legal adviser to the commission."
Less than one year later, April 6, 1959, there was a cere­
mony in Nicosia to announce the completion of the Draft 
Constitution. The task of filling in the frame set up by 
the London Agreements, with specific constitutional provi­
sions was no mean effort. The burden of work fell upon 
2
Conference on Cyprus, Cmnd. 679, February 19, 
1959, VIII, "Agreed Measures to Prepare for the Now Arrange­
ments in Cyprus," No. 2 (b), p. 15.
3
British Information Service, Cyprus, ID 13^0, 
July, i960, p. 9 .
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the leading legal experts of Greek and Turkish nationality, 
since the British authorities had no representatives on
If
the Commission. However, when the Draft Constitution was 
submitted to Her Majesty's Government, they informed the 
other interested nations that they had neither comments 
on it, nor any additions or deletions. "Thus, after almost 
a year of complicated negotiations, the Committee's /sic/
K
assignment was fulfilled."
The one great achievement, prior to the final 
Draft Constitution, was the Greco-Turkish compromise on 
the power of the Executive Office. The first article under 
the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus," as pro­
vided in the London Agreements, states:
The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a 
presidential regime, the President being Greek 
and the Vice-President being Turkish, elected by 
universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish com­
munities of the islemd respectively.&
The only other provision in the London Agreements relating
4
The London Agreements stated: "This Commission
shall be composed of one representative each of the Greek- 
Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community and one representa­
tive nominated by the Government of Greece and one repre­
sentative nominated by_the Government of Turkey, together 
with a legal adviser /M. Marcel Bride/7 nominated by the 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey..." Conference on 
Cyprus, loo, cit.
"The Constitutional System of the Republic of 
Cyprus," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, 
December, i960, p. 20.
^Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 5
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to the executive concerned the joint veto of the President 
and Vice-President over decisions of the Council of Minis-
7
tars, as well as the bills of the House of Representatives. 
The rights and duties of the two offices thus had to be 
decided upon by the Constitutional Commission. The com­
promise was effected and signed November 10, 1959, by the 
leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, 
Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Pazil Kutchuk. This agreement 
removed a large obstacle and thus cleared the way for the 
presidential election, which was to be held before the
g
actual declaration of the Republic. This compromise was 
to become Part III of the final Constitution of Cyprus.
Basically, the compromise, and therefore the 
final agreement on the Constitutional powers of the Execu-
9
tive Office, were quite simple. The President was to be 
the head of state and was to represent the Republic in all 
its official functions. Also he would sign and receive all 
credentials of diplomatic personnel, and his office was to 
have "precedence over all persons in the Republic." The 
Vice-President would be allowed to attend all official
'^Ibid. . Article II, Sec. (a). Par. 5*
g
In a personal interview with Sir Hugh Foot, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, January 12, 1961.
9
Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus,
Part III: "The President of the Republic, the Vice-Presi­
dent, and the Council of Ministers," Arts. 36-60. Included 
in Cyprus. Cmnd. 1093, July, I960, Appendix D.
178
functions as the vice-head of State, and would be empowered 
to suggest the names of members of the Turkish community 
for special honors, which the State might confer. It is 
interesting to note that the Vice-President does not have 
the power of succession in the event of the death of the 
President. Succession would come from the President of 
the House of Representatives, who is constitutionally 
required to be member of the Greek community.
In order to "ensure the executive power, "the 
President and Vice-President were authorized to appoint a 
Council of M i n i s t e r s . T h e  Council was to be composed of 
seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish. The Council was 
empowered by the Constitution to give general direction and 
control to the government, particularly in the fields of 
foreign affairs, defense, security, and coordination of 
the affairs of the two communities in the island. The 
decisions of the Council were to be reached by an absolute 
majority and the President and Vice-President were allowed 
to exercise vetoes of these decisions. With the matter of 
the Executive Office finally agreed upon, the first elec­
tion was subsequently scheduled to be held on December 13»
1959.
^^Ibid., Art. kk and Art. 72.
^^Ibid., Art. 46.
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Elections During the Transition 
Prior to the first elections in Cyprus, the
Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, promulgated the Registration of
12
Electors Law on November 9> 1959, after it had been agreed 
upon jointly by the Transitional Committee and the Governor's 
Executive Council. This provided, in essence, that anyone 
already twenty-one years of age and resident of the island 
for the six months prior to passage of the law, could regis­
ter in either the Greek or Turkish community. Members of 
the Armenian, Maronite, and Latin Church minorities would 
register with the Greek community, while other minorities 
could choose their community upon application and approval 
of the governor. Those specifically disenfranchised were 
those who had been prison for the past six months, had been 
detained as a mental patient, were judged of unsound mind, 
or had been convicted of an electoral crime.
The total registered electorate for the Greek 
community ran over 238,000. In the presidential election 
of December 13, 1959, Archbishop Makarios received l44,g01 
votes as the candidate of the United Democratic Reform 
Front (edMA), and other right-wing parties. His opponent,
John Clerides of the Cyprus Democratic Union, received 
71,753 votes. The new president found most of his support 
in the countryside, while Clerides was notably successful 
12See B.I.S. Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 9-
180
in the larger towns, where the labor unions were strong­
est. The election of the Vice-President was uncontested 
at the December 3rd primary, when Dr. Pazil Kutchuk ran
13
unopposed.
The other elections were held in Cyprus before 
the actual grant of independence, and the election laws 
enacted by the last Governor were still in force at the 
time. The elections to the 30-m@mber House of Represen­
tatives were held on July 31» I960 and those of the two 
Communal Chambers were held on August 7» I960. Members 
of the religious minorities who were registered as part
of the Greek Community, were each to have representatives
ikin the Greek Communal Chamber. These particular elec­
tion laws were designed, unlike other laws passed during 
the transitional period, to lose their effectiveness and 
legality once the Republic had been established.
The Proposals for the Public Service
^^The New York Times. December 13, 1959, p. 1.
^^The New York Times. August 1, I960, p. 2. The
concern for the rights of smaller religious groups prior 
to the granting of independence was a paramount concern 
of both the Transitional and Constitutional Commissions 
in Cyprus. A statement of Her Majesty's Government, for 
example, provided that the Constitution of the Republic 
should give an "assurance that the smaller religious groups 
need have no fear that they will be at a disadvantage in 
future in the allocation of public funds." Cyprus, Cmnd.
1093» op. cit., Appendix E, p. 175-
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The Transitional Committee was given the respon­
sibility to reorganize the Civil Service, within the frame-
15work established by the London Agreements. The ratio of 
the Civil Service was to be seven Greeks for each three 
Turks, and the Committee was not concerned with debating 
the merits of the obvious Turkish advantage. Sir Hugh 
Foot stated, after independence had been granted, that his 
most difficult task, regarding the reorganization of the 
civil service, was the order in which the British colonial 
officers would be r e l e a s e d . T h e  London Agreements served 
as the guide by which the Governor's Executive Council 
gradually gave way to Cypriot members of the Transitional 
Committee, who were virtually administering the island's 
affairs by the time the Republic was officially declared.
The Cypriot officers were promoted to the highest 
posts in the governmental bureaucracy, as soon as the terms 
of the colonial officers expired. The Governor had devised 
a special scheme by which the replacement process would 
take place progressively up to the inauguration of the 
Republic of Cyprus. By July, I960, it was announced that 
the implementation of the 70:30 ratio stipulated in the 
London Agreements, would take place no more than five 
months after the Republic was inaugurated, and this hopeful
^^Conferenoe on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7-
^^Interview, Sir Hugh Foot, loc. cit.
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prediction was corroborated by the last Governor of Cyprus. 
In fact, it was the success of the reorganization of the 
public service that caused Sir Hugh to refute the statement 
of some dismal commentators who had predicted the people 
of Cyprus would destroy each other bit by bit. He stated 
in retrospect: "There are some critics of the newly inde­
pendent Republic who say this generation will live to see 
Cyprus drown in a sea of blood and hate. Of course, any­
thing can happen, but I don't believe it would over go that 
far."^7
In the one year's period that the island has 
experienced independence, there have been some unfortunate 
examples of how the inflexible 70:30 Civil Service ratio 
has been abused. According to the last Royal Governor 
of Cyprus, the Turks have difficulties filling their pro­
portion in certain specialized areas of the Civil Service. 
An early example of the built-in difficulty of the rigid 
ratio occurred a month after independence when six vacan­
cies for government doctors was announced. The Greek 
applicants for the position were qualified, and the Turks
were not, yet the Turkish members of the House of Repre-
18sentatives Insisted on their constitutional share.
Such an institutional check on the rights of the Turkish
?^Ibid.
18Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Part 
VII, Arts. 122-125.
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minority might cause some friction, but it would never bring
about open conflict since (in the Governor's words): "the
Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus never had intended consciously
19to fight one another." Still the Turkish members of the 
House of Representatives have resorted to political maneu­
vers to secure their constitutional rights. This arises 
most readily in the matters of general taxes, which need 
the approval of the Turkish members of the House before such 
laws are passed. At one point, the Greek members of the 
House wished to continue an existing tax, while the economy 
was being studied. However, the Turks refused to go along 
with the proposal in the hope that they could trade the tax
bill for their constitutional share in certain areas of the 
20Civil Service. Nevertheless, if one were to adhere strict­
ly to the terms of the Constitution, the Turks have a valid 
legal right in making their stand on the guarantee of the 
ratio in the Civil Service. Once that point is conceded, 
there remains only the question as to the wisdom of the 
Constitutional provision in the first place.
More recently, in February, 1961, the Turkish 
Vice-President of the House of Representatives, Raul 
Denktash, charged that the Public Service Commission had 
acted ultra vires in its failure to appoint Turks to Forest 
19Interview, Sir Hugh Foot, loc. cit.
^°Ibid.
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21Guard vacancies, which should have been allocated to them.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Constitutional Court 
and the Turkish case rested on the fact that the ratio 
should be filled despite the fact that some of the Turkish 
candidates were six months short of the qualified training 
period. While this case was routine in its implications,
the curious aspect arose when the Attorney General, who
22happens to be a Greek-Cypriot, was accused of taking the 
case of the Public Service Commission only after receiving 
instructions from the Greek members of the House. The inde­
pendent Attorney-General, in theory, is not supposed to 
represent any side or party, yet in this case his senti­
ments seem to force him into an unenviably biased position. 
Wliether he should strictly uphold the law and risk politi­
cal retaliation and private sanctions, or go along with 
his community interests and violate his oath of office, is 
the dilemma in which such a public servant finds himself.
It is in view of such constitutional complexities that 
"citizens will find it difficult to live in this country,"
declared the Turkish-Cypriot leader at one stage in the 
23hearing. Still the Turkish Community does not seem to
Cyprus Mail. February 15, 196l, p. 1 ff.
22The Constitution states that the Attorney-General 
and Deputy-Attorney shall be appointed by the President and 
Vice-President, provided they "shall not belong to the same 
community." Art. 112.
23Cyprus Mail. loc. cit.
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be Inclined to compromise on some of the Constitutional 
provisions, in an effort to make the operations of the 
country any less difficult for the Cypriot citizens gen­
erally.
The Work of Transition Outside Cyprus 
In London a Joint Committee was established with 
the expressed purpose "Of preparing drafts of the final 
Treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London
2kConference." The Committee was composed of the United 
Kingdom's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the Greek 
and Turkish Ambassadors in London, and representatives of 
both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Communities.
The work of the Committee commenced on March 23, 1959, 
and the members met regularly during the following months 
under the auspices of an appointed Committee of Deputies. 
After nine-months— and only one month before the originally 
proposed date for the transfer of sovereignty— a high level 
meeting was called for in London, in order to review the 
progress of the Joint Committee. The aim of the meeting 
was to reach "final decisions on outstanding questions,"
in time for the planned date of independence, February 19,
25i960. Yet this goal was not to be realized and the con­
ference ended by postponing the date of independence one
2kCyprus. Cmnd. 1093, op. cit.. p. k.
^^Ibid.
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month, in order that considerations of all outstanding 
matters might be completed.
One of the chief matters facing the Joint Com­
mittee in London was the question of Cyprus' joining the 
British Commonwealth then or at some later date. The mat­
ter was not easily resolved, since the Cypriot leaders 
wished to show the world that their proposed freedom need 
not be tied automatically to economic union with the former 
mother country. But, on the other hand, the Cypriots knew 
that the trade and financial advantages of Commonwealth 
membership could be a tremendous catalyst in the effort to 
achieve economic viability. The problem was neatly handled 
in the following manner:
It was agreed that the question of Cyprus' future 
association with the Commonwealth must be left for 
consideration by the Cypriot House of Representatives 
meeting after Independence. Archbishop Makarios and 
Dr. Kutchuk requested that the United Kingdom Bill 
providing for the Independence of Cyprus should be 
prepared in a form which would make this possible and 
that it should also provide for Cyprus in the mean­
time to continue to be treated under United Kingdom 
law in the same way as the independent countries of
the Commonwealth.2°
It was thus guaranteed to the fledgling Republic, both the 
right of a sovereign nation, plus the security of economic 
ties with a prosperous union of nations. There was little 
surprise caused six months after the proclamation of the 
Republic, when the Cyprus House of Representatives voted in 
2 6
Ibid.. Appendix F, p. 177» Commonwealth Rela­
tions Office, Januaiy 20, I960.
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a 4-1 majority to make application for the admission of
Cyprus for a five year trial period to the Commonwealth.
Nor did the world register any degree of amazement when
27the British Government welcomed the application. Pos­
sibly the only startling aspect of the Commonwealth q^ ues- 
tion came when Cyprus was given full status along with
the other twelve member-nations in the "association of
1 ,.28 equals."
The British Bases in Cyprus 
The announcement of the Cyprus independence date 
being postponed one month served simultaneously to suspend 
the operations of the Joint Committee in London and to 
shift the bargaining to Nicosia. Subsequent negotiations 
were then carried out in Nicosia between the Under Secretary 
27 "Cyprus Joins the Commonwealth," Commonwealth 
Affairs, March, 1961, No. 89, p. 5. Also Cyprus Mail,
February-17, 1961, p. 1.
2 8In a personal letter to the author from the 
Secretary of the Conservative Overseas Bureau on September 
21, I960: the pre-Commonwealth problem of Cyprus had rami­
fications of a much larger magnitude than just the one small 
island in the Mediterranean. "What is of special constitu­
tional interest in the case of so small a territory is what 
form such membership could take in regard to official Common­
wealth gatherings. The same question is likely to arise 
in the case of Sierra Leone. Obviously, some form of regional 
structure of the Commonwealth would make this conundrum eas­
ier to solve; but in any case there would have to be some 
form of representation at the centre so as not to detract 
from sovereign status." While this one observer was incor­
rect in his prediction for Cyprus, the matter of small na­
tions in the Commonwealth is far from resolved.
188
of State for the Colonies, Julian Amery, the Governor of 
Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, and the leaders of the two ethnic 
communities in the island. After the nine months of pre­
liminary discussions in London, there ware still four prin­
cipal problem areas remaining to be settled and three of
29
them had to do with the bases:
(a) the future of the sovereign base areas if Britain 
ever were to decide to relinquish them;
(b) the arrangements for administering the areas;
(c) the exact delimitation of the areas;
(d) the amount of financial assistance to be given 
to the Republic of Cyprus.
The original declaration of the British regard­
ing base rights in the independent Republic of Cyprus came 
after the Zurich Agreements, but well before the signing of 
the London Agreements. The prime ministers of both Greece 
and Turkey made no mention of British base rights in their 
first accord, but they must have known that the British 
would come up with an annex to the Zurich Agreements. The 
British Foreign Office had learned by 1959 that contractural 
lease arrangements made with independent former colonies 
were not the safest way to secure legal occupation of 
distant bases, e.g., Suez, Jordan, Iran, the Tracial Sheik­
doms, inter alia. Therefore, the British were inclined to 
agree to the independence of Cyprus, provided that two areas 
29
B. I. S. Cyprus, op. cit., p. 11.
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— Akrotiri said Dhekelia— would be "retained under full
30British sovereignty." The British declaration went on, 
that before sovereignty could be transferred to the Repub­
lic of Cyprus, the following conditions had to be met;
thr.c such rights are secured to the United Kingdom 
Government as are necessary to enable the two areas 
to be used effectively as military bases...and that 
satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey, 
and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the 
areas retained under British sovereignty and the use 
and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights 
referred to above.
The British declaration ended by spelling out ten areas
in which rights would have to be maintained in connection
with the successful operation of the bases, i.e., ingress,
egress and overfly; use of public utilities; access to
other sites on the island, particulary ports and the
Nicosia airport; said jurisciction of the British forces
32comparable to NATO's Status of Forces agreement. These
conditions were grsuited by the interested parties in the 
—
Conference on Cyprus. Cmnd. 6?9, op. cit., p. 12.
31Ibid. This statement might be called the euphe- 
mized version of the policy position expressed by Mr. Selwyn 
Lloyd at the United Nations five years before: "The strength
of my country in that part of the world is still one of the 
main bulwarks of peace. We have treaty obligations to the 
Arab States; we are vitally interested in the southern flank 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization cuid in the defense 
of Turkey, said of Greece itself. We have great responsibil­
ities under the Charter. Cyprus is vital to the discharge 
of those responsibilities... there is no acceptable alterna­
tive in the circumstances to sovereignty. Full administra­
tive control is necessary because leases expire, treaties 
have a habit of being whittled away and..Greek governments, 
like other governments change." Cyprus, Cmnd. 9300, 1954, p.
* 32
Ibid. . pp. 12-13.
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London Agreements and thus became part of the "agreed 
foundation..."
The base negotiations brought about the most 
difficulty for the Joint Committee in London. The vague 
aspects of this part of the London Agreements were made 
even more nebulous by thé continual shifting of the Bri­
tish claim as to the necessary size of the retained areas. 
After the Joint Committee had suspended its negotiations, 
the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, tried to explain to 
the House of Commons the cause for the breakdown of the 
base treaty talks. Originally the Government had esti­
mated and demanded:
that it would be necessary to retain areas in which 
about 16,000 Cypriots resided..,/then7 an area 
between l60 and I70 square mile_s, with 4,500 Cyp­
riot inhabitants.../and finally/ areas amounting to 
120 square miles and involving the reduction of the 
number of Cypriots living in them to under 1,000... 
/with? no question of a separate little "colony.
Still this final British offer did not prove acceptable
until the sovereign base areas "were whittled down to two
34separate areas totalling some ninety-nine square miles."
The negotiations on the sovereign base areas, as well 
as on the other unresolved problems, were protracted far 
beyond the newly scheduled independence of the island, viz. 
^^Hansard (Commons), February 1, I960, Vol 616, Col.
636.
34"The Cyprus Settlement," Commonwealth Affairs, No. 
82, July, i960, p. 2. See also, Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093, 
op. cit.. Annex A. p. I6.
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March 19, I960. After this second target date had passed 
without the necessary legislation having come out of the 
British Parliament, a period of four months lapsed before 
the parties were sufficiently en rapport, so as to justify 
any hopes of a speedy settlement. In early May, 1959, it 
appeared that the differences of opinion between the two 
sides had narrowed down to a few manageable points and a 
wave of optimism was to sweep through the British Isles,
This outlook, however soon proved abortive, since no for­
mal meetings were to be held for the next seven weeks.
The parleys up till then were looked upon as "an almost 
grotesque race against time," i.e., whether the Cyprus
Bill would go through Parliament before the recess for 
35the year. The crucial obstacle was to be overcome by 
late June, I960, when the agreement on the civil adminis­
tration of the base areas was finally concluded.
Archbishop Makarios had made a rigid demand 
throughout the negotiations that there should be created 
certain special arrangements whereby the Cypriots were to 
run the civil administration of the bases. Any concessions 
of this sort on the part of the British would have infringed 
on Her Majesty's Government policy of "unfettered control 
of the base areas." In order to bring the two extremes 
closer together, the British had made the series of
^^The Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 25, I960.
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proposals which continually reduced the total square miles 
the bases were to encompass. The idea was obviously to 
delineate an area sufficiently large for military purposes, 
yet small enough so that the number of Cypriots living in 
the areas would not be a bone of contention. In the Bri­
tish mind, sovereign authority over the bases meant sover­
eignty all the way. Thus, any resident within the areas 
of the bases would be completely under British sovereign 
jurisdiction, and this would include any Cypriots who 
chose to remain in the areas. It was clear that the Bri­
tish were prepared to make any number of necessary conces­
sions, provided they contributed in some way to securing 
the sovereignty of the bases. In other words, the British 
would bargain any aspect of the London Agreements except 
the sovereign nature of their future bases in Cyprus.
The question of the administration of the base 
areas was finally decided in Britain's favor. Makarios 
dropped his demands that the civil administration of the 
bases be controlled by the Cypriots, which he originally 
wanted in a binding, legal guarantee by the British Govern­
ment. He settled for something far less than this, but by 
doing so gained something far more valuable to the forma­
tive years of his Republic. The British "declaration of 
policy"--"which the Cypriots have always argued has no 
validity in international law" — granted no concession on
3^Ibid.
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the sovereignty of the base areas, but it did include an 
assurance that Great Britain had no intention of ever invok­
ing certain special privileges of the Cypriots living in the 
area, such as citizenship rights and free access. What made 
the Archbishop retreat from his original position was evi­
dently the counter-offer made by the British negotiators 
on the continuance of aid even beyond the first five years, 
as was informally agreed to during the London negotiations. 
The British were cautious not to go overboard in their offer 
for future aid, since "too generous aid might be regarded 
as a precedent for other territories in the throes of gain­
ing their independence."^^ Still the figure (totalling 
over Ik million pounds sterling, infra) was tempting enough 
to bring the inordinate demands of the Archbishop back within 
the limits established by Her Majesty's Government.
By July 1, i960, a joint communique was issued
stating that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders had
agreed with the United Kingdom delegation on all major
outstanding questions, such as:
the text of the treaty concerning the establishment 
of the Republic of Cyprus; the boundaries of the 
sovereign base areas ; the future of the sovereign 
base areas; the system of administration within the 
sovereign base areas; and financial aid to ^he 
Republic from Her Majesty's Government.^ word
"sovereign" was actually used as often as is noted/
3?Ibid.
OQ
B. I. S., Cyprus, op. cit.. p. 12.
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Also it was pointed out that the Turkish and Greek Govern­
ments were kept informed of the negotiations throughout 
and there would be no opposition from those quarters when 
the final treaty was to be signed. On the floor of the 
House of Commons, the Colonial Secretary, lain McCleod, 
was able to make this summary statement of the results of 
the nineteen month period of negotiations which followed—  
and breathed life into— the London Agreements:
The date of independence will be fixed in agreement with 
the Cypriot leaders. On that day, which will be after the 
holding of elections in Cyprus, the Treaties and related 
documents will be signed and become operative. The sover­
eign base areas will comprise two separate areas totalling 
some ninety-nine square miles. The villages of Ormidhia 
and Xylotymbou and the Dhekelia power station will be 
enclaves of Cypriot territory with the sovereign base areas 
and there will be special arrangements for access to them. 
Akrotiri, which is too closely adjacent to the main air­
field to permit of an enclave solution, will be the only 
village under British sovereignty. Her Majesty's Govern­
ment are satisfied that, with the special arrangements 
for training euid other facilities in the Republic itself 
which have been agreed in full detail, the sovereign base 
areas are adequate for our requirements. A point which 
was not susceptible of easy and rapid solution and which 
involved lengthy and involved consultations between all 
parties, was the future of the base areas. Her Majesty's 
Government's view on this is that since we have no inten­
tion of relinquishing sovereignty the question of cession 
does not arise. Nevertheless, in view of the importance 
attached by the Greek Cypriots to this issue, an under­
taking has been reached that should Her Majesty's Govern­
ment in the future decide in view of changes in their mili­
tary requirements, that sovereignty should be relinquished, 
it shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus. As 
regards the administration of the base areas, a declaration 
will be made by the United Kingdom Government describing 
their intentions, subject to military requirements and 
security needs in respect of various aspects of administra­
tion. It has been agreed that Her Majesty's Government 
will provide over the next five years a sum of 12 million 
/pounds sterling/. Provision is made for the amount of aid
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in the future five-year periods to be determined, after full 
consultation with the Republic. In addition, there will be 
payments arid commitments made by Her Majesty's Government 
for particular purposes, including a special grant to the 
Turkish Cypriot Community. The negotiations have been 
long and complicated. It has, however, proved possible 
on all points at issue to reach an accommodation between 
the essential requirements of the United Kingdom and the 
requests put forward by the Cypriot leaders and to achieve 
a settlement in full accord with the Zurich and London Agree­
ments. I trust that these matters will now move forward 
swiftly to a final c o n c l u s i o n .39
Thus, with the solution to the British uncompromis­
ing stand on the sovereignty of her base areas in Cyprus—  
which was complete sovereignty of the areas, other than the 
Cypriot's three enclaves— the path was finally cleared for 
the signing of the three Treaties on August l6, 1961, viz. 
the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee, and the Treaty 
of Alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. However, 
before this was to be accomplished the Cyprus Bill was debated 
in the House of Commons on July l4, I960. The loyal opposi­
tion of the Labour Party, smarting apparently from their 
own failures in the past with the Cyprus issue, took the 
opportunity to level charges of procrastination at the Tory 
Government. Mr. Marquand, speaking for the Opposition, 
declared that the settlement should have been reached years 
before, but the delay and weakness in handling the situation
"had arisen from a fear of the Conservative's own backbench- 
40ers." There was little debate on the terms of the actual
^^Hansard (Commons), I960, Vol. 6l6, Cols. 32-33-
^^Hansard (Commons), I960, Vol. 626, Col. 1720. An 
editorial in the Greek language newspaper in Cyprus.
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Bill, for most of the members of Parliament were relieved 
that the thorny problem of Cyprus was once and for all 
cleared-up. On July 29, I960, The Cyprus Act was "enacted 
by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, 
and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled.
As expected, the first order of business in the act con­
cerned itself with the "sovereign base areas";
2.— (l) The Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the entirety 
of the Island of Cyprus with the exception of the two areas 
defined as mentioned in the following subsection, and
(a) nothing in the foregoing section shall affect 
Her Majesty's sovereignty or jurisdiction over 
those areas;
(b) the power of Her Majesty to make or provide for 
the making of laws for the said areas shall 
include power to make such laws (relating to 
persons or things either within or outside the 
areas) and such provisions for the making of 
laws (relating as aforesaid) as appear to Her 
Majesty requisite for giving effect to arrange­
ments with the authorities of the Republic of 
Cyprus.
Phileleftheros, July 27, I960, made this comment about the 
Cyprus Bill in Parliament: "The debate in Parliament has
made one thing clear, that the colonial mentality is an 
incurable disease for Britain. No treaty or agreement can 
survive that is not based on morality and justice, as in 
case of Cyprus where settlement was dictated by expediency, 
absolutely alien to the interests of the people concerned." 
USIS Translation of the Cyprus Press.
^^Cyprus Act. I960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 Ch. 52, p. 1.
Lp
Ibid.
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The text of the Treaty of Establishment, along with the 
usual "Exchange of Notes," was published in February, 1961, 
in what might be one of the last White Papers the British 
Government may issue in the matter of the Island of Cyprus. 
The eventful history of the British Colony of Cyprus was 
thus finalized by the typical bureaucratic touch, which 
seems so necessary before decisions are considered both 
conclusive and legal.
The Treaty of Guarantee between the United King­
dom, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus, which 
was signed the same day, August l6, I960, was designed to 
secure the provisions of the Treaty of Establishment. 
Article III states that the four nations jointly would:
undertake to respect the integrity of the areas 
retained under the United Kingdom sovereignty at 
the same time of the establishment of the Republic 
of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment of 
the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it 
by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the 
Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic
of Cyprus.
Moreover, by the terms of the Treaty, the Republic of 
Cyprus must maintain "its independence, territorial inte­
grity, and security, as well as respect for its Constitu- 
Ho
T 3
h5
tion." wever, if the Republic for any reason breaches
Treaty Series No. 4 (l96l), Treaty Concerning 
the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Cmnd. 1252. 
February, 1961.
^^Treaty Series No. 5 (l96l). Treaty of Guaran­
tee, Cmnd. 1253. February, 1961.
^^Ibid.. Art. I.
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provisions of the Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom could "undertake to consult together with respect
to the representations or measures necessary to ensure
Zj.6
observance of those provisions." This was designed pri­
marily to prevent the former positions of either Greece or 
Turkey, i.e., enosis ur partition, ever to reach actuality 
at any future date.
Other Institutional Aspects in the 
Constitution of Cyprus
The State structure of the Republic is most intri­
cate, and the long and complicated Constitution (l99 Articles) 
seems apropos for the existing situation. The framers of the 
Constitution of Cyprus tried to find equitable solutions to 
the many traditional complications in the islands. The his­
tory of Cyprus, if anything, does serve to explain the 
built-in conflict between the Greek and Turks, which still 
can be detected so readily today by the impartial observer 
in the island. By the same method, the Cypriot hatred and 
distrust of the British can be proven when one sums up the 
80 years of colonial occupation of the island. The Consti­
tutional authors would, therefore, have to have been students 
of the history of Cyprus if they were ever to find pragmatic 
answers in the present to the problems of the past. To say 
that the independent Republic of Cyprus should never be in
existence because of its two currents of nationalism, or
 ^  -----------------------------------------------------
Ibid., Art. IV.
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because of the historic mutual suspicions and lack of 
goodwill, would be foolish in view of the fact that a year 
has passed withaut unusual conflict. In fact, notable signs 
of progress have been registered. It is apparent that the 
legalists who wrote the Constitution of Cyprus had pro­
fited from the warning signs of the past, in as much as they 
were clever enough to avoid traditional enmities in the
creation of the institutional framework of the Republic of 
kl
Cyprus.
From the very beginning of the Constitution there 
is the recognition of the historic separateness of the two 
ethnic communities in the island. In Part I, General Pro­
visions , there is the definition of what the Greek and 
Turkish communities, as well as related matters, are to be. 
It is also provided in this section for the official lan­
guages, which are both Greek and Turkish— though much busi­
ness is unofficially carried out In English, which is common 
to both groups. Part II, Fundamental Rights and Liberties, 
enumerates the rights of the citizens of the Republic gen­
erally, and then states certain rights which are derived
k8from community membership. To a great extent the rights
Chapters I and II, trace in detail the origins 
of the communal distinctiveness in the island. To force 
the two ethnic elements to live together and identify with 
common symbols, would have spelled doom for the Constitution 
and the Republic of Cyprus.
In a like manner, Americans derive certain 
rights from national citizenship, while other rights are 
derived from state citizenship.
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were patterned after the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but the source per se is not given any credit 
in the Constitution itself. Among other guarantees, each 
citizen of the Republic has the constitutional right of 
social security, as well as the privileges and immunities 
of the particular community in which the citizen chooses 
to reside.
Part III, The President of the Republic, and 
the Vice-President of the Republic and the Council of 
Ministers, (discussed at length, supra)states simply that 
the executive power is to be shared jointly by the Greek 
President and the Turkish Vice-President, in what amounts 
to a mixed presidential end parliamentary system. Certain 
of the powers are exercised jointly, i.e., the appointment
of the Council of Ministers and the signing of bills into
law, while others are left to either one office or the 
other acting individually. Both the President and the Vice- 
President have a veto over any decisions of the Council of 
Ministers or on the bills voted by the House of Representa­
tives. It should be stressed that the office of the Cypriot 
Vice-President is in no way similar to that of the same
name in the U. S. or other countries that have institued
a presidential system. The Council of Ministers operates 
under the two executives and are directly appointed by and 
responsible to both of them. While the concept of ministerial
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responslblity (respondeat superior) is not stated speci­
fically in any of the articles, this principle may be 
reasonably implied to be operative in the Republic.
The legislative powers are treated both in Part 
IV, The House of Representatives, and Part V, The Communal 
Chambers. In matters which are reserved to the competence 
of the two communities, the Communal Chambers have complete 
legislative authority. The 50-member House (in the ratio 
of 7 Greeks for each 3 Turks) primarily legislates on mat­
ters of general interest to the island, i.e., security, 
finances, etc.; while the Communal Chambers deal with the 
more parochial matters, i.e., religious matters, education, 
agricultural co-operatives, etc. There is not emy conflict 
of interest or incompatibility in holding offices simultane­
ously in both the House and one of the Communal Chambers. 
Any subject which may result in a conflict between the 
House and either, or both, of the Communal Chambers, or 
between the Chambers themselves, may be brought up before 
the Supreme Constitutional Court.
Part VI, The Independent Officers of the Repub­
lic, establish four offices which are intended to be above 
the political process being appointed jointly by the Presi­
dent and Vice-President. These posts are to be considered 
under the permanent civil service, but the tenure and 
grounds for removal vary with the office. The Attorney 
General and Deputy hold office, as do the judges of the
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Supreme and High Courts, until the age of sixty-eight and 
may be removed only for misconduct or incapacity of a men­
tal or physical nature. The Auditor General and the Deputy 
are appointed and removed in the same manner. The Governor 
of the Issuing Bank of the Republic and his Deputy are 
less secured in the posts, since they may be removed at 
the pleasure of the President and the Vice-President act­
ing jointly. The Accountant General and the Deputy are 
removed or disciplined under the competence of the Public 
Service Commission (which is analogous to the Civil Service 
in the United States.) It should be noted that each chief 
officer and his deputy should not belong to the same com­
munity in the island, i.e., if the one be a Turk, the other 
must be a Greek.
Part VII, The Public Service, established the 
civil service composed of 70^ Greeks and 30% Turks. There 
is a ten-member Public Service Commission which lays down 
rules of conduct and qualifications for the various posi­
tions, and these members serve at the pleasure of the Exe­
cutive Office. The general principles of the public ser­
vice are similar to those of the British Civil Service, 
and the ideas of permanency and career-status, i.e., pro­
motion from within the ranks, are paramount. Part VIII,
The Forces of the Republic, creates a 2,000 man standing 
army, of which 60% will be Greek and 40% Turkish. The army
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will be made up of voluntary enlistments, and the matter of 
compulsory military service would not be instituted with­
out the consent of both the President and Vice-President. 
While the Army was made up of the 60:40 ratio, the police 
force was be in the 70:30 proportion, as the rest of the 
public service.
The next two parts create the judicial system of 
the Republic. Part IX, The Supreme Constitutional Court, 
is composed of a Greek, a Turkish, and neutral judge, who 
are appointed jointly by the President and Vice-President. 
The Greek and Turkish judges are appointed "from amongst 
lawyers of high professional and moral standard," (if there 
be such a type). The neutral judge, ex officio President 
of the Court is to be appointed for a period of six years 
from outside the island, and the first one to hold the 
post is a German national. The Supreme Constitutional 
Court is to pass on any controversy arising or relating 
to an interpretation or violation of the Constitution. 
Particularly important are disputes and matters relating 
to the separation of powers as established under the Con­
stitution, and on these matters the highest organ of the 
judicature must pass. Part X, The High Court emd the Sub­
ordinate Courts, determines jurisdiction in matters con­
cerning the two communities. Civil disputes in which the 
plaintiff and defendant belong to the same community are 
decided by a tribunal composed of judges who are inhabitants
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of that community. However, in criminal cases the judge 
must be a member of the same community as the accused party. 
Where more than one community, or members of different com­
munities, are in dispute then the High Court of Justice 
must decide. This High Court is composed of a Turk, two 
Greeks and one neutral judge. The indigenous judges have 
the same independence as the Supreme Court judges, and the 
alien neutral is appointed for a six-year term (the first
\ 49one being an Irish national).
Part XI, Financial Provisions, deal with the 
matters of monies collected or paid out by the Government. 
This part also empowers the separate communities to estab­
lish funds for taxes collected from their individual mem­
bers, and these funds may be dispersed as the communal 
chambers see fit, provided the appropriation is for some­
thing within the scope of the communal Chambers. Accounta­
bility, budgeting and control are also mentioned in this 
part, and this procedure is modelled after that in the 
British government.
The last two parts, (Part XII, Miscellaneous 
Provisions and Part XII, Final Provisions and the section 
on Transitional Provisions) deal with general matters in 
the Republic. Possibly one of the most interesting and 
49The neutral judge has two votes to break any 
possible tie decision.
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unique— not mentioning the disputable aspect of it— article 
is #173- Under this article, the five largest towns are 
set up into separate municipalities, viz. Nicosia, Limassol, 
Famagusta, Lamaca, and Paphos. Each municipality was to 
have its own council, elected only by the members of the 
respective community in the town. For joint services, each 
town was to establish a co-ordinating body, made up of two 
members of each community and the fifth member, acting as 
the president, was chosen by both of the councils. This 
scheme was to be under the close scrutiny of both the Presi­
dent euid the Vice-President who would "within four years. . . 
examine the question whether or not this separation of
50municipalities in the aforesaid towns shall continue."
This provision of the Constitution has been the most diffi­
cult to implement because certain basic procedural aspects 
were omitted, e.g., whether the municipalities should be 
geographic or merely administrative in character. Some 
close observers feel that the creation of the separate muni-r 
palities was an extreme bit of deference to the historic 
distinctiveness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and
there may be a mutual decision to abolish the system entirely
51or alter it drastically.
^^Art. 173» Sec. 1, Par. 2.
51Interview, Jacovides, op. cit.
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The Institutionalizing of Communal Distinctiveness
The problem of the communal rights and interests 
of the two largest ethnic elements in Cyprus was the chief 
concern of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers wh.en 
they sat down to discussions in Zurich and the matter has 
not been resolved to this very day. The breach between the 
two groups of Cypriots had reached such proportions by the 
beginning of 1959 that there was certainly no hope of repair­
ing it simply by a Greco-Turkish accord. The job for the 
two foreign ministers was to prevent the internal conflict 
from amplifying, and this had to be done by institutional­
izing the distinctiveness of the two communities. "The 
'Basic Structure' /the Zurich and London Agreements/ there­
fore accepts that what must be consolidated is not so much
the integrity of the island's life as the rights of the
52two communities vis-a-vis one another." While the estab­
lishment of the communal chambers, as well as the communal 
town council, were done as expediencies, there were still 
attempts to introduce symbols with which the two communi­
ties could both identify: Thus the creation of the Cypriot
flag, the co-ordinating bodies in the five larges munici­
palities, the mention of the UN Charter, and lastly the 
rule of law, without which the complex Constitutional System 
52Eric Baker, "The Settlement in Cyprus," The 
Political Quarterly. (London), July-September, 1959, p. 248.
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could never function. Whether these values will in time 
cause the Cypriot Greeks and Turks to join closer together 
is a matter of conjecture. Or possibly there would have to 
emerge a super-ordinate goal, (e.g., a threat to common 
security, the desire for economic viability, common lan­
guage and religion, or even the drive to rid the island of 
foreign bases) which would cause a departure from traditional 
anchorages and the formation of a single Cypriot identity.
But is the creation of the Cypriot identity the 
over-riding goal of the clearer-thinking Cypriots? The 
answer would seem to be no. Not only has the Constitution 
accentuated the difference of the groups, but the two ele­
ments were working toward separateness long before the 
Zurich Agreements. In June, 1958, the Cypriot Turks wore
the first to create communal town councils in the four
53largest towns. As a result of the Emergency Period, in 
which pressures were applied to those crossing communal 
lines to do any business, there has developed a sense of 
integral economic sufficiency within each of the communities. 
As one Turkish Cypriot put it, functional or "economic
partition" has taken over where geographic partition was
5knot allowed. In view of these factors, there seems to be 
little sense in pushing something the natives obviously do
53%bid.
5k
^ Ibid.. pp. 250-51.
208
not desire. Thiis, the aim of the Republic of Cyprus sums
up to be "that the amount of unity to be achieved in the
island shall be that minimum which is compatible with the
55maximum expression of communal individuality." Consider­
ing the examples of Switzerland, Belgium, The Lebanon,
inter alia, the communal distinction in Cyprus is "no
56bar to political continuation."
The Constitutionally established institutions, 
as is true of all such systems, have not provided the 
Republic of Cyprus with all the answers. The new govern­
ment still faces periods of hesitation and instability, 
when the rest of the world would prefer seeing a smoothly 
running internal order. The British traditionally have 
tried to introduce measures and responsibilities in their 
colonies, which necessarily go along with self-government. 
Whether or not this British governmental training period 
for Cyprus has been sufficient and effective enough will 
be revealed as the young nation faces the vicissitudes and 
future challenges along the road of independence.
Analysis of the Independence of Cyprus
The peaceful settlement of what had appeared to 
be one of the most perplexing and insoluble problems of the 
day has finally been recorded in the pages of history.
55ibid., p. 248.
^^Interview, Jacovides, loo, cit.
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Indeed, the amazing rapidity with which the Cyprus settle­
ment was made cannot be over-emphasized. As a British 
Conservative publication has observed:
A short time ago it seemed beyonds the bounds of 
possibility that the situation in Cyprus could be 
transformed almost overnight from one of guerilla 
fighting and bitter political animosity, with 
repercussions far wider than the island itself, to 
one of agreement on an independent State involving 
concessions by all parties concerned. Yet that is 
exactly what happened...Interests that had seemed 
irreconcilable gave way to a spirit of reason and 
cooperation.5'
Compromise, concession, and relinquishment of 
former intransigent stands paved the way to the final out­
come for the Cyprus problem. None of the parties involved 
received their original demands. The British ostensibly 
lost the most, since they had to give up their insular 
possession; but, in reality, they were probably the ones 
who benefitted most— no surprise to anyone who has followed 
British diplomacy through the years. The British were 
allowed to retain permanent sovereignty over their two 
Cyprus bases, and at the same time they were relieved of 
a colonial problem which had become a malignant cancer in 
the Colonial Office. The Greeks, in contrast, had to give 
up enosis, but it was something which they never really had 
in the first place. Thus, no one should say that the 
Greeks are the greatest losers by the terms of the London
March, 1959, p. 4.
57Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs. No. 68,
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Agreements, As the matter stands the Turks gained a 
noteworthy diplomatic achievement, in view of the favorable 
proportions given the Turkish Cypriots and the sound minor­
ity protections guaranteed to them in the Agreements; at 
the same time, the Turks only had to give up their demand 
for partition, a stand which was taken reluctantly merely 
to appease Turkish public opinion. If anyone should be 
called losers by the terms of the London Agreements, it is 
the Cypriot people themselves.
The Cypriot people were the ones who had to give
up in actuality what the Greek and Turkish governments only
thought they were losing. Self-determination and partition
on Cyprus were forsaken for independence, and many doubts
exist as to any advantages this decision has given the 
58Cypriot people. The first year of Cypriot independence 
has shown that to translate the delicately balanced provi­
sions of the London Agreements into a sound administrative
^^The New York Times. February 2k, 1959• Another 
journal states that following the announcement of the London 
Agreements, British jtroops again placed barbed wire on the 
"Mason-Dixon" line /_a±o/ which separates the Greek and Tur­
kish quarters in the capital city of capital city of Nicosia 
so as to prevent clashes. However, there were demonstrations 
of dissatisfied Turks who carried placards stating "Menderes, 
you were sold for dollars," while pleased Greeks carried 
among other favorable signs, "Long live Dighenis (the pseu­
donym of George Grivas, leader of EOKA.). " Generally most 
Cypriots seemed in favor of their new Independence. Asian 
Recorder, V, No. 11, March 14-20, 1959, p. 2562.
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order, had required the combined cooperation and blessings 
of the British, Greeks, Turkish and other governments of the 
world. Greek and Turkish Cypriots, now must turn aside 
petty differences and seek a mutually agreeable course of 
conduct. A New York Times news headline succinctly stated 
the internal problem which has been created when the Repub­
lic of Cyprus was in the offing: "Cypriotes /si^/ Say
KQ
Communal Enmity Must End If Freedom Is To Work." Undoubt­
edly, the news of independence was "like a shock to Cypriotes 
/si_ç7>"^*^ but any individual therapy for this new Cypriot 
malaise is out of the question— most things of this sort 
in Cyprus must now be treated by mutual efforts.
While the Cypriots look at their newly gained 
independent status under understandable apprehensions, 
the other parties to the London Agreements have welcomed 
the outcome. Great Britain, which had lost 142 subjects 
in the violence on Cyprus the last four years,witnessed 
another jewel fall from her imperial crown but paradoxi­
cally felt no loss. Prime Minister Macmillan at the close 
of the Conference stated in a speech before the House of 
Commons :
^^Ibld.. p. 10.
^^ Ibid.
^^"Cyprus; Conflict and Reconciliation," The
World Today. April, 1959, p. l4?.
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I regard this Agreement as a victory for reason and 
cooperation. No party to it has suffered a defeat—  
it is a victory for all. By removing a source of 
bitterness and division it will enable us and our 
Allies and the people of Cyprus to concentrate on 
working together for peace and f r e e d o m .
The Greeks and the Turks miraculously agreed on this view 
and have so far continued to supply the cooperative spirit, 
which Prime Minister Macmillan had called the "missing fac­
tor which had so long eluded us...in the terms of the 
6 3settlement."
Nevertheless, the London Agreements and the
eventual establishment of the Republic of Cyprus has many
areas of unexplained behavior on the parts of the interested
nations. But the question of outstanding interest still
surrounds the Zurich and London Agreements, and this must
necessarily be directed to the historian:
what alteration in the balance of internal or exter­
nal policies of the three countries principally 
involved made it possible for their respective gov­
ernments so to modify their positions as to negotiate
on what had previously been held with the utmost
intransigence?"^
The materials now available only open up more areas of
speculation in this matter. The true answers must come
as the other diplomatic secrets of the past have revealed
themselves, namely only through the passage of time.
62
In a speech by the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan 
in the House of Commons, February 19, 1959. (Official text, 
British Information Service).
^^ Ibid. _  -
6k
Baker, op. cit., p. 24$
Chapter V
THE CYPRUS PROTOTYPE AND FEASIBILITY 
OF ITS APPLICATION ELSEWHERE
As long as the problem of Cyprus had appeared 
to be interminable, publicists in many nations were pon­
dering the question of what Criteria should be employed 
in the settlement of similar disputes between colony and 
mother-country. In the case of Cyprus, every imaginable 
claim was presented by the interested parties and the 
final settlement was somewhat of a synthesis of the many 
viewpoints. The ethnocentric Greek claims, appealing more 
to emotion and sentiment, were offset both by the histori­
cal-legal petitions of the British and by the strategic, 
as well as geographic, case of the Turks. But the vali­
dities of all three positions were seriously doubted by the 
objective viewer at one time or another. In reality, the 
dispute was simply the need of the colonial power for bases 
in a strategic area versus the indigenous drive for inde­
pendence and self-government. The solution in the case of 
Cyprus was one which ostensibly satisfied both sides. What 
confused the Cyprus issue and made it atypical in the annals 
of international law was the complex interplay of three 
sovereign nations exerting what was felt to be legal rights.
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When the conflict had reached a stalemate among the three 
disputants, it was, by default, thrown into the court of 
world public opinion. In this intangible, yet increasingly 
influential, tribunal, the matter was reduced to the bare 
essentials: colonial oppression versus rising nationalism.
Tradition and legalistic claims seldom persist in defiance 
of international opinion, and the three countries soon yielded 
their inflexible positions. The compromise on Cyprus, there­
fore, brought a welcome end to a protracted conflict between 
moribund colonialism and the tradition of Western liberalism.
But just what were the special ingredients of the 
final solution to the Cyprus problem? Why did this last 
proposal succeed when so many others had failed? Was there 
a "magic touchstoAe" in the case of Cyprus which helped to 
reconcile this particular colonial situation while others, 
e.g., Algeria, continue in a hopeless impasse? Does the 
solution in Cyprus, therefore, have applicability to other 
strategic British dependencies: Aden, Bermuda, Falkland
Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
Malta, North Borneo, Pitcairn Island, the Solomon Islands, 
or Zanzibar? Could the Cyprus example find a use in resolv­
ing other persistent colonial and trusteeship problems: 
Algeria, Martinique, the Trucial Sheikdoms, West Iriem, 
Bizerte, or the Ryukyus? The question also arises whether 
the Cyprus settlement is really successful, i.e., will it
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continue to work? Moreover, one must speculate as to the 
future importance of Cyprus, i.e., will it always be a 
strategic base? Finally, the philosophical enigma presents 
itself, namely should there be an ideal prototype for ter­
minating the colonial status of a strategically located 
territory? Obviously these questions have no exact answers, 
but they, nohetheless, are necessary to consider when one 
tries to devise a model solution to age-old problems.
Summary of the Cyprus Prototype
It is generally conceded that the establishment 
of the Republic of Cyprus required more goodwill than dip­
lomatic acumen.^ The so-called explanations of the "altera­
tion in the balance of internal or external politics of the
2three countries principally involved," are not sufficiently 
convincing to critical students of the subject. If Turkey 
dropped its contention for the status quo in Cyprus--or 
its "second best" alternative of partition— merely because 
of the fear of a weakening alliance on her eastern flank 
(the Baghdad Pact), then Just what assurances of a stronger
^Eric Baker, "Two Islands in Trouble," The Chris­
tian Century. August 5» 1959, p. 900. Yet it still might 
be argued here whether or not "goodwill" is a sine qua non 
of "diplomatic acumen."
^Ibid., The Settlement in Cyprus," The Political 
Quarterly, July-September, 1959, p. 245. The author admits 
that his, as well as other attempts to explain the Cyprus 
solution, seem to leave much unanswered.
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Asiatic border did Turkey derive from the London Agreements? 
If Greece departed from her historic position of enosis sim­
ply to concentrate energies on domestic improvements, where 
are the demonstrable proofs that the Greek economy has 
improved between 1959 and 1962? If the Tory government 
primarily feared that the results of the 1959 elections 
would have been disastrous had the "Cyprus muddle" not been 
resolved, then why did the Tories not stress the Cyprus 
victory more in the campaign?
Timing of the Cyprus solution was an important 
factor, but not as much of the overarching concern of the 
three codntries as some analysts would have readers believe. 
The Cyprus settlement apparently did not come about because 
of sheer transitory and selfish political expediencies.
Rather, there must have been a more pervasive motivation 
that brought the conflicting elements into line. For want 
of a better interpretation, the case of Cyprus may have 
just been caught up in the postwar trend in international 
affairs that has come to favor, in territorial disputes, the 
independence of colonies over the precedents of international 
law. As had been shown in the development of the case, supra. 
it would be an oversimplification to think that Cyprus was 
given freedom because of humanitarian sentiment or inter­
national pressures alone. Still it appeared that world 
public opinion did play some part in the final outcome. By
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the beginning of 1959, it was manifest that Cyprus had to 
be made an independent state. Consequently, the task for 
the three nations concerned was to save as much individual 
prestige as they could in face of the inevitable course of 
events. The ultimate Cyprus accord was designed to do just 
that.
The unusual circumstances surrounding the case 
of Cyprus, i.e., the two native ethnic currents, the geo­
graphical island status, and the scope of its international 
implications, would limit the chances for the settlement, 
per se, to have a universal application. However, the uni­
que agreement on the British bases therein— which, after 
all, seems to be crux of most colonial problems— may have 
a general relevancy to parallel situations. Most agree­
ments on foreign bases in sovereign countries are lease- 
type treaties, in which base rights are granted only for 
a stated length of time, e.g., the 99-y©ar leases of Uni­
ted States bases in the Philippines and Guantanamo, Cuba. 
After the specified period has elapsed, there are seldom 
assurances that the treaty will automatically be renewed.
In such instances, certain foreign bases in strategically 
located areas have occasionally been closed down at a most 
inopportune time, e.g., the British evacuation of Suez.
Lease arrangements may be effective in satisfying strategic 
requirements for matters immediately at hand, but the course
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of world events cannot always be shaped to fit rigid treaty 
considerations.
By the time the independence of Cyprus seemed 
imminent, Great Britain had lost a number of strategic 
areas due to conditional base agreements. The loss of Suez 
emphasized to the British the importance of retaining Cyp­
rus as the symbol of Western power in the Eastern Mediter­
ranean, if for no other than a psychological reason. It 
was, therefore, imperative that a solution be reached that 
would fulfill military needs in that area, and Britain pre­
ferred it to be one of a permanent nature. While advocates 
in Britain of an appeasement policy toward Cyprus casually 
dismissed the importance of it as a base— since, it was 
claimed, one well-placed missile with a nuclear war-head
3
could easily demolish the entire island— the British For­
eign Office on the other hand, never minimized the crucial 
nature of Cyprus in the Western base system. Britain knew 
perfectly well that in theory each strong component in 
NATO's collective security pattern would serve to lessen
the probability that any of the other components might one 
—  ^
This line of argument was attributed to, among 
others. Archbishop Makarios who alluded to the doubtful 
nature of Cyprus as a base as early as 1956. He stressed 
this point during his speaking tour of the United States 
in 1957» and the critics of the Tory Party's firm Cyprus 
policy took up the campaign in England. See; Cypruss 
Correspondence Exchanged Between the Governor and Archbishop 
Makarios. Cmnd, 9708, March, 1956; also The New York Times. 
December, 1957» passim. Supposedly Makarios had a "fall in 
prestige" after "he had been compelled to retract charges
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day be ajinilhilated, e.g., a proposed attack on one base 
would be deterred by the readiness of the others. The 
air distance between Cyprus and the borders of the Soviet 
Union is less than 800 miles, and this made the island sig­
nificant enough in the eyes of NATO. Thus, the merits of 
Cyprus as a base were not debated in Whitehall. On the 
contrary, the chief consideration at that time was how to 
secure at least part of the island as a permanent military 
installation.
The model modern-day solution to the vagaries 
of British colonial bases policy in general, and to Cyprus 
in particular, would be to retain the base areas as sover­
eign parts of the United Kingdom while granting indepen­
dence to the remainder of the colony. In this way, there 
would never be a need in the future to re-negotiate trea­
ties or leases, also internal administration could be hand­
led as seen fit, long-range plans could be made without the 
threat of abrupt termination of occupancy, and, above all, 
colonial status would be eliminated. Under such a scheme, 
base areas would actually be a chunk of Great Britain rest­
ing in a far-off land. The enclaves would not be "little 
colonies," since the propsed number of indigenous inhabi­
tants living in these areas would be negligible, if any 
at all. But the most important, the solution would be
made against the British while he was in the United States." 
See Baker, "The Settlement in Cyprus," op. cit.. p. 246.
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permanent "since /Her Majesty's Governmenjt/ would have no
4
intention of relinquishing sovereignty." This marks a 
departure from the typical colonial settlements since 19^7» 
and shows a marked degree of ingenuity in the combined 
talents of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. True, this 
was the denouement tailored especially for Cyprus, but with 
alterations, the solution might easily fit other problem 
areas in the shrinking British Empire.
The Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus
The Treaty of Establishment between the United
5
Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus con­
tains twelve different sections of Annexes, and eight of 
these deal with the sovereign base areas. In the hopes 
of apparently not cluttering up the main body of the Treaty, 
most of the important provisions were placed in the Annexes, 
which "shall have force and effect as integral parts of 
this Treaty."^ The matters covered therein were; the 
delineation of the sovereign base areas, definition of terms, 
sites emd facilities, land tenure, training, access to the
^Hansard (Commons), I960, Vol 626, Col. 35- 
Statement by Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian Macleod.
5
Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Repub­
lic of Cyprus. Cmnd. 1252, February, 1961, Treaty Series No. 
k (l96l).
^Ibid.. Article 11, p. 7.
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Nicosia Airfield, payments, and the status of forces. 
Scrupulous care was taken by the framers of the Treaty 
to cover each detail thoroughly, and the finished pro­
duct is a prolix re-phrasing of essential points for the 
purpose of clarity, emphasis, and, supposedly, for the 
avoidance of loopholes. While the Treaty patently anti­
cipates and exhausts every potential misinterpretation, 
one is reminded of the phenomenon in legal history about 
the longest documents having the least area of agreement.
If, however, there are points of discord in the base 
arrangement in Cyprus, they have certainly not been raised 
during the first year of its operations.
Essentially, the Treaty defines the boundaries 
of the sovereign base areas, including their territorial 
waters, (Map #2, Appendix.) Provisions were made in this 
regard for a boundary commission of combined representatives 
of the United Kingdom and the Republic, who would first 
lay out the exact boundaries. Then, with the advice of 
an independent expert, the commission would settle any 
future questions of interpretation of the maps, and other 
relevant materials, which helped define the boundaries.
The Khekelia power station, situated on territory of the 
Republic, is to supply hydroelectric power to both the 
base areas and the Republic. Under certain "exceptional 
circumstances" the British Government reserved the right
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to "ensure" that adequate supplies of power and water were 
delivered to the base areas. Such a reservation was intro­
duced to discourage the Republic from ever trying, at some 
future date, to freeze out the bases by cutting off sources 
of essential supplies.
Certain defense rights and facilities were secured 
to the United Kingdom in the territory of the Republic.
Among these were; freedom of movement between the sover­
eign base areas and certain specified places in the Repub­
lic, the right of military aircraft to overfly the territory 
of the Republic, the right to use ports and harbors, the 
right to establish separate postal and communications sys­
tems, and lastly there was included the right to employ 
Cypriot nationals at the "existing wage levels." The use 
of the Nicosia Airfield for both civil eind military purposes 
was guaranteed intgpnetuity, and the British government 
promised almost $1.5 million (500,000 pounds sterling) for 
the construction of a terminal at the Nicosia Airfield. The 
matter of payments was lightly covered in the agreement, 
(Appendix B. Part VI of the Treaty deals with port fees 
and the acquisition of immovable property, which were to be 
calculated with respect to relevant legislation of the Repub­
lic). The question of the "rental" for the base areas was 
included under the five year aid agreements which were
7
determined before the Treaty was signed.
^Hansard (Commons), I960, Vol. 626, Col. 35-
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The status of forces agreement (Appendix C of 
the Treaty) dealt with the presence of British, Greek, 
Turkish, or Cypriot soldiers in the base areas. The agree­
ment was patterned after the NATO provisions in this regard, 
and defines which offenses were in the province of the Ser­
vice courts and which were under the jurisdiction of the 
Republic courts. In cases whereby "a member of a force 
or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under 
the jurisdiction of the receiving State," the accused is 
guaranteed procedural rights consonant with the traditional 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and common law.
Possibly the most complicated aspect of the sover­
eign base agreement was the compromise regarding the type 
of administration in the base areas. Archbishop Medcarios 
was apprehensive of military administration, because he 
felt it would be tantamount to colonial rule. On this he
was adamant almost to the point of breaking off the treaty 
9talks. The final arrangement on this particular issue was 
clearly a British victory. Anything less than unfettered 
British miliatry rule would have jeopardized the concept 
of the sovereign base areas. Only two villages were to 
remain under British rule and this would encompass a total 
of less than 1,000 Cypriots if they chose to continue liv­
ing in the villages. The British guaranteed the resettle­
ment of any of these inhabitants desirous of leaving. To
9
See Chapter IV, supra.
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eliminate one sore point, the British reluctantly entrusted 
three enclaves in the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area to Cyp­
riot rule (Map #2), but this was the sole concession that 
Britain made. Under the final agreement therefore, completely 
unrestricted British sovereignty and jurisdiction would be 
exercised in the two base areas. The chief administrator 
was an ex officio post of the Air Officer Commander-in- 
Chief, Middle East Air Forces, Royal Air Force. In this 
capacity he would still be responsible to the Secretary of 
State for Air. By so doing the British avoided the mistake 
of making the chief administrator of the Cyprus base areas 
responsible to the Colonial Secretary, which had been the 
case before the Republic was established.
The base administrator was empowered to make 
rules for the "peace, order, and good government" of the 
sovereign base areas, but these had to be in line with a 
broader policy. In the final declaration regarding the 
administration of the sovereign base areas. Her Majesty's
Government stressed "the main objects to be achieved:
(1) Effective use of the Sovereign Base Areas as 
military bases.
(2) Full co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus.
(3) Protection of the interests of those residing 
or working in the Sovereign Base Areas.
The British Government went on at greater length to outline 
11its intentions;
^^Cyprus. Cmnd. 1093» op. cit.. Appendix 0, pp.
201-205.
^^Ibid., Article 2, p. 201.
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(i) Not to develop the Sovereign Base Areas for other 
than military purposes.
(ii) Not to set up and administer "colonies,"
(iii) Not to create posts or other frontier barriers
between the Sovereign Base Areas and the Republic.
(iv) Not to set up or permit the establishment of 
civilian commercial or industrial enterprises 
except in so far as these are connected with 
military requirements, and are not otherwise to 
impair the economic, commercial or industrial 
unity and life of the island.
(v) Not to establish civilian or commercial seaports 
or airports.
(vi) Not to allow new settlements of people in the
Sovereign Base Areas except for military purposes 
on payment of fair compensation.
The section then goes on to specify seventeen distinct areas* 
e.g., "freedom of access," "criminal proceedings," "commerce 
and industry," etc.— where possible conflict might occur.
A Joint Consultative Board was created to "advise the auth­
orities of the Republic and those of the Sovereign Base 
Areas on such arrangements as may be necessary from time to
time to give effect to the intentions of Her Majesty's Gov-
12ernment set out in this Declaration." Throughout, the 
relations between the Republic and the Sovereign Base Areas 
were supposedly to be characterized by a non-discriminatory 
treatment of those Cypriots who either lived or worked in 
the base areas.
^^Ibid.. Article 5» P . ZOk.
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The British declaration of intent for the Sovereign 
Base Areas was the key element which caused Archbishop 
Makarios to drop his demand for civil administration of the 
base areas. His fears that the gestation of colonialism 
would always be represented in the bases were not elimina­
ted by the virtue of the declaration, bat they were suffi­
ciently allayed for as long as it took to sign the final 
treaties. Makarios' rationale for the retreat from his 
original stand was explained by him in this way:
We had to accept the offers made to us and_to 
sacrifice some of our rights temporarily /italics 
supplied/ instead of sticking to all our demands 
and obtaining nothing. That was because we wanted 
to get rid of the colonial shackles. I am happy 
triat we have gained our freedom...we oppose colon­
ialism and support freedom everywhere.13
The allusion of the President of the Republic of Cyprus 
made to the temporary sacrifice of rights has the tendency 
to disturb certain students of international affairs. It 
appears that Makarios looks upon the intricate Cyprus solu­
tion more as a modus vivendi than a finality, and such an 
attitude in a person of his stature is indeed portends a 
threat to the future of the British bases. An Egyptian 
journalist managed to draw this statement from the Arch­
bishop during an interview in Cairo:
We have made it clear to Britain that if the bases 
were ever used in a manner that prejudiced our
13"Cyprus Breaks the Shackles," Arab Observer. 
Vol. I, No. 11, September 4, I960, p. l6.
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relations with other countries or were equipped 
with atomic weapons, we would rise in revolt once 
more. Personally, I believe that all bases, parti­
cularly atomic bases, should be put under the super­
vision of the United Nations. The world seeks peace 
and does not want to live in the shadow of fear. At 
any rate, it was not Cyprus that gave the bases to 
the British. Those bases must return to Cyprus one 
day.1%
It is obvious that viewpoints as expressed above 
can contribute little to the perpetuation of the status quo 
in Cyprus. The source may not be completely accurate, but 
the essence of the statement seems consistent with many of 
the past expressions of the Archbishop. Makarios, however, 
is too shrewd a politician and diplomat to attack the Cyp­
rus treaties so blatantly. While he would like to place 
restrictions on the uses the British make of their sover­
eign base areas, he knows full well that there is no legal, 
economic, nor political way by which he can justify such 
action. Still even the unconscious desire of the Archbishop 
to place one day the British bases under Cypriot sovereignty 
creates a disruptive potential. Makarios represents, or 
better yet embodies, the two most powerful institutions in 
the Republic; the presidency, or the repository of the poli­
tical power of the Cypriot nation, and the Church, or the 
repository of the national conscious of the majority of the 
Cypriot people, Together these two institutions are a poten­
tial force that could be suppressed only by military power— -
an alternative the British would rather not face, either
 ^     -
Ibid.. p. 15.
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now or at some future date.
Nevertheless, should provocative action against 
the British bases arise which would necessitate naked 
military power as a measure to counter any insurgency, 
the Treaty of Guarantee establishes the right of the 
British, the Turks, or the Greeks to employ such an extreme. 
The base agreements, while almost to the letter exactly 
what Great Britain had wanted all along, are by no stretch 
of the imagination completely foolproof. For example, the 
bases are not self-contained in the two coastal areas.
There are thirty-one training areas, installations, and 
sites which, for a number of geographical and technical 
considerations, could not possibly have been included under 
British sovereignty. (See Map #4). British access to these 
sites have been secured by every legal instrument devisable, 
yet the Archbishop could easily harass British troops move­
ments to and from these areas by any number of means. It 
is indeed a remote possibility that the Cypriot President 
would attempt to violate the treaty arrangement so early 
in the game. It is hoped that the energies of the Cypriots, 
even during the brutal Mediterranean summers, will be chan­
nelled into more productive outlets, but this hope might 
not hold true for all time. In reality, as long as the 
bases constitute an economic asset to the Republic, there 
is every likelihood that the Treaties will remain intact.
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Criticism of the existence of British bases in 
Cyprus has originated from sources other than those from 
within the island. The aim of the Republic, as stated by 
the Archbishop, is to serve as "the bridge of unity in the 
Middle East."^^ If this be the case, how can Cyprus secure 
relations with the United Arab Republic, for instance, as 
long as Nasser feels the British bases are "directed solely 
toward C a i r o M a k a r i o s  answers only in broad generali­
ties concerning the present, but he has been more definitive
about the future, as his projected goal" to return the
17bases to Cyprus one day" indicates. When that "day" 
will come is a matter of grave speculation for the British. 
Neither Makarios, nor the British may be able to withstand 
future pressures to remove the bases in Cyprus, especially 
if these feelings are vociferous enough and emanate from 
sufficiently powerful quarters. British sovereignty of 
the bases in Cyprus could ostensibly be submerged in a 
wave of adverse feeling based on morality, that could be 
more potent than any international legal document. It
Cyprus Sniffs At Neutrality," The Economist, 
September 17, I960, p. 1102.
^^"Neutral Between Neutral," The Economist. Sept. 
10, i960, p. 1096. It was from Cyprus that the Suez cam­
paign was launched against Egypt in 1956.
17
See Footnote #l4.
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should not be forgotten that a similar moral force in 
1959 contributed in part to Britain's retreat from under 
the legal umbrella of the Lausanne Treaty^ so as to pave 
the way for the independence of Cyprus. Thus, moral argu­
ment has already rendered a legal instrument obsolete in 
Cyprus and the occasion could quite possibly arise once 
again in the matter of the British base treaty.
In most respects, the sovereign base areas agree­
ment with the Republic of Cyprus presents a model arrange­
ment for the United Kingdom. Hypothetically, there are 
more than enough legal safeguards included in the Treaties 
of Establishment and Guarantee to protect the bases for as 
long as the British would chose to remain. Principally, 
the continuation of the British bases in Cyprus will require 
more goodwill than adherence to legality. One analyst 
summed up the future of the bases in this manner:
the success of the arrangement made for the bases 
will mainly depend upon political stability in the 
Island and continuing cooperation between the Bri­
tish and Republican authorities.^®
This statement will doubtless prove most accurate in the
next few years to come, but an important factor has been
excluded from the above prediction. Political stability in
any country rests on the spirit of the people, and the spirit
of the people more often than not reflects the spirit of the
18
Nancy Crawshaw, "The Republic of Cyprus; From 
the Zurich Agreements to Independence," The World Today. 
December, I960, p. 539-
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times, the Zeitgeist. If the Zeitgeist should one day deem 
that foreign military bases are no longer valid and useful, 
it would be most difficult to perpetuate even the most per­
fect of base agreements. Still and all, unless the tenor 
of international relations changes radically in the next 
decade or so, Britain should continue to enjoy unchallenged 
rights and privileges in her sovereign slices of the Repub­
lic of Cyprus.
Possible Application of the Cyprus Prototype:
The Case of Okinawa
Possibly none of the remaining British dependen­
cies, with perhaps the exception of Malta or Zanzibar, em­
bodies more of the peculiar conditions that surrounded the 
Cyprus problem than does a goup of Pacific islands under the 
provisional administration of the United States. Reference 
is made here to the Ryukyu Archipelago, which is a group of 
64 small islands that stretch curvilinearly southwest for 
almost 400 miles between Japan and Taiwan. The largest 
in the group in the 65-mile long island of Okinawa, which 
accounts for over half of all the land area of the archi­
pelago and one-fourth of the 882,000 total population. The 
main island has been termed among other appellations recently 
"Keystone of the Pacific," "America's Last Colony" end the
19"Cyprus of the Pacific." In actuality, the islands are 
—
John Barr, "The Ryukyu Islands: AU. S. Bastion
in the Pacific," The World Today. May, 1961, p. 18?.
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not a United States's colony, nor are they insular posses­
sions in the usual sense, nor are they considered a trust 
territory, under the United Nations. Rather, the United 
States has been given complete administrative and govern­
mental control of the Ryukyus by virtue of the terms of 
Article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. Occupa­
tion of the islands has been in effect since the end of
World War II, but all the time Japan was exercising, what
20John Foster Dulles later terms, "residual sovereignty."
The Ryukyu Islands are now controlled by the
United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
(USCAR), under the terms of an executive order, issued by
21President Eisenhower in 1957* The authority granted to 
the United States in the Treaty of Peace with Japan con­
tinues to be exercised by the Secretary of Defense, in turn 
delegated to the Department of the Army and finally control 
of the President. The chief U. S. official in the islands 
is a high commissioner who is ultimately appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense after consultations with the Secretary 
of State. The commissioner serves as the direct represen­
tative of the U. S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).^^ 
—   ^  ^  ^  ^ —
Ibid..The concept of "residual sovereignty" was 
defined by Dulles to mean that the U. S. holds the islands 
for strategic reasons, but has a view to their eventual 
return to Japan.
21Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu 
Islands, Executive Order No. 10713, June 5, 1957»
22This ranking of Cabinet members might indicate 
the esteem in which the islands are held by the United
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The other U. S. government agencies on Okinawa and the
23powers they exercise may be summed up as follows:
The Department of Defenses
Along with control of the local administration, 
legislation and jurisdiction over the islands by 
the Secretary of Defense, the Army, Navy, Air Fore®, 
and Marine Corps all conduct military and related 
operations in the Ryukyus,
The Department of States
A consular Unit (attached to the Embassy in Tokyo) 
supplies consular services to military and other 
personnel stationed in the islands. Also a Foreign 
Service Officer acts as Political Advisor to the 
High Commissioner. Responsibility for conducting 
the Ryukyu Islands' relations with foreign countries 
and international organizations is that of the Secre­
tary of State directly. An aspect of this respon­
sibility is the control of the Voice of America 
station in the islands which is operated by the 
United States Information Agency.
The United States Coast Guard (under the Treasury 
Department) A long range navigation (LORAN) station- 
is maintained in the Ryukyus.
Central Intelligence Agency
Among other responsibilities, the C. I. A. monitors 
radio broadcasts for inclusion in the daily Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service series.
The following agencies have limited interests in the 
Ryukyus within their own spheres, but do not normally 
keep permanent representatives there: The Department
of Justice deals with legal matters involving United 
States citizens in the area.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration has control over 
air space. The Department of the Treasury has control 
of the use or shipment of narcotics in the area.
States, i.e., military considerations come first while 
diplomatic deliberations come second.
2^
''Condensed from a personal communication from 
Paul Blackburn, Analyst in U. S. Foreign Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D. C ., February 7* 1962.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of 
the Budget, and the Civil Servie® Commission also 
have periodic interests in the Ryukyu Islands.
A sizeable amount of self-government is now exer­
cised by the Ryukyuanm in their local affairs compared to 
what the islanders had enjoyed under their previous over­
lords, the Japanese. The Eisenhower Executive Order of 
1957 added to the number of democratic institutions in the 
islands and these now include: universal suffrage, an
elected 29-member biennial legislature, a bill of rights,
24cind a system of local courts. Possibly the best term to
use in describing the local form of Government in the
Ryukyu Islands would be "quasi-parlieunentary" or a modi-
25fied parliamentary system. The plenary powers are 
entrused to the American appointed high commissioner, who 
then appoints the Ryukyuan chief executive from the party 
which had obtained a majority in the Legislature. This
24"Cyprus in the Pacific," The Economist, Feb. 8, 
1958, p. 499. A bit of wry British humor was used in des­
cribing the selection process in Okinawa; "As every race 
and color waited in line to cast their votes, some Negro 
soldiers from Alabama stood watching them enviously."
25Harold Seidman, Assistant Chief, Office of Man­
agement and Organization, United States Bureau of the Budget, 
was instrumental in setting up the form of government now 
being implemented in the Ryukyus. In his paper, "Our Terri­
torial Dilemma," which was published in the Congressional 
Record, February’ 4, 196O, Dr. Seidman used both of these 
terms in his description of the present governmental struc­
ture in theRÿukyus, which in his words, "plants the first 
seed of a parliamentary system."
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"Majority Party System" agreement was made with the high 
commissioner and representatives of the two leading poli­
tical parties on June l4, I960, in an effort to assuage the 
sentiment for the popular election of the Chief Executive.
Under the system, the territorial chief executive 
is to be politically responsible to the Legislature, in 
respect to all matters other than those directly affecting 
American interests. Theoretically, the number of American 
matters, other than those dealing intimately with military 
strategy, would decrease as the Ryukyuan leaders increase 
their sophistication in the governmental process. Such a 
modified parliamentary system "would have the flexibility 
to permit the evolutionary growth of responsible self- 
government without breaking essential Federal /U. S_j_/ ties."^^ 
At the present political and cultural juncture in the Ryuk­
yus , self-government is still a long-range goal, but that 
does not obviate planning for the day when that eventuality 
might have to be faced. The immediate concern of the Uni­
ted States in the Ryukyus is how strategic interests can be 
protected. The future concern is whether these strategic 
interests can ever be separated from domestic interests, if 
and when self-determination is applied in the Ryukyus.
2 6The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands,
Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, 1 April I960, 
to 30 September I960, Vol VIII, No. 2, (RCS CSCAMG-5), 
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C ., I960, p. 3.
27
Seidman, op. cit.
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The Contemporary Okinawan Question 
With the extensive measure of self-government 
and. home-rule existing in the Ryukyu Islands, one might 
be lulled into thinking that the islanders are contentedly 
waiting under the aegis of the United States for the day 
when they will either be returned to Japan or made indepen­
dent. This is not, however, the present situation in the
Ryukyus. There is a good of discontent facing the American
28administrators because of six major problem areas. The 
first of these is the excessive commandeering of scarce 
arable land for military purposes. The second is the penal 
code, which "smacks of martial law" and tends to deny 
Ryukyuans their basic procedural rights. The third area is 
that of over-population and the lack of an adequate emi­
gration program. The fourth area concerns the inability 
of the populace to elect their chief executive. The fifth 
area centers on the opposition to the building of nuclear 
missile sites on the island. And the last, and most demand­
ing, problem area is the extant movement to revert the
Ryukyus immediately back to Japan, "regarded as the islands'
29spiritual and cultural fatherland." In these areas
there have been few significant advances made with the help
28
Barr, op. cit.. pp. 188-89.
29
"We Have Colonial Troubles Too," The Christian 
Century, July 4, 1956, p. 795-
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of the United States; but when any sort of progress is 
made toward resolution, there invariably seems to be one
30of the numerous Ryukyuan Communists on hand to take credit. 
Thus, the problem of Communism in the islands is another 
potential problem area, though it now seems to be effec­
tively controlled.
It is readily apparent where the similarities 
exist between the cases of Okinawa--th® principal island 
of the Ryukyus--and Cyprus. Both are islands, both are 
strategic bases in the West's defense system, pre-indepen­
dence and election discord in Cyprus is partially analo­
gous to turmoil in the Ryukyus today; and lastly there is 
the mutual problem of the majority of the populace seeking 
union with another than the one last administering it.
The differences are equally obvious. There has not existed
a long-period of enmity between the Ryukyuans and the Ameri-
31cans, as was the case in Cyprus. Another chief differ­
ence in the two situations is the fact that in Okinawa
there is no effective opposition to the majority's drive 
—   ^ —
Editorial, The Christian Century. March 20,
1957, p. 349.
31
It has been alleged, however, that the Americans 
have seemingly made a collective effort to cause as much 
ill-will in the Ryukyus in as short a period of time as 
possible. But this has been said of many of the occupation 
forces of the United States, both in Europe as well as 
Asia. "Why Discriminate Against Okinawa," Christian 
Century. July 25, 1956, p. 868.
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toward union with Japan; the seven leading political par­
ties all included a pleink for the reunification with Japan
. 32
in the I960 election platforms.
A further distinction is the standard of living 
and level of governmental accomplishment thus far attained 
in Cyprus and the Ryukyus. Cyprus had profited by the 
eighty years of Great Britain's "white man's burden" and 
there were developed sufficient administrative personnel 
able to take over the reins of government when independence 
was finally granted. On the other hand, in the Ryukyus, 
as a Japanese prefecture, there was rank discrimination
33
and actually little local rule by the indigenous population.
In Cyprus the standard of living was relatively high under 
the British— certainly far higher than that of the Greeks, 
with whom the majority of the Cypriots wanted enosis. In 
Okinawa, the people are indigent and, with the possible 
exception of a few entrepreneurs, still primitively try to 
scratch out an existence in the thin farming soil between 
the islands' rocky surfaces. The Ryukyuans now logically 
seek union with one of the richest and most materialistic, 
modern nations in the Far East.
32
This concept of fully compatible with the Com­
munists's objective for the Ryukyus, i.e., to force U. S. 
withdrawal'.
33
The Japanese could never visualize self-govern­
ment for Ryukyu Islands then or at any time in the foresee­
able future. Personal communication with Harold Seidman, 
Washington, D. C ., February 8, 1962.
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Despite the fact that there is no long history 
of hatred between the Ryukyuans and the Americans, there is 
still a degree of animosity in evidence. Since the majority 
of the islanders desire union with Japan, the American 
occupation forces loom as the primary obstacle to this.
As a result, the Americans are the target of opportunistic 
local politicians and any good which has thus far been 
accomplished under the occupation is often submerged in 
the way of trumped-up anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, 
the United States had indicated conditionally that "rever­
sion" to Japan is plausible, but conveniently, and under-
3kstandably, no date has ever been set for this event.
Thus, there are deeper causes for the strained American-
Ryukyuan relations and heading this list is the wanton
seizure of Okinawan land by the United States, "under the
35guise of needing it for one military reason or another."
Most of the area taken by the U. S. authorities is arable 
farming land, but what makes the situation more intense is 
the manner in which this land is appropriated. The military 
authorities insist on buying the land under eminent domain 
3kThe United States has pledged its withdrawal 
when conditions of "threat and tension" no longer exist 
in east Asia. See: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy. Study No.
5, U. S. Foreign Policy in Asia, by Conlon Associates,
Ltd., Vol. I, 86th Congress 2d sess., September, I960, p.
500.
p. 194.
35
"The Hot Seat," The Economist, January 1, 1958,
2hQ
proceedings, while the Okinawans would prefer to own it 
and have rental paid on it.^^ In an effort to mitigate 
the situation a congressional committee was created in 
1956 to investigate the matter of military land in the 
Ryukyus, Under the chairmanship of Congreasmen Charles 
M. Price, (d. Illinois), hearings were held in the islands, 
at which time pleas were made for the Congress to recon­
sider the U. S. land policies. The committee's recommen­
dations to Congress, however, included non© of the sugges­
tions, offered by the Ryukyuan delegation, to improve the 
state of affairs. Instead, the Committee felt the U. S. 
military forces needed 12,000 more acr©s--which would give 
the necessary area for a new golf course-— and the payments
would be given in a lump sum rather than spread over a
37number of years.
The unpopular land policies of the United States 
in the Ryukyus are but a part of the overall picture of 
economic development, with which American authorities must 
concern themselves as long as the islands are occupied.
Since the investigations of the Price Committee, lump sum 
payments for land has been abandoned and the Congress passed, 
in i960, a bill which set a $6 million fiscal year limitation 
on the funds to be spend for economic and social development
"Why Discriminate Against Okinawa?" op. cit.,
p. 869.
37Ibid.
2kl
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in the islands. The American military involvement in
the Ryukyus, as in Hawaii, provides the largest source of
39income for the islands. Thus, any change in U. S. mili­
tary policy would have a resounding effect in the economic 
sector of the islands. Prior to the current fiscal changes 
instituted for the Ryukyus, the American administration of 
the islands has followed the initiative of the local demo­
cratic legislature, which has tended to place the Americans 
in a secondary role in economic affairs. The subsequently 
poor economic growth, invariably compared by Ryukyuans to 
that of Japan, was rationalised by past American military 
officials just to be one of the meuay vicissitudes to be 
encountered in a fledgling democracy. But this has made 
even the most conservative Ryukyuan official feel that 
"the United States has assumed the responsibility for govem- 
ing their people but not for taking adequate care of them." 
Since the American military commitment in the Ryukyas appears 
to be that of a permanent nature, the economic progress of 
the islEinds must be part of the long-range policy toward 
the islands. As one observer stated it:
qO
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, The Par East and the Middle East, Report of Sen. 
John Sparkman, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., November 30, I960, p.
11. In 1958, the funds available to the High Commissioner 
for economic assistance were only $750,000. Ibid.
^^ Ibid.
Ilq
Ibid.. p. 10.
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We /the United Stat®_s/ cannot afford to pretend 
that we are relatively unconcerned with the 
Okinawan economy when in fact we are the power 
ultimately responsible for that island and its 
people. Funds would give us both, the raeans and 
right to exert greater influence.
It might not be quite fair to say that the United States 
is able to buy its way wherever it may choose, but peace 
and harmony in thé Ryuk^nis are certainly variables depen­
dent to a large extent on the economic well-being in the 
islands. And the economic well-being of the Ryukyus is 
indeed an epiphenomenon of how many, and in what way, dollars 
are spent in the islands.
In view of all the interacting forces, there are 
possibly only two broad policy alternatives open to the 
United States in Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. The first 
is the obvious one of perpetuation the existing arrangement 
in the face of any and all opposition, i.e., to keep the 
unilateral American control over the islands and not to 
discuss reversion with Japan. Or the second alternative 
would be to plan for the gradual takeover of the island by 
Japan and, consequently, decide on the best means to pro­
tect American strategic interests, both during and after 
the process. The first policy alternative would be the less 
complicated. As the status quo in the Ryukyus has been des­
cribed, it offers the United States "maximum military flexi­
bility and convenience, together with less complexity of 
4lU. S. Foreign Policy in Asia, op. cit., p. 505-
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h o
administration." Yet this attitude would apparently over­
look the growing discontent which the present American 
administration generates. The second alternative, there- 
fore, looms as the more realistic of the two and the United 
States should now prepare for the day of reckoning when the 
indigenous clamorings for "reversion" can no longer be 
contained— -a condition which the British too long denied 
in Cyprus, resulting in their being forced to negotiate 
from a defensive position when the time finally came for 
the Cypriots to act.
Isolated incidents in the last few years have 
emphasized the need for the Americans to make long-range 
plans for the Ryukyus. Local politicians have magnified 
the importance of certain events in order to marshal pub­
lic opinion against the American administration of the 
islands. For example, the building of U. S. nuclear sites 
in Okinawa, as well as the public pronouncement that pro­
grams are being designed for even more "sophisticated types
43
of military hardware," have provoked fear and suspicion 
in the minds of the natives. The leading newspaper in 
the islands, the Okinawa Times, has carried stories of how 
the Russians have promised to retaliate in kind on those 
bases from which nuclear attacks are launched. Mass pro­
tests have done little to alter the -freehand the United
42Ibid., p. 502.
43
Report of Senator John Sparkman, op. cit., p. 12.
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States has enjoyed in Okinawa, but American authorities are
far from oblivious to the psychological concomitants of
locating nuclear bases. The nuclear issue was dramatically
demonstrated in June of 1959 when a U. S. jet plane crashed
into an Okinawan village and killed or injured almost 150
natives. Had the plan been carrying nuclear armaments, so
claimed the critics of the Americans, there would have been
untold damage done to the island. The American military
authorities, realizing the public furor over this accident,
were quick to pay some 278 liability claims sind send plastic
44surgeons to Okinawa to perform necessary operations.
Unfortunately, the humanitarian and generous gest®e given
the Okinawans could not be appreciated for anything more
than what it to them, viz. one more manifestation of why
the Americans must leave euid islands then returned to Japan.
The lesson the Americans should have learned by
now in the Ryukyus is exactly the same one the British had
so much difficulty perceiving in Cyprus; simply, that
local patriotism cannot be forever suppressed solely in
the name of international strategic responsibility. Or
as it was put by a British journalist in Okinawa; "The
Americans can't damp down the fire of aggrieved nationalism
45by just sitting on it." It would be far better in such
^^Barr, op. cit., p. 192.
45
^"The Hot Seat," loc. cit.
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disputes for each adversary to understand first the basic 
justice of each other's position and then try to assess 
their own individual demands honestly. It is hoped by this 
method, an accommodation can be reached through common sense 
before less desirable alternatives emerge after a senseless 
period of bloodshed. The Sxicish did not utilize such 
means in the case of Cyprus and the four years of emergency 
is looked upon in retrospect with much sorrow and chagrin. 
The Americans in the Ryukyus still have the opportunity to 
bargain with the natives in good faith over the future 
disposition of the islands. There have not been any per­
iods of violence and most of the Ryukyuans have visibly 
profited by the American occupation— the so-called "Golden 
Era." The United States, however, cannot rest on the mere 
fact that they have brought somewhat of a higher standard 
of living to the people of a once obscure archipelago in 
the South Pacific Ocean. The British learned that the 
material glitter they brought to Cyprus was no substitute 
for enosis. or at least freedom from colonial rule. And 
the Americans in Okinawa, and the rest of the Ryukyus, 
should also realize the establishment of a university or 
the introduction of soft drinks have not replaced the 
Ryukyuans dream of union with Japan. The matter of "rever­
sion" must be met with candor, and the sooner it is done,
!
the better it will be for American interests in the islands.
246
as well as in Southeast Asia generally.
The Value of the Cyprus Prototype to Future 
American Policy in the Ryukyu Islands
If one were more concerned with appeasing nation­
alistic demands and less with military strategy, the solution 
for the Ryukyuan problem would be to return them as soon as 
possible to Japan and then hope for extracting some sort of 
guarantee from Japan for the retention of the American mili­
tary bases. The hard military strategist, however, would 
first maintain the security of the American bases and then 
gradually work toward step-by-step reversion of the Ryukyus 
to Japan. It should be emphasized that the present stag© 
of development in the Ryukyus, self-government certainly 
must be looked upon as a goal rather than an immediate pos­
sibility. The policy of the United States Civil Administra­
tion of the Ryukyu Islands (u SCAR) is now to encourage 
greater responsibility in local affairs as well as to 
invite certain non-political endeavors on the part of 
Japan, i.e., technical assistance, private investment, and 
education. This would serve the combined goal of increasing 
Ryukyuan governmental sophistication along with promoting 
the natural ties the Ryukyuans share with Japan, which the 
U. S, has already acknowledged under the residual sovereignty 
concept. In this manner, American policy in the Ryukyu can 
be both progressive and flexible, with minimal concessions 
being made at the most propitious time. This sort of spaced
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negotiations would ultimately be more effective than attempt­
ing to handle all the multifarious Ryukyuan self-government 
problems at a later, more critical date.
The gradualist's approach to reconciling the 
Ryukyuam dilemma would concentrate first on the domestic 
aspects and would not immediately touch upon American strat­
egy in the Pacific area. The military bases are now, and 
will continue to be, "of central importance to the West's
46global defense structure." This military area as Siich 
cannot bé negotiated upon as freely as the domestic insti­
tutions, since the islands are considered such essential 
elements to our military commitments in Asia, e.g., Okina­
wa's Kadena Air Force Base has two runways that are longer
than any other available to U. S. military aircraft in that
4?part of the world. Nevertheless, the United States should 
look toward a forward strategy for the Ryukyu Islands, when 
changing needs of modern warfare might minimize the value 
of a massive Asian military installation. Foreign bases 
implicity require domestic considerations, yet in the pre­
sent cold war the military requirements must necessarily 
take precedence. If the bases in the Ryukyus were nothing 
more than staging areas for low-level contingency (limited
war) operations, then one might conceivably be able to 
 ------------------------------------------------------
Robert Strausz-HupS, Alvin J. Cottrell, and 
James E. Dougherty, American-Asian Tensions, New York: 
Praeger, 1956, p. 113-
47
Report of Senator Sparkman, op. cit., p. 10.
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separate military from domestic factors. Also if geo­
graphic location of the bases were remote and logistic 
and/or deployment problems were not inextricably connected 
with indigenous governmental affairs, then a solution such 
as that in Cyprus could be plausible for the Ryukyus. 
However, the Cyprus prototype has its best application where 
bases are not so enmeshed with local functioning and this 
does not appear to be the case for the United States in 
the Ryukyus. As early as 1954, one analyst could see no 
possible way to divorce political or legal considerations 
from the military strategy in Okinawa:
If the geography of Okinawa were like that of Japan 
proper, joint control of this Important base might 
be feasible. In reality, however, the entire south­
ern third of Okinawa is a vast network of American 
military installations interwined with Okinawan 
economy and vitally affecting every aspect of Okin­
awa's life. To cut through this maze of relationships 
and isolate those elements which are essentially mili­
tary and those which are civilian would be exceedingly
difficult.
It has almost become axiomatic today that where a base 
territory is geared to a massive modern military environ­
ment, and not merely to considerations of contingency prob­
lems, then ideal solutions to colonial enigmas may not 
entirely be applicable.
Regardless of the fact that the Cyprus prototype 
is of little immediate use to the United States in the 
48Ralph Bribanti, "The Ryukyu Isleuids; Pawn of 
the Pacific," The American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 
December, 1954, p. 973*
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Ryukyug, it would nonetheless he advantageous for the 
American officials involved with Far Eastern affairs to 
be familiar with the experience of the British in Cyprus.
The problem in the Ryukyus is more complex than simply 
American base rights versus native nationalism, as it was 
with the British in Cyprus. Still the pattern of prelim­
inary historic events is so strikingly similar in both 
cases, that one could be led to believe that the same 
forces were at work in both examples— it would, however, 
be much too convenient to say that this same force was 
international communism, for instance. The United States 
has been guilty of trying to introduce a noble purpose in 
the Ryukyus, while still attempting to protect national 
self-interest, i.e., to prove democracy can work in 
Ryukyan internal politics, yet simultaneously to make a 
Far Eadbbastion out of the same area. One mistake might 
have been trying to perpetuate democratic methods under 
a military government, as the two tend to be mutually con­
tradictory concepts.
The Cyprus prototype, i.e., securing the mini­
mum size of sovereign base areas, while granting the remain­
der of the territory independence, might one day have a use 
in ending the American occupation of the Ryukyus. Interna­
tional factors, which cause the Ryukyus to be so profoundly 
a part of the United States' nuclear strategy, prevent this
2^0
day from coming in the near future. Moreover, the entire 
islands' economy and politics are so commingled with the 
American occupation that any sudden withdrawal would prob­
ably cause such a disarticulation that the result would be 
disastrous for orderly governmental and economic develop­
ment. If one day a Cyprus-type solution could be effected 
in the Ryukyus, with American strategic requirements pro­
tected while the islands are administered by Japan, a 
heavy burden could be taken off the U. S. military arm, 
and maybe even the U. S. Treasury as well. The United 
States does not fit the role of "colonists" and it would 
be a grave insult to the innate American political genius 
if a way could not be uncovered soon that would rid the 
United States of the stigma, which is now suffered because 
of the present Ryukyan position. It is now a necessity 
that the United States reassess its policy toward the 
Ryukyu Islands, but in so doing, a delicate balance must 
be struck between strategic requirements and the matters 
of justice, humanity, and morality. The Cyprus prototype 
is not the panacea, it is but an admonition and a lesson 
from recent history. At some point in the near future, 
the United States may no longer astutely circumvent the 
"reversion" issue and an agreement will have to be made 
about the retention of the American bases. Even then it 
is doubtful if the Japanese would, indeed could, accept
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any type of conditional American sovereignty in the Ryuk­
yuan base areas.
Conclusions
The Cyprus settlement is a prime example of how 
even the most bitter territorial disputes can be resolved. 
Mature Western minds should not find it difficult to com­
promise territorial differences, especially when the fate 
of the free world is the dependent variable. In any inter­
nal conflict between allies against the Soviet system, the 
only party to profit is inevitably the communists. A 
schism in NATO was caused because of Cyprus and further 
situations should not be allowed to develop, if the North 
Atlantic Alliance is to remain intact. Diplomats have 
learned from the Cyprus settlement and other recent cases 
that they can ply their ageless trade in present day terri­
torial conflicts, which almost without exception pits the 
aspirations of colonial peoples against the economic and 
strategic requirements of the mother-country. The negotia­
tions behind "the agreed solution to the problem of Cyprus" 
proved that an air of goodwill can still characterize dip­
lomatic parleys. Thô most deep-rooted enmities can. be 
forgotten if both sides can recognize a common need to 
solve a problem which jointly threatens both if left unset­
tled. The case of Cyprus was just that sort of problem and
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its outcome must have brought hope to many colonial areas 
in search of a super-ordinate goal, beneficial to all con­
cerned.
By virtue of the Cyprus settlement, Britain main­
tained her security needs in the island, yet lost the unpopu­
lar label of "colonist." Akrotiri and Dhekelia are analogs 
in Cyprus of what Gibraltar is in Spain, but the crucial 
difference is that Gibraltar is still a colony. The rights 
Great Britain enjoys in the two sovereign base areas are 
all-inclusive, which means the advantages of a colony are 
derived without having to sustain the burdens. Other 
"Gibralters" exist in the Mediterraneem area: Frsince has
one in Bizerte, Tunisia and emother in Mers El Kebir, Algeria; 
Spain has two in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla; and Britain con­
trols Malta. Stiff the distinction between Britain's bases 
in Cyprus and the other "Gibralters" is that the ones in 
Cyprus are sovereign, whereas the others are maintained 
purely on a lease arrangement, or as in the case of Malta 
and Gibraltar are still formal colonies.
Britain and Prance may soon have to face other 
Cyprus-like situations in their Mediterranean possessions.
In Malta, the inability to separate military and domestic 
requirements there made the operation of complex dyarchical 
government impossible. Also indigenous pressures in Spain 
has pushed the Franco government toward a reappraisal of
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the archaic situation in Gibraltar. Many extremists 
openly declare, "Gibraltar es para Espana," (Gibraltar is 
for Spain), but a Cyprus-type accord might be the best 
Spain could hope to achieve. Demonstrations in Bizerte 
have recently shown the French will be forced to re-nego- 
tiate base rights there. Still the Mediterranean is not 
all chaos. The successful arrangements the United States 
has already demonstrated with its bases in Libya, Greece, 
Turkey, and Spain prove to all the nations of the world 
that international security considerations may be met,
while the sovereignty or freedom of the host nations are
49
left unimpaired. Other bases in the Mediterranean 
might well be re-established on the model given by the 
United States there, but in those particular places, where 
applicable, the ideal solution would probably be the Cyprus 
prototype.
The approach the British took in the final set­
tlement of the Cyprus base problem has a definite applica­
tion to other international puzzles concerning the clashes 
between strategic interests on the one side and self-deter­
mination on the other. Other aspects of the Cyprus solution, 
however, are so closely related to the peculiar circumstances 
in the island that they could well prove to have no adapta­
bility elsewhere. The chief lesson in the entire Cyprus 
_
It should never be forgotten that emerging 
nations jealously regard their unencumbered sovereignty above
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story is simply that no colonial problems, or those related, 
are so complex that they defy settlement. If the four con­
flicting elements in the Cyprus conflict, the United King­
dom, Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriots, could ostensibly be 
mollified by the final compromise, then it is reasonable to 
claim that other colonial tensions, which involve fewer 
actors, would even have a better chance for resolution.
The unique exemple of Cyprus has shown to the few 
remaining colonial powers that ways and means can be devised 
to compose settlements of most any conflict situation. The 
British will do well to take heed of their own lead in Cyp­
rus and apply similar settlements in other colonial areas 
under the aegis of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Cyprus 
prototype should be an inspiration and even guidepost for 
some of the other nations presently engaged in brutal col­
onial impasses, i.e., the French in Algeria, as well as to 
some of the nations who are faced with potential upheavals, 
i.e., the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. The proto­
type, above all, should show that goodwill, empathy, and 
diplomacy are often the missing catalysts in the attempts 
to solve territorial disputes. With these elements, the 
prologue of the past, and the sincere desire on the parts 
of the involved parties to conciliate nationalistic disputes, 
there might be few strategically located territories that
factors which might seem more consequential to other, more 
established countries.
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would ever demand force and violence in the effort to 
resolve differences.
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